An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets

Two important design elements for emission trading programs are whether and to what extent firms are able to bank emissions permits, and how these programs are to be enforced. In this paper we present results from laboratory emissions markets designed to investigate enforcement and compliance when these markets allow permit banking. Banking is motivated by a decrease in the aggregate permit supply in the middle of multi-period trading sessions. Consistent with theoretical insights, our experiments suggest that high permit violation penalties have little deterrence value in dynamic emissions markets, and that the main challenge of enforcing these programs is to motivate truthful self-reports of emissions.compliance, enforcement, emissions trading, laboratory experiments, permit markets, permit banking

Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory Investigation

This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted values when these values were predicted to be low. Thus, although a standard model of compliance with emissions trading programs tends to predict significantly higher violations than we observe when subjects have strong incentives to violate their emissions permits, individual emissions control responsibilities are distributed among firms as predicted.enforcement, compliance, emissions trading, permit markets, pollution, laboratory experiments

A comparison of the UK Standard Assessment Procedure and detailed simulation of solar energy systems for dwellings

The drive to reduce worldwide Carbon Emissions directly associated with dwellings and to achieve a zero carbon home dictates that Renewable Energy Technologies will have an increasingly large role in the built environment. Created by the Building Research Establishment (BRE), the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) is the UK Government's approved methodology for assessing the energy ratings of dwellings. This paper presents an evaluation of the advantage given to SAP ratings by the domestic installation of typical Photovoltaic (PV) and Solar Domestic Hot Water (SDHW) systems in the UK. Comparable PV and SDHW systems will also be simulated with more detailed modelling packages. Results suggest that calculation variances can exist between the SAP methodology and detailed simulation methods, especially for higher performance systems that deviate from the default efficiency parameters

The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger, and provide more of a public good, when their members are responsible for financing enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that member-financed enforcement of compliance reduces the provision of the public good. The decrease is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. Provision of the public good increases significantly when we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form.lab experiments

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly. Key Words: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods

The Politics of Manganese Nodules: International Considerations and Domestic Legislation

The legal regime governing the recovery of deep seabed minerals may be the most difficult issue now confronting the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Congressman Murphy discusses unilateral legislation, concluding that it would be fully consonant with prevailing international law and that it would act as a spur to the negotiations of the Conference. He analyzes the Deep Seabed Mining bill in the contexts of the international legal system and the Law of the Sea Conference and urges the United States to enact the bill so that exploration and commercial recovery may proceed

An ESL Oral Communication Lesson: One Teacher\u27s Techniques and Principles

This article presents a set of techniques and principles for teaching English as a second language (ESL) oral communication that is designed to prepare ESL students as successful participants in the introductory courses in communication. The discussion is divided into two major sections: a detailed description of an authentic classroom lesson and a concise listing of thirty techniques and principles derived from the lesson. It is widely acknowledged that ESL speakers sometimes experience debilitating degrees of anxiety/apprehension during oral communication lessons which may results in resistance to traditional methods of instruction. Aiming to address this concern, the article presents a way of minimizing ESL students\u27 anxiety/apprehension levels by highlighting the use of dyadic interactions. It illustrates a non-traditional classroom structure that encourages learners\u27 active participation

The Rhetorical Trick Trump Used on the ‘Squad’ and How it Could Affect the Vote

President Trump’s tweets calling on four Democratic congresswomen of color to “go back” to the “corrupt” countries they came from sparked the controversy he undoubtedly wanted, as did his subsequent attack on one, Representative Ilhan Omar, a Democrat from Minnesota.   The chant “Send her back,” a variation on the 2016 Trump supporters’ chant about Hillary Clinton, “Lock her up,” resounded through a recent political rally.   These slights reveal Trump’s fondness for a rhetorical device called synecdoche