The launch of the euro

The introduction on January 1, 1999, of the euro--the single currency adopted by eleven of the fifteen countries of the European Union--marked the beginning of the final stage of Economic and Monetary Union and the start of a new era in Europe. The creation of a single currency and a single monetary policy has provided both extraordinary challenges and exceptional opportunities within Europe. This article reviews the organization, objectives, and targets of the euro area's new central bank and discusses some of the early challenges it has faced in setting and implementing monetary policy with the new common currency. It discusses the initial functioning of the payment system and the interbank market and reviews the effects to date of the single currency on European bond and equity markets, on the banking system, and in euro-area transactions.Euro ; European Monetary System (Organization) ; European currency unit

On the probabilistic min spanning tree Problem

We study a probabilistic optimization model for min spanning tree, where any vertex vi of the input-graph G(V,E) has some presence probability pi in the final instance G′ ⊂ G that will effectively be optimized. Suppose that when this “real” instance G′ becomes known, a spanning tree T, called anticipatory or a priori spanning tree, has already been computed in G and one can run a quick algorithm (quicker than one that recomputes from scratch), called modification strategy, that modifies the anticipatory tree T in order to fit G ′. The goal is to compute an anticipatory spanning tree of G such that, its modification for any G ′ ⊆ G is optimal for G ′. This is what we call probabilistic min spanning tree problem. In this paper we study complexity and approximation of probabilistic min spanning tree in complete graphs under two distinct modification strategies leading to different complexity results for the problem. For the first of the strategies developed, we also study two natural subproblems of probabilistic min spanning tree, namely, the probabilistic metric min spanning tree and the probabilistic min spanning tree 1,2 that deal with metric complete graphs and complete graphs with edge-weights either 1, or 2, respectively

Beam spin asymmetry in deeply virtual π\pi production

An interpretation of the beam spin azimuthal asymmetries measured at JLAB in deep exclusive electroproduction of charged and neutral pions is presented. The model combines a Regge pole approach with the effect of nucleon resonances. The $s$- and $u$-channel contributions are described using a dual Bloom-Gilman connection between the exclusive form factors and inclusive deep inelastic structure functions. The results are in agreement with data provided the excitations of nucleon resonances are taken into account.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures. Talk at the 19th International Spin Physics Symposium (SPIN2010), Sept.27-Oct.2, 2010, Juelich, German

How criminalizing minor offenses can mean there is less of a deterrent for people to commit more serious crimes.

Those convicted of a crime are often punished twice; once via the legal system’s formal sanction, and again through the stigma of having a criminal record. Murat C. Mungan argues that the criminalization of many small offenses – such as drug possession – means that this stigma is becoming diluted for more serious criminal offenses. If a large percentage of the population is branded as criminals, he writes, this means that having a criminal record becomes less of marker of a person’s character, no matter if that crime is minor or severe

The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation

Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (1) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (2) murder and voluntary manslaughter, and (3) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders. This Article proposes a richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices and potentially behind many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory accounts not only for the deterrent effect of criminal punishment, but also for its incapacitative effect. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it acknowledges the fact that people have fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal tendencies. That is, it recognizes that some people who ordinarily would not consider committing a wrongful act can, in rare circumstances, lapse into committing a crime. Surprisingly, these two simple but critical concepts have never to my knowledge been jointly considered in an economic analysis of crime, even though their inclusion appears to be an obvious extension of the standard crime and deterrence model formalized almost half a century ago by Gary Becker. The threat of imprisonment deters crime, but even when deterrence fails and a crime is committed, imprisonment benefits society by preventing the criminal from committing further wrongs outside prison for the duration of the sentence. The more dangerous the criminal, the stronger the rationale for imprisonment because these incapacitative benefits exist only if the offender would commit more crimes if left at large. Since people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, however, the mere fact that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect information regarding his likelihood of recidivating. As such, the offender’s criminal history and the circumstances surrounding the crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to update our beliefs concerning the offender’s expected dangerousness— that is, to distinguish those who have made an uncharacteristic mistake from the dangerous and reckless criminals. Capturing the interaction between the incapacitation function of imprisonment and potential offenders’ fluctuating criminal tendencies allows the model to supply specific, consequentialist justifications for repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws, and the treatment of remorse in criminal law. Going forward, this more nuanced approach will provide a clearer lens through which to view other pervasive elements of criminal law, such as the mens rea requirement, and to revisit the normative prescriptions of the previous generation of economic analyses

Economics of the Independent Invention Defense under Incomplete Information

Patents lead to ex post deadweight loss arising from a noncompetitive market structure for the invention. Many have argued that introducing independent invention as a defense (IID) to patent infringement can increase social welfare by decreasing such deadweight loss at the price of a modest decrease in the number of inventions. This paper considers the effects of IID in a setting where R&D firms have incomplete information about their rivals. Four main results follow under incomplete information: (i) fewer things are invented under an IID regime; (ii) IID’s effects on welfare are ambiguous; (iii) IID is more likely to increase welfare if gains from competition in the product market are high; and (iv) determining precise conditions under which IID performs better than the current regime requires access to data that are extremely hard to find and quantify

Abandoned Criminal Attempts: An Economic Analysis

An attempt is \u27abandoned\u27 if the criminal, despite having a chance to continue with his criminal plan, forgoes the opportunity to do so. A regime that makes abandonment a defense to criminal attempts provides an incentive to the offender to withdraw from his criminal conduct prior to completing the previously intended offense. However, the same regime may induce offenders to initiate criminal plans more often by reducing the expected costs associated with such plans. The former effect is called the marginal deterrence effect and the latter is called the ex-ante deterrence effect of the abandonment defense. This Article formalizes a trade-off between marginal and ex-ante deterrence by using standard economic analysis. The analysis suggests, contrary to the principles encapsulated by existing legal regimes, that all abandoned attempts, voluntary and involuntary alike, ought to potentially be punished less severely than completed attempts. Furthermore, an abandonment need not be treated as either a full excuse or no defense at all; optimal punishment schemes require abandonments to be treated as mitigating factors in sentencing. The Article then identifies two important factors that ought to be taken into consideration while determining the magnitude of mitigation: the predictability of the events that led to the abandonment and the information regarding the offender’s dangerousness that is revealed through the abandonment. Finally, existing laws on abandonment are briefly reviewed. This review reveals that there is significant variation among states, and that there are cases where courts (i) excuse abandoning defendants even when the law does not provide an abandonment defense, and (ii) punish abandoning defendants even where a strict reading of the law would require the defendant to be excused. I conclude by suggesting that deviations from strict readings of the law can be minimized by moving more closely towards the optimal punishment schemes identified in this Article

Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought not to be Inflicted where the Penal Provision is not Properly Conveyed

Law enforcers frequently issue warnings, as opposed to sanctions, when they detect first-time offenders. However, virtually all of the law and economics literature dealing with optimal penalty schemes for repeat offenders suggest that issuing warnings is a sub-optimal practice. Another observed phenomenon is the joint use of warnings and sanctions in law enforcement: person A may receive a sanction, whereas person B is only warned for committing the same offense. This situation can be explained through the use of hybrid warning strategies, a concept not yet formalized in the law enforcement literature, where law enforcers issue warnings to x% sanctions to (100-x)% of first-time offenders. This article uses a two-period optimal deterrence model to provide a rationale as to why it may be optimal to issue warnings. When uninformed individuals are present and their punishment is assumed to be costly, there is a trade-off between such costs and reduced levels of deterrence. Depending on the cost structure associated with the punishment of uninformed individuals, warning strategies, including hybrid ones, may be optimal. A secondary contribution of this article is to point out that lack of information concerning laws may lead to optimal escalating punishments for repeat offenders