Entrepreneurship and Growth

In the year 2000 at a meeting in Lisbon, leaders of the European Union (EU) articulated a set of goals for the Union, which have come to be called the Lisbon Strategy or Lisbon Agenda. The agenda had three main goals: to promote growth through innovation, to create a learning economy, and to bring about social and environmental renewal. Exactly what the last goal implies is not clear, at least to me, but the intent and substance behind the first two certainly is. Research spending was to rise across the EU, university enrollments would rise with them, and a more friendly environment for innovation would be created as markets continued to be liberalized and integrated. The EU leaders meeting in Lisbon set the year 2010 as their goal for fulfilling this agenda. The year 2010 has come and gone. Today, growth rates in Europe are even lower than they were in 2000. Research and university budgets have been cut – sometimes drastically – across the EU. These developments are, of course, largely a response to the recent financial crisis and its impact on state finances. But the crisis would not have been nearly as severe as it has been, if EU countries had been well on their way to fulfilling the goals of the Lisbon Agenda when the crisis hit. The EU’s failure to come anywhere near meeting the goals set out in the year 2000 stems, I shall argue, to underlying structural factors and ideological perspectives, which constitute major obstacles to the kind of knowledge-based, innovative society that the EU leaders dreamed of in Lisbon more than a decade ago. This paper attempts to identify what these obstacles are.Entrepreneurship; Economic Growth; Human Capital; European Union

Rights and Citizenship in the European Union

This paper employs the methodology of “constitutional political economy” to examine the definition of citizenship, and the delineation of the rights that accompany citizenship. The concepts developed are then applied to the question of how rights and citizenship should be defined in the European Union. The answer to this question is shown to depend on whether the Union is organized as a federation or a confederation. The concepts developed are then used to critique the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and to question whether this Charter should be made a part of a new European Union constitution.

The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation

Considerable concern has been expressed in recent years about declines in voter participation rates in the United States and in several other major democratic countries. Some feel low participation rates introduce a “class bias” into the political process and thereby worsen the outcomes from it. Little empirical work exists, however, that measures the effects of lower participation on the welfare of a country. This paper begins to fill this void. It presents cross-national evidence that high levels of democratic participation are associated with more equal distributions of income. The paper’s results also imply, however, that this reduction in income inequality comes at a cost. High participation rates are related to larger government sectors which in turn lead to slower economic growth. We also present evidence of the “capture” of government by upper income groups in Latin and Central American countries.

Rights and Citizenship in the European Union

This paper employs the methodology of constitutional political economy to examine the definition of citizenship, and the delineation of the rights that accompany citizenship. The concepts developed are then applied to the question of how rights and citizenship should be defined in the European Union. The answer to this question is shown to depend on whether the Union is organized as a federation or a confederation. The concepts developed are then used to critique the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and to question whether this Charter should be made a part of a new European Union constitution

The Determinants of Merger Waves: An International Perspective

One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If "real" changes in the economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves. --Merger waves,listed versus non-listed firms,managerial discretion,overvaluation

The Determinants of Merger Waves

One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves, and that these waves are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We test four hypotheses that have been advanced to explain merger waves: the industry shocks, q-, overvaluation and managerial discretion hypotheses. The first two are neoclassical in that they assume that managers maximize profits, mergers create wealth, and the capital market is efficient. The last two, behavioral hypotheses relax these assumptions in different ways. We test the four hypotheses by estimating models of the amounts of assets acquired by firms, models that identify the characteristics of targets, and estimates of the returns to acquirers’ shareholders. Although some support is found for each of the four hypotheses, most of the evidence favors the two behavioral hypotheses. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Determinanten von Fusionswellen) Es ist eines der auffallendsten Merkmale von Unternehmenszusammen-schlüssen, dass sie in Wellen stattfinden und dass diese Wellen mit dem Anstieg der Aktienkurse und des Preis/ Ertragsverhältnisses zusammen hängen. Wir untersuchen vier Hypothesen, die als Erklärung von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen genannt werden: die der Industrieschocks, die q-Hypothese, die Hypothese der Überbewertung und die Hypothesen des Ermessensspielraums von Managern. Die ersten zwei sind neoklassischer Natur insofern als sie davon ausgehen, dass Manager Gewinne maximieren, Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse Reichtum schaffen und der Kapitalmarkt effizient ist. Die zwei letzteren sind Verhaltenshypothesen, die die neo-klassischen Annahmen (auf unterschiedliche Weise) lockern. Wir untersuchen die vier Hypothesen, indem wir Modellschätzungen der von Unternehmen akquirierten Aktien vornehmen. Dabei werden in den Modellen die Charakteristika der bei Zusammenschlüssen aufgekauften Unternehmen identifiziert und die Rendite für die Aktionäre des aufkaufenden Unternehmens geschätzt. Auch wenn alle vier Hypothesen in gewisser Hinsicht Bestätigung finden, untermauern die meisten Belege die zwei Verhaltenshypothesen.Mergers waves, managerial discretion, overvaluation

Corporate Governance, Capital MarketDiscipline and the Returns on Investment

We analyze the impact of corporate governance institutions, ownership structures andexternal capital market constraints on company returns on investment by using a sampleof more than 19,000 companies from 61 countries across the world. We show that (1) ofthese three sets of institutions, the origin of a country’s legal system proves to be themost important. Companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earn returnson investment that are at least as large as the cost of capital. (2) Differences ininvestment performance related to a country’s legal system dominate differences relatedto ownership structure. (3) Strong external capital markets improve the investmentperformance of companies. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Corporate Governance, Kapitalmarktdisziplinierung und die Renditen vonUnternehmensinvestitionen) Dieses Papier analysiert den Einfluss von Corporate Governance Institutionen, Eigentümerstrukturen und externen Kapitalmärkten auf die Renditen von Investitionen für ein Sample von mehr als 19.000 Unternehmen aus 61 Ländern weltweit. Wir zeigen, dass von diesen drei Institutionen (1) die Herkunft des Rechtssystems eines Landes der wichtigste Faktor ist. Unternehmen in Ländern mit Rechtssystemen englischer Herkunft verdienen Renditen, die die Kapitalkosten im Durchschnitt abdecken. (2) Unterschiede im Rechtssystem eines Landes dominieren Unterschiede in der Eigentümerstruktur. (3) Funktionierende externe Kapitalmärkte verbessern die Performance von Investitionen.Return on Investment, Ownership Structure, Coporate Governance, Capital Market

The Economic Effects of Democratic Participation

Considerable concern has been expressed in recent years about declines in voter participation rates in the United States and in several other major democratic countries. Some feel low participation rates introduce a class bias into the political process and thereby worsen the outcomes from it. Little empirical work exists, however, that measures the effects of lower participation on the welfare of a country. This paper begins to fill this void. It presents cross-national evidence that high levels of democratic participation are associated with more equal distributions of income. The paper's results also imply, however, that this reduction in income inequality comes at a cost. High participation rates are related to larger government sectors which in turn lead to slower economic growth. We also present evidence of the capture of government by upper income groups in Latin and Central American countries

The Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison

This paper analyzes the effects of mergers around the world over the past 15 years. We utilize a large panel of data on mergers to test several hypotheses about mergers. The effects of the mergers are examined by comparing the performance of the merging firms with control groups of nonmerging firms. The comparisons are made on profitability and sales. The results show that mergers on average do result in significant increases in profits, but reduce the sales of the merging firms. Interestingly, these post merger patterns look similar across countries. We also did not find dramatic differences between mergers in the manufacturing and the service sectors, and between domestic and cross-border mergers. Conglomerate mergers decrease sales more than horizontal mergers. By separating mergers into those that increase profits and those that reduce them and by then examining the patterns of sales changes following the mergers, we determine the effects of mergers on efficiency and market power. Our results suggest that those mergers that decrease profits and efficiency account for a large proportion. However, we can also identify mergers that increase profits by either increasing market power or by increasing efficiency. The first conclusion seems to be a more likely explanation for large companies, whereas the latter is likely to be true for small firms. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Die Effekte von Fusionen: Ein internationaler Vergleich) Dieser Artikel analysiert die Effekte von Fusionen, die weltweit über die letzten 15 Jahre stattgefunden haben. Wir vergleichen die Gewinn- und Umsatzentwicklung von fusionierenden Firmen mit der Entwicklung von nicht-fusionierenden Firmen. Die Resultate zeigen, dass Fusionen im Durchschnitt zu signifikant höheren Profiten führen, aber dass die Umsätze im Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe zurückbleiben. Interessanterweise sind diese Effekte bei Vergleichen zwischen den verschiedenen Ländern, bei einem Vergleich zwischen Industriesektor und Dienstleistungssektor bzw. zwischen nationalen und grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen ziemlich ähnlich. Konglomerate Fusionen reduzieren die Umsätze mehr als horizontale Fusionen. Um die Effekte der Fusionen auf die Marktmacht bzw. die Effizienz zu analysieren, teilen wir zuerst die Fusionen in gewinnsteigernde und gewinnreduzierende Fusionen, um dann die Umsatzentwicklung zu betrachten. Unsere Resultate zeigen, dass ein großer Prozentsatz der Fusionen die Gewinne und die Effizienz reduzieren. Wir können jedoch auch Fusionen identifizieren, die die Gewinne entweder durch Marktmacht- oder Effizienzsteigerungen erhöhen. Die erste Erklärung ist wahrscheinlicher für große Firmen, die zweite für kleine Firmen.Mergers, Acquisitions, International Comparison