The Second Demographic Transition Theory: A Review and Appraisal

References to the second demographic transition (SDT) concept/theoretical framework have increased dramatically in the last two decades. The SDT predicts unilinear change toward very low fertility and a diversity of union and family types. The primary driver of these changes is a powerful, inevitable and irreversible shift in attitudes and norms in the direction of greater individual freedom and self-actualization. First, we describe the origin of this framework and its evolution over time. Second, we review the empirical fit of the framework to major changes in demographic and family behavior in the U.S., the West, and beyond. As has been the case for other unilinear, developmental theories of demographic/family change, the SDT failed to predict many contemporary patterns of change/difference. Finally, we review previous critiques and identify fundamental weaknesses of this perspective, and provide brief comparisons to selected alternative approaches

Do Cross-National Differences in the Costs of Children Generate Cross-National Differences in Fertility Rates?

Parity-specific probabilities of having a next birth are estimated from national fertility data and are compared with nation-specific costs of having children as measured by time-budget data, by attitude data from the International Social Survey Program, and by panel data on labor earnings and standard of living changes following a birth. We focus on five countries (the US, West Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom), whose fertility rates span the observed fertility range in the contemporary industrialized world and whose social welfare and family policies span the conceptual space of standard welfare-state typologies. Definitive conclusions are difficult because of the multiple dimensions on which child costs can be measured, the possibility that child costs affect both the quantum and the tempo of fertility, the relatively small fertility differences across industrialized nations, and the inherent small-N problem resulting from nation-level comparisons. Empirical analysis, however, supports the assertion that institutionally driven child costs affect the fertility patterns of industrialized nations.

Do Cross-National Differences in the Costs of Children Generate Cross-National Differences in Fertility Rates?

Parity-specific probabilities of having a next birth are estimated from national fertility data and are compared with nation-specific costs of having children as measured by time-budget data, by attitude data from the International Social Survey Program, and by panel data on labor earnings and standard of living changes following a birth. We focus on five countries (the US, West Germany, Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom), whose fertility rates span the observed fertility range in the contemporary industrialized world and whose social welfare and family policies span the conceptual space of standard welfare-state typologies. Definitive conclusions are difficult because of the multiple dimensions on which child costs can be measured, the possibility that child costs affect both the quantum and the tempo of fertility, the relatively small fertility differences across industrialized nations, and the inherent small-N problem resulting from nation-level comparisons. Empirical analysis, however, supports the assertion that institutionally driven child costs affect the fertility patterns of industrialized nations

In the Pursuit of Sons: Additional Births or Sex-Selective Abortion in Pakistan?: In the Pursuit of Sons

Even though Pakistan is a highly patriarchal society, it has not featured prominently in studies focusing on sex-selective abortion and sex ratios at birth. But with fertility declining and existing strong son preference—Pakistan has one of the highest desired sex ratios in the world—how will Pakistani families respond? In the pursuit of sons, will they have additional children or resort to sex-selective abortions? Or is there evidence that the pursuit of sons is weakening? Using data from three rounds of the demographic and health survey, we show clear evidence of son preference in fertility intentions, patterns of contraceptive use and parity progression ratios. More specifically, we find pervasive evidence that Pakistanis continue childbearing to have a son, to have more than one son and to have at least one daughter. We do not find consistent and convincing evidence that sex ratios at birth (which indicate sex-selective abortion) are increasing

Low Fertility at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century

In the past few decades, demographic concerns have shifted from rapid population growth fueled by high fertility to concerns of population decline produced by very low, sub-replacement fertility levels. Once considered a problem unique to Europe or developed nations, concerns now center on the global spread of low fertility. Nearly half of the world's population now lives in countries with fertility at or below replacement levels. Further, by the mid-twenty-first century three of four countries now described as developing are projected to reach or slip below replacement fertility. We review the research on low fertility through the predominant frameworks and theories used to explain it. These explanations range from decomposition and proximate determinant frameworks to grand theories on the fundamental causes underlying the pervasiveness and spread of low fertility. We focus on the ability of theory to situate previous and future findings and conclude with directions for furthur research

A Cognitive-Social Model of Fertility Intentions

We examine the use and value of fertility intentions against the backdrop of theory and research in the cognitive and social sciences. First, we draw on recent brain and cognition research to contextualize fertility intentions within a broader set of conscious and unconscious mechanisms that contribute to mental function. Next, we integrate this research with social theory. Our conceptualizations suggest that people do not necessarily have fertility intentions; they form them only when prompted by specific situations. Intention formation draws on the current situation and on schemas of childbearing and parenthood learned through previous experience, imbued by affect, and organized by self-representation. Using this conceptualization, we review apparently discordant knowledge about the value of fertility intentions in predicting fertility. Our analysis extends and deepens existing explanations for the weak predictive validity of fertility intentions at the individual level and provides a social-cognitive explanation for why intentions predict as well as they do. When focusing on the predictive power of intentions at the aggregate level, our conceptualizations lead us to focus on how social structures frustrate or facilitate intentions and how the structural environment contributes to the formation of reported intentions in the first place. Our analysis suggests that existing measures of fertility intentions are useful but to varying extents and in many cases despite their failure to capture what they seek to measure

The Determinants of Low Fertility in India

Using a conceptual framework focusing on factors that enhance or reduce fertility relative to desired family size (see Bongaarts 2001), we study fertility variation across time (1992–2006) and space (states) in India. Our empirical analyses use data from three waves of the Indian National Family Health Surveys. We find that this framework can account for a substantial portion of the variation in the TFR across the states and over time. Our estimates focus attention on the critical components of contemporary Indian fertility, especially desired family size, unwanted fertility, son preference, and fertility postponement