A coalitional procedure leading to a family of bankruptcy rules

We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems inspired by the Talmud.bankruptcy, coalitions, claims, Talmud.

The effect of international trade on mark-ups distribution

This paper presents empirical evidence about the relationship between market openness and markup distribution of manufacturing firms. The empirical analysis uses a panel data set of Spanish firms in the period 1990-2005, with a structural approach that lets us to identify individual mark-ups. The results point out that tougher competition associated to openness reduces the average of marginal costs and prices, while it increases the average firm size. However, the evidence about the effect on average markups and the dispersion of performance variables is weaker. These results partially support the theoretical predictions by the recent literature on efficiency heterogeneity and international trade and, in particular, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).markups, marginal costs, size, openness

Markups, bargaining power and offshoring: an empirical assessment

This paper tests the pro-competitive effect of imports on product and labour markets for Spanish manufacturing firms in the period 1990-2005. In doing so, it takes into account the type of imported products: final vs intermediate. Markups are estimated following the procedure suggested by Roeger (1995) and including an efficient bargaining model. The observed heterogeneity among firms is parameterized to consider additional product standardization and market concentration. The results support the Imports as Market Discipline hypothesis for importers of final goods, while firms that offshore intermediate inputs show similar markups to non-importers. Additionally, the union bargaining power is smaller the more final-goods oriented imports are and the more homogeneous is the type of goods elaborated by firms.Markups, offshoring, bargaining power

Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece- wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups.voting, taxes, majority, single crossing, special interest politics

The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which agentsÕ claims may refer to different issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result

The Proportional Rule for Multi-Issue Bankruptcy Problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which agents' claims may refer to di erent issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result.

Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies

We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our model agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend, and the amount of a socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results.equality of opportunity, interdependent preferences, social policies, compensation, responsibility.

The proportional rule for multi-issue bankruptcy problems

We investigate how to extend bankruptcy rules to the more general setting in which claims may refer to different issues. We consider two natural procedures and show that, among all bankruptcy rules, the proportional rule is the only one whose extensions according to the two procedures yield the same outcomes.Multi-issue bankruptcy problems, proportional rule, characterization result.