Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods

This paper provides a characterization of the class of incentive compatible (i.e., strategy-proof) allocation mechanisms for decision problems associated with classical economic environments. It is shown that when at least one public good is provided, then only dictatorial allocation mechanisms are incentive compatible. Dictatorial mechanisms are very unsatisfactory, as any conflict of interest is always resolved in favor of a single individual (the dictator). This result reveals a basic incompatibility between incentive compatibility and any other desirable property (e.g., any kind of efficiency, fairness, etc.) of an allocation mechanism. In particular, incentive compatible allocation mechanisms typically produce inefficient outcomes

Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic

A fundamental problem in public finance is that of allocating a␣given budget to financing the provision of public goods (education, transportation, police, etc.). In this paper it is established that when␣admissible preferences are those representable by continuous and increasing utility functions, then strategy-proof allocation mechanisms whose (undominated) range contains three or more outcomes are dictatorial on the set of profiles of strictly increasing utility functions, a dense subset of the domain in the topologies commonly used in this context. If admissible utility functions are further restricted to be strictly increasing, or if mechanisms are required to be non-wasteful, then strategy-profness leads to (full) dictatorship.Publicad

Quantitative Analysis of the Italian National Scientific Qualification

The Italian National Scientific Qualification (ASN) was introduced in 2010 as part of a major reform of the national university system. Under the new regulation, the scientific qualification for a specific role (associate or full professor) and field of study is required to apply to a permanent professor position. The ASN is peculiar since it makes use of bibliometric indicators with associated thresholds as one of the parameters used to assess applicants. Overall, more than 59000 applications were submitted, and the results have been made publicly available for a short period of time, including the values of the quantitative indicators for each applicant. The availability of this wealth of information provides an opportunity to draw a fairly detailed picture of a nation-wide evaluation exercise, and to study the impact of the bibliometric indicators on the qualification results. In this paper we provide a first account of the Italian ASN from a quantitative point of view. We show that significant differences exist among scientific disciplines, in particular with respect to the fraction of qualified applicants, that can not be easily explained. Furthermore, we describe some issues related to the definition and use of the bibliometric indicators and thresholds. Our analysis aims at drawing attention to potential problems that should be addressed by decision-makers in future ASN rounds.Comment: ISSN 1751-157

The Bianchi variety

The totality Lie(V) of all Lie algebra structures on a vector space V over a field F is an algebraic variety over F on which the group GL(V) acts naturally. We give an explicit description of Lie(V) for dim V=3 which is based on the notion of compatibility of Lie algebra structures.Comment: 26 pages, 8 figures, to appear on Diff. Geom. App