God and the Argument from Consciousness: A Response to Lim

Recently, Daniel Lim has published a thoughtful critique of one form of my argument for the existence of God from consciousness (hereafter, AC).1 After stating his presentation of the relevant contours of my argument, I shall present the main components of his critique, followed by my response. Since one purpose of my publications of AC has been to foster discussion about a neglected argument for God’s existence, I am thankful to lim for his interesting article and the chance to further the discussion

Oppy on the Argument from Consciousness: A Rejoinder

Graham Oppy had criticized my argument for God from consciousness (AC) in my recent book ’Consciousness and the Existence of God’ (N.Y.: Routledge, 2008). In this article I offer a rejoinder to Oppy. Specifically, I respond to his criticisms of my presentation of three forms of AC, and interact with his claims about theism, consciousness and emergent chemical properties

The Pre-History of Subsidiarity in Leo XIII

(Excerpt) Part of the confusion over subsidiarity—but also, perhaps, an aspect of the principle’s richness—is its combination, then, of both “libertarian” and “communitarian” elements. Progress in our understanding and application of subsidiarity will require a careful assessment of these considerations and determining when intervention or assistance [subsidium] from a higher authority is needed and when devolution of responsibility is warranted. More precisely, we will need to determine when authority is properly located at a higher level and when authority is properly recognized in the smaller community. This conclusion, in turn, will require a discussion of subsidiarity’s political theoretical and “anthropological” dimensions, that is, its grounding in a conception of the person in society. Rather than as a principle only of economic efficiency or limited government, subsidiarity is best viewed as an aspect of Catholic social thought’s emphasis on the human person adequately understood. Subsidiarity, I aim to show, cannot be properly understood apart from an adequate appreciation of the Catholic theory of political authority, of the state, and of associational life

Comments on Steven Smith, Pagans and Christians in the City

(Excerpt) One of the most interesting aspects of this generally very interesting book was the discussion of sexual morality in paganism and Christianity. I have thought for a while that much of the contemporary debate about religious freedom is not about religious freedom in a generic sense but instead about religious freedom in a very particular context—sex. But that is a descriptive point—much more challenging is trying to give an account of why sex should have come to be (or as Smith’s argument implies, has long been) the battlefield on which much of the fight over religious freedom takes place. My offhand thought in these remarks is that our debates about religious freedom would benefit from a more sustained engagement with this seemingly odd feature of our late modern age—that the fragile consensus around religious toleration in modernity has started to come undone over sexuality—and the deeper reasons for it