Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the efficiency of the volunteering game.war of attrition, volunteering, discrete public goods, asymmetric information, information acquisition

Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the efficiency of the volunteering game. -- Die private Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter ähnelt häufig einem Zermürbungskrieg: Die Beteiligten warten, bis sich jemand anderes freiwillig meldet und das öffentliche Gut bereitstellt. Nach einer gewissen Zeitperiode des Wartens kann jedoch ein Beteiligter zufällig dazu bestimmt werden, die Bereitstellung zu übernehmen. Wenn die Beteiligten ihre Bereitstellungskosten nicht genau kennen, sich aber vor dem Bereitstellungsspiel Information über ihre Kosten beschaffen können, dann kommt dieser Information ein strategischer Wert zu; die Beteiligten könnten es vorziehen, ihre Bereitstellungskosten nicht genau zu kennen. Wenn der Zeithorizont des Bereitstellungsspiels hinreichend kurz ist, entscheidet sich im Gleichgewicht lediglich ein Beteiligter, Information zu akquirieren. Bei einem längeren Zeithorizont ist es eine strikt dominante Strategie, sich Information zu beschaffen. Der Zeithorizont stellt ein wichtiges Instrument zur Beeinflussung der Effizienz des Bereitstellungsspiels dar.War of attrition,volunteering,discrete public goods,asymmetric information,information acquisition

Strategic information acquisition and the mitigation of global warming

We consider the strategic role of uncertainty and information acquisition for the mitigation of global warming which is modeled using a standard framework for private provision of a public good. Prior to the voluntary contribution mechanism, we allow for investments in information about the country-specific benefit of reductions of the emissions of greenhouse gases. We show that information acquisition has a substantial strategic value in the following interaction. Countries may prefer not to learn their valuation of the public good even if information acquisition does not involve a direct cost. This strategic information choice may further decrease the efficiency of the public good provision. -- Diese Arbeit untersucht die strategische Bedeutung von Unsicherheit und Informationsakquise für den Kampf gegen den Klimawandel, der im Standardrahmen der privaten Bereitstellung eines öffentlichen Gutes abgebildet wird. Bevor die Beiträge zum öffentlichen Gut auf freiwilliger Basis gewählt werden, haben Länder die Möglichkeit, in Information über den länderspezifischen Nutzen einer Reduzierung der CO2-Emissionen zu investieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass der Informationsakquise ein substantieller strategischer Wert in der nachgelagerten Interaktion zukommt. Selbst wenn durch die Informationsakquise keine direkten Kosten anfallen, können Länder es vorziehen, ihre Bewertung des öffentlichen Gutes nicht zu erfahren. Diese strategische Informationsentscheidung kann die Effizienz der Bereitstellung des öffentlichen Gutes zusätzlich beeinträchtigen.Private provision of public goods,environmental public goods,information acquisition,uncertainty,global warming

Aspirations of the middle class: Voting on redistribution and status concerns

This paper analyzes the role of narrowly selfish and other-regarding preferences for the median voter in a Meltzer-Richard (1981) framework. We use computerized and real human co-players to distinguish between these sets of motivations. Redistribution to real co-players has a negative effect on the median voter's tax rate choice. Further, perceived income mobility decreases the desired amount of redistribution. Our results suggest the importance of concerns about own mobility as well as status concerns of the median voter who tends to keep distance to the low-income group, whereas inequity aversion does not play a role in the political economy context. --Redistribution,other-regarding preferences,median voter,experiments

Development of a hydrogen-oxygen internal combustion engine space power system

Hydrogen-oxygen internal combustion engine space power syste

Conductance in inhomogeneous quantum wires: Luttinger liquid predictions and quantum Monte Carlo results

We study electron and spin transport in interacting quantum wires contacted by noninteracting leads. We theoretically model the wire and junctions as an inhomogeneous chain where the parameters at the junction change on the scale of the lattice spacing. We study such systems analytically in the appropriate limits based on Luttinger liquid theory and compare the results to quantum Monte Carlo calculations of the conductances and local densities near the junction. We first consider an inhomogeneous spinless fermion model with a nearest-neighbor interaction and then generalize our results to a spinful model with an onsite Hubbard interaction.Comment: 14 pages, 12 figure

Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can find out about this cost ahead of the volunteering game, a strategic value is attached to the information, and individuals may prefer not to learn their cost of provision. If the time horizon is sufficiently short, in equilibrium only one individual may acquire information about his cost. For a long time horizon, acquiring information is strictly dominant. The time limit is an important instrument in influencing the efficiency of the volunteering game

Brothers in Arms - An Experiment on the Alliance Puzzle

Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among ‘brothers in arms’ when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, ‘brothers in arms’ may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.alliance, conflict, contest, free-riding, hold-up problem, solidarity

D Mesons in Nuclear Matter: A DN Coupled-Channel Equations Approach

A set of coupled two-body scattering equations is solved for the DN system embedded in an iso-symmetric nuclear matter. The in-medium behavior of charmed D mesons: (D^+,D^0), is investigated from the self-consistent solution within this scheme. The effective meson-baryon Lagrangian in charm quantum number one sector, the key ingredient in the present study, is adopted from a recent model by Hofmann and Lutz which has aimed at combining the charmed meson degree of freedom in a consistent manner with chiral unitary models. After a critical examination, the original model is modified in several important aspects, such as the method of regularization, in order to be more consistent and practical for our objective. The resultant interaction is used to reproduce the position and width of the s-wave \Lambda_c(2593) resonance in the isospin zero DN channel. In the isospin one channel, it generates a rather wide resonance at \~2770 MeV. The corresponding in-medium solution is then sought by incorporating Pauli blocking and the D- and \pi-meson dressing self-consistently. At normal nuclear matter density, the resultant \Lambda_c (2593) is found to stay narrow and shifted at a lower energy, while the I=1 resonance is lowered in position as well and broadened considerably. The possible implication of our findings on the J/\Psi suppression, etc. in relativistic heavy ion collisions is briefly discussed.Comment: 30 pages, 8 eps figures, some typos and coefficients corrected, published in Phys. Rev.