The “Green Jobs” Fantasy: Why the Economic and Environmental Reality Can Never Live Up to the Political Promise

Agriculture is one of the least “green” — that is, the least environmentally friendly — sectors in Canada, based on its energy-use intensity and greenhouse gas emissions intensity. But agriculture is also the “greenest” sector in Canada, according to one measure that calculates the proportion of “green employment” in various industries. Welcome to the world of “green jobs,” where vague definitions often give energy-intensive, carbon-heavy industries a “green” stamp of approval. Examples include companies making solar panels, but using large volumes of energy to do so or where an accountant preparing financial returns is counted as a “green” worker at one office, but turns instantly “dirty” should he cross the street to do the same accounting work at another office. It is also a world where inefficient power generation is considered positive, if it means employing more “green workers” per unit of power output, regardless of any negative effects that may have on the economy. The concept of “green jobs” has become immensely popular among policy planners looking to address the problem of global warming, yet are aware of the economic costs of anti-carbon measures. The promise that western economies can reduce carbon emissions while creating thousands, if not millions, of “green jobs” — which will more than compensate for the job losses that will occur in sectors reliant on fossil fuels — has been especially embraced by politicians, relieved to find a pro-climate policy that also doubles as a pro-economic policy. Unfortunately, there is scant agreement on what fairly qualifies as a “green job,” and much evidence that what policy-makers frequently consider “green jobs” are, in fact, existing jobs, belonging to the traditional economy, but simply reclassified as “green.”  By emphasizing “green jobs,” policy-makers risk measuring environmental progress based on a concept that can often be entirely irrelevant, or worse, can actually be detrimental to both the environment and the economy. Too often, “green job” policies reward inefficiency, while also failing to distinguish between permanent, full-time jobs and temporary or part-time jobs. In some cases they can also discourage trade, limit or thwart competition, result in greater job losses elsewhere in the economy, and demand massive government subsidies, with some government “green job” programs requiring hundreds of thousands of dollars, or even millions, to create a single job.  The urge of politicians to champion “green employment” is understandable given its convenient, if frequently unrealistic promise of a politically saleable anti-carbon policy. However, a more reliable and meaningful measure of environmental progress ultimately has little to do with the number of jobs a particular company creates (after all, if economic efficiency — and hence, prosperity — is indeed a policy goal, the number of jobs created should ideally be as minimal as necessary for every unit of output). Rather, if minimizing energy use and greenhouse gas emissions is the desired policy outcome, then measuring the intensity of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions per unit of output can be the only meaningful metric. It may not have the political appeal that a promise of “green jobs” does. But unlike “green jobs,” both of these measures provide quantifiable, non-arbitrary metrics of environmental performance and progress. In other words, unlike the problematic, arguably illusory concept of “green employment,” measuring energy-use intensity and emissions intensity actually tells us very clearly and reliably whether we are making the environment better or worse

Energy Literacy in Canada

Energy plays an important role in everyday activities, whether at a personal, institutional, corporate or social level.  In this context, an informed or literate public is critical for the longterm conservation, management, pricing and use of increasingly scarce energy resources.  A series of surveys were used to probe the literacy of Canadians with regard to energy issues ranging from relative ranking and importance of energy compared to other national issues, preference for various fuel types and willingness to pay for offsetting environmental impacts from energy generation. In addition, they were asked how Canada’s government should prioritize national energy independence over trade, even if ultimately reducing imports might impact national economic health. The survey revealed that Canadians have a good general knowledge of energy use and relative cost but lack detailed knowledge about sources of energy fuels, as well as sources and linkages with environmental impacts. However, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated they were concerned about environmental issues; most seemed to direct that concern towards fuels such as coal and nuclear power where support was low compared to a relatively unconcerned view about the often substantial environmental effects of hydro dams or wind farms. Canadians say they have been willing to make adjustments to their own energy-consumption habits, to save money and conserve energy. Further, respondents  generally expressed a willingness to pay a surcharge on monthly utility bills, if it would help mitigate the environmental impact of energy generation. There were limits to this view. Support for extra charges falls off rapidly as the costs go up; drivers showed themselves highly resistant to switching their commute to transit, even despite rising gas prices; and respondents were less enthusiastic to the idea of installing home solar panels or switching to electric cars, even when offered a subsidy to do so. In spite of some limitations regarding overall energy literacy, Canadians are also highly skeptical about the information they do get from virtually every stakeholder in the energy arena. In terms of trust and confidence, overall, respondents said they were more willing to listen to academics and economic experts; only a small majority was willing to fully trust those information sources at even low levels. In this serious topic area, respondents indicated they could not trust the credibility of environmental groups, and considered the oil and gas industry and governments by far the least trustworthy sources of information. Finally, in terms of future policy development, most cite the importance of Canada’s energytrading relationship with the United States, but believe it is too dominant, and should diminish, with more effort focused on opening up new export markets elsewhere

Aboriginal-Canadians and Energy Literacy: A Survey of Opinions and Thoughts on Energy

In Canada, the energy and resource industry, its investments, employment and products have an effect on every citizen and every cultural group. And yet, the public debate over energy projects in Canada is increasingly divisive. Aboriginal-Canadians are an important part of the debate over land use and energy development, and it is essential to understand the attitudes towards and knowledge of energy in this unique group. This survey of Aboriginal-Canadians from across the country reveals that their knowledge and opinions about Canada’s energy system are similar to that of Canadians polled in previous surveys of the general population and of business and policy leaders. However, in a few key areas, the opinions of AboriginalCanadians diverge from those of other poll respondents. Aboriginal-Canadians place less trust in business, industry groups and the government as reliable sources of information about energy issues. Thirty-four per cent of Aboriginal-Canadians put absolutely no trust in information from oil and gas companies, compared to 26 per cent of the general public, and 24 per cent of Aboriginal-Canadians put no trust in information from the federal government, compared to only 15 per cent of the general public. Additionally, Aboriginal-Canadians tend to place a much higher emphasis on environmental preservation over economic concerns: they say they are “very concerned” about the environmental impacts of energy production at a rate that is 14 percentage points higher than the general public. Land and land access are important issues for the Aboriginal-Canadians surveyed. They reluctantly support oil and gas pipelines near their communities, with only 38 per cent in favour. When project development delivers additional funding for educational and social programs in their community, support shifts to a slight majority (51 per cent). This survey highlights the need for simultaneously extending efforts to improve the energy literacy of this important demographic and cultural group, while incorporating their opinions, beliefs and land ethics into long-term energy development strategies. Overall, this group understands many of the overarching issues facing energy development that impacts them, yet reinforces the gap in public knowledge revealed in the previous surveys. Developing Canadian energy will require addressing Aboriginal-Canadian concerns, including lack of trust and the environmental impacts of energy projects

Impact of Pre-Columbian Agriculture, Climate Change, and Tectonic Activity Inferred From a 5,700-Year Paleolimnological Record from Lake Nicaragua

Lake Nicaragua, the largest lake in Central America, is a promising site for paleolimnological study of past climate change, tectonic and volcanic activity, and pre-Columbian agriculture in the region. It is near the northern limit of the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), which brings the rainy season to the tropics, so effects of decreasing precipitation due to southern migration of the ITCZ through the Holocene should be observable. Because fault zones and an active volcano lie within the lake, the long-term impact of tectonic and volcanic activity can also be examined. Finally, the fertile volcanic soils near the lake may have encouraged early agriculture. We analyzed diatoms, biogenic silica (BSi), total organic carbon (TOC), water content, volcanic glass, and magnetic susceptibility in a sediment core from Lake Nicaragua with eleven accelerator mass spectroscopy radiocarbon dates, spanning ~5,700 years. Sediment accumulation rates decreased from the bottom to the top of the core, indicating a general drying trend through the Holocene. An increase in eutrophic diatom abundance suggests that pre-Columbian agriculture impacted the lake as early as ~5,400 cal yr BP. Above a horizon of coarser grains deposited sometime between ~5,200 and 1,600 cal yr BP, planktonic diatoms increased and remained dominant to the top of the core, indicating that water depth permanently increased. Although magnetic susceptibility peaked and water content dipped at the coarse horizon, volcanic glass fragments did not increase, suggesting that the coarse horizon and subsequent increase in water depth were caused by tectonic rather than by volcanic activity. Decreased accumulation rates of BSi and TOC indicate that water became clearer when depth increased

Energy and Energy Literacy in Canada: A Survey of Business and Policy Leadership

Lots of people have opinions about Canadian energy, how we use and export it, its costs and its impacts on the environment. In the end, however, it is leaders in business and policy circles whose opinions can have a greater impact on influencing how the rest of us think about energy, and ultimately, how our national energy picture eventually unfolds. Remarkably, however, a survey of leaders in business and policy-making across the country finds that their knowledge about Canadian energy systems is not that much deeper or different than the Canadian public at large. Their opinions about how we should use, conserve and export energy are also strikingly similar. Anyone presuming that leaders in business and policy have a firm understanding of how Canadians get their energy might be startled to discover that, in Ontario, Alberta, the Atlantic region and Saskatchewan, a substantial fraction of these “elite” survey respondents incorrectly identify the primary resource used for energy in their province. Nor are business and policy leaders the ardent free traders some of us might expect when it comes to energy exports and imports. While an overwhelming majority (89 per cent) of survey respondents considered it important or at least somewhat important to decrease Canada’s reliance on the U.S. market for our exports, 56 per cent of those surveyed also advocated for more Canadian energy independence, even if it meant reduced revenue for the Canadian economy. Not only that, but they largely believed that eliminating energy imports and relying exclusively on Canadian sources would somehow result in an overall drop in energy costs. Furthermore, a strong majority of policy-makers and business leaders had a general agreement that it was worth bearing higher energy costs in the future if it resulted in better environmental quality. Additionally, when it came to evaluating who they could trust for reliable information about energy, business and policy-making elites proved just about as skeptical as the general public when it came to companies, industry groups and government officials, ranking all three fairly weakly on trustworthiness. They saw academics and economic experts as slightly more trustable sources for information, though even those sources had limits. And while environmental and community groups and activists were given generally middling scores for trustworthiness, business leaders, interestingly enough, actually ranked these activist groups as just a bit more reliable than did policy-makers. Finally, a clear preference in both groups was revealed for more planning and systematically adapting to changing energy markets and environmental conditions through the development of some form of public policy energy strategies

Size, Role and Performance in the Oil and Gas Sector

The oil and gas sector is a key driver of the Canadian and Albertan economies. Directly and indirectly it typically accounts for roughly half of Alberta’s GDP, as well as one-third of the country’s business investment and a quarter of business profits — and rising global demand will only add to these figures. However, that energy sector is also a changeable place populated by companies of all shapes and sizes, from small Emerging Juniors to wellestablished Majors whose daily production capacities are hundreds or thousands of times greater. The sector’s assorted firms have different structures and ambitions, respond in distinct ways to market forces and have unique impacts on the economy. These differences in size, role and performance must be reflected in energy and related economic policies if they are to be effective in achieving policy goals. For example, they must recognize that the smallest firms are not always the fastest growers or the most innovative; that Intermediates are the most highly leveraged, with the highest debt-to-equity ratios; and that while Majors tend to have the lowest average cost per well drilled, they also (along with Emerging Juniors) have the highest operating costs. Despite the industry’s critical importance, relatively little hard data has been made available concerning companies’ structure, behaviour and performance, based on size. This paper goes a considerable way toward filling that gap, bringing together comprehensive datasets on 340 public oil and gas firms to chart essential patterns and trends, so policymakers and industry watchers can better understand the complexity and functioning of this important sector

Pacific Basin Heavy Oil Refining Capacity

The United States today is Canada’s largest customer for oil and refined oil products. However, this relationship may be strained due to physical, economic and political influences. Pipeline capacity is approaching its limits; Canadian oil is selling at substantive discounts to world market prices; and U.S. demand for crude oil and finished products (such as gasoline), has begun to flatten significantly relative to historical rates. Lower demand, combined with increased shale oil production, means U.S. demand for Canadian oil is expected to continue to decline. Under these circumstances, gaining access to new markets such as those in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming more and more important for the Canadian economy. However, expanding pipeline capacity to the Pacific via the proposed Northern Gateway pipeline and the planned Trans Mountain pipeline expansion is only feasible when there is sufficient demand and processing capacity to support Canadian crude blends. Canadian heavy oil requires more refining and produces less valuable end products than other lighter and sweeter blends. Canadian producers must compete with lighter, sweeter oils from the Middle East, and elsewhere, for a place in the Pacific Basin refineries built to handle heavy crude blends. Canadian oil sands producers are currently expanding production capacity. Once complete, the Northern Gateway pipeline and the Trans Mountain expansion are expected to deliver an additional 500,000 to 1.1 million barrels a day to tankers on the Pacific coast. Through this survey of the capacity of Pacific Basin refineries, including existing and proposed facilities, we have concluded that there is sufficient technical capacity in the Pacific Basin to refine the additional Canadian volume; however, there may be some modifications required to certain refineries to allow them to process Western Canadian crude. Any additional capacity for Canadian oil would require refinery modifications or additional refineries, both of which are not expected, given the volume of lighter and more valuable crude from the Middle East finding its way to Pacific Basin markets. Consequently, any new refinery capacity is not likely to be dedicated to Canadian crude shipments. This places increasing importance on the need to enter into long-term contracts to supply Pacific Basin refineries, backed up by evidence of adequate transportation capacity. Canadians will have to show first, and quickly, that we are committed to building pipelines that will bring sufficient volumes of oil to the Pacific coast necessary to give the refiners the certainty they need to invest in infrastructure for refining Canadian oil. Access to this crucial market will depend critically on the outcome of the pipeline approval process, and also the cost to ship from Canada. If Canada does not approve of the Pacific coast pipeline expansions, or takes too long in doing so, it could find its crude unable to effectively penetrate the world’s most promising oil export market

Risky Business: The Issue of Timing, Entry and Performance in the Asia-Pacific LNG Market

Canada’s federal government has championed the prospect of exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to overseas markets. The government of British Columbia is aggressively planning to turn itself into a global LNG-export hub, and the prospect for Canadian LNG exports is positive. However, there are market and political uncertainties that must be overcome in a relatively short period of time if Canada is to become a natural gas exporter to a country other than the United States. This report assesses the feasibility of Canadian exports and examines the policy challenges involved in making the opportunity a reality. Demand for natural gas in the Asia-Pacific region is forecast to grow over 60 per cent by 2025. LNG trade is expected to make up nearly two-thirds of global natural gas trade by 2035. Supply in the Asia-Pacific region is limited, requiring significant LNG imports with corresponding infrastructure investment. This results in substantial price differentials between North America and the Asia-Pacific countries, creating a potentially lucrative opportunity for Canada. The lower North American prices are a reflection of the fact that there is a surplus of gas on this continent. Canada’s shipments to its sole export market, the United States, are shrinking in the face of vast increases in American production of shale and tight gas. Canada has a surplus of natural gas and there is growing demand in the Asia-Pacific region. Proponents argue that all Canada needs to do is build and supply facilities to liquefy gas and ship it across the Pacific; the reality is not so simple. Timing is one of the key challenges Canada faces. Producers around the world — including in the newly gas-rich U.S. — are racing to lock up market-share in the Asia-Pacific region, in many cases much more aggressively than Canada. While this market is robust and growing, the nature of the contracts for delivery will favour actors that are earliest in the queue; margins for those arriving late will be slimmer and less certain over time. As supply grows, so too does the likelihood of falling gas prices in the Asia-Pacific region, making later projects less lucrative. LNG projects are feasible only on the basis of long-term contracts; once a piece of market share is acquired, it could be decades before it becomes available again. Currently, there are more proposed LNG-export projects around the world than will be required to meet projected demand for the foreseeable future. Delays beyond 2024 risk complete competitive loss of market entry for Canadian companies. B.C. is behind schedule on the government’s goal of having a single terminal operational by 2015. Of equal concern is the lack of policy and regulatory co-ordination, with disagreements between governments over standards, process and compensation for those stakeholders involved in the potential LNG industry. Issues as basic as taxing and royalty charges for gas shipments between provinces and locating facilities and marine-safety standards remain unsettled in Canada. The B.C. government has announced plans to levy special taxes on LNG, a policy that could render many current proposals uncompetitive. The LNG market is much more complicated than current discussions suggest; this report delves into every aspect relevant for Canada as a potential exporter. The prospect for Canada expanding into the Asia-Pacific market is entirely viable. Canada has almost everything going for it: political stability, free-market principles, immense resources, extensive infrastructure and industry experience. Everything, that is, except a co-ordinated regulatory and policy regime. Without that, Canada could be shut out, stuck relying on a single U.S. gas-export market that, increasingly, does not need us

Rosiglitazone and Fenofibrate Additive Effects on Lipids

Background. To evaluate the effect of rosiglitazone, fenofibrate, or their combined use on plasma lipids in normoglycemic healthy adults. Methods and Results. Subjects were randomized in a double-blind fashion to rosiglitazone + placebo, fenofibrate + placebo, rosiglitazone + fenofibrate, or matching double placebo. The between-group difference in the change in fasting TG, high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (HDL-C), LDL-C, and plasma apolipoproteins A-I, A-II, and C-III level were compared after 12 weeks of treatment. A total of 548 subjects were screened and 41 met the inclusion criteria. After 12 weeks of therapy, the median change in the triglyceride levels showed a significant reduction ranging from 47 to 55 mg per deciliter in the fenofibrate only and rosiglitazone/fenofibrate groups compared with placebo (P = 0.0496). However, the rosiglitazone only group did not show significant change in triglyceride level. The change in the Apo AII showed increase in all the treatment groups compared with placebo (P = 0.009). There was also significant change in the Apo CIII that showed reduction of its level in the fenofibrate only and rosiglitazone/fenofibrate groups (P = 0.0003). Conclusion. Rosiglitazone does not appear to modulate hypertriglyceridemia in patients with elevated triglycerides independent of glucose metabolism