Decreasing Inequality Under Latin America's "Social Democratic" and " Populist" Govenments: Is the Difference Real?

This paper addresses the claim that the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, Latin America's so-called "left-populist" governments, have failed to effectively reduce inequality in the 2000s and have only benefitted from high commodity prices and other benign external conditions. In particular, it examines the econometric evidence presented by McLeod and Lustig (2011) that the "social democratic" governments of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay were more successful and finds that their original results are highly sensitive to the use of data from the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Conducting the same analysis using data on income inequality from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) leads to the exact opposite result: it is the so-called "left-populist" governments who appear to have effectively reduced income inequality over the last decade. The key difference between data from SEDLAC and ECLAC is that the latter corrects for income underreporting -- when households in an income survey underreport their true amount of income, thus biasing the measurement of inequality -- while the former does not. Absent reasonable criteria for choosing one dataset over the other, the paper suggests that any econometric results based on income inequality data should prove robust to both sources

Tilting Rightward: C-SPAN's Coverage of Think Tanks

This study's main finding is that C-SPAN coverage of think tanks overwhelmingly favors conservative think tanks while left-of-center think tanks are under-represented. In 2006, conservative think tanks received 43.76 percent of total think tank coverage. Conservative/ libertarian and centrist think tanks received 6.94 percent and 31.76 percent respectively. Center-left and progressive think tanks, on the other hand, only received 12.73 percent and 4.86 percent respectively. Thus, the combined conservative and conservative/libertarian think tanks got an absolute majority of 50.7 percent representation on C-SPAN. Everything left of center got only 17.59 percent, just one third of the coverage received by the Right

The IMF and Economic Recovery: Is Fund Policy Contributing to Downside Risks?

The IMF's most recent World Economic Outlook (WEO), published last week, projects world economic growth will slow, from 4.8 percent in 2010 to 4.2 percent next year. Throughout the report, there are numerous concerns expressed about the "fragility" of the global economic recovery. The Acting Chair of the Executive Board states that "[t]he recovery is losing momentum temporarily during the second half of 2010 and will likely remain weak in the first half of 2011, as extraordinary policy stimulus is gradually withdrawn."In view of the report and its findings, one might expect a strong bias towards continuing fiscal stimulus in weak economies, and a bias against fiscal consolidation. However, this paper finds that the IMF continues to support pro-cyclical policies in some countries, fiscal consolidation in many others, and clearly does not support central bank financing of fiscal stimulus -- even in countries such as the United States -- where the threat of high inflation is very remote

More Pain, No Gain for Greece: Is the Euro Worth the Costs of Proa

This week the Greek government reached agreement with the European authorities and the IMF for 130 billion euros in lending, as part of a new adjustment package to replace the current IMF program that began in May of 2010. Although the agreement should allow the government to avoid default in March, there are grave doubts as to whether the agreed upon program will lead the country to a point where it returns to growth, has a sustainable debt burden, and can borrow from private markets

Alternatives to Fiscal Austerity in Spain

This paper looks at the planned austerity measures in Spain, the rationale for the spending cuts and tax increases, likely outcomes for future debt-to-GDP ratios, and the probable results of alternative policies

Jamaica: Macroeconomic Policy, Debt and the IMF

This paper looks at Jamaica's recent history of indebtedness, its experience during the global economic downturn, and examines its current agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It finds that Jamaica's economic and social progress has suffered considerably from the burden of an unsustainable debt; and that even after the debt restructuring of 2010, this burden remains unsustainable and very damaging. Pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, implemented under the auspices of the IMF, have also damaged Jamaica's recent and current economic prospects

Update on the Jamaican Economy

This paper looks at Jamaica's stalled agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its economic performance over the past year and examines its persistently high debt burden. It finds that an unsustainable debt burden continues to displace needed investments, preventing long-term growth. The stalling of the IMF agreement has prevented disbursements of necessary multilateral financing, slowing the economy's recovery. Together with pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies supported by the IMF, the recovery of the Jamaican economy remains muted

Jamaica: Macroeconomic Policy, Debt and the IMF

This paper looks at Jamaica’s recent history of indebtedness, its experience during the global economic downturn, and examines its current agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It finds that Jamaica’s economic and social progress has suffered considerably from the burden of an unsustainable debt; and that even after the debt restructuring of 2010, this burden remains unsustainable and very damaging. Pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, implemented under the auspices of the IMF, have also damaged Jamaica’s recent and current economic prospects.jamaica, imf, debt, JDX,

More Pain, No Gain for Greece: Is the Euro Worth the Costs of Pro-Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Internal Devaluation?

This week the Greek government reached agreement with the European authorities and the IMF for 130 billion euros in lending, as part of a new adjustment package to replace the current IMF program that began in May of 2010. Although the agreement should allow the government to avoid default in March, there are grave doubts as to whether the agreed upon program will lead the country to a point where it returns to growth, has a sustainable debt burden, and can borrow from private markets. The most important problem with the commitments that Greece has made in the past two years is that its fiscal policy is pro-cyclical – that is, the government has been, and is committed to, tightening its budget while the economy is in recession.greece, euro, europe, devaluation, procyclical, countercyclical, imf,

The IMF and Economic Recovery: Is Fund Policy Contributing to Downside Risks?

The IMF’s most recent World Economic Outlook (WEO), published last week, projects world economic growth will slow, from 4.8 percent in 2010 to 4.2 percent next year. Throughout the report, there are numerous concerns expressed about the “fragility” of the global economic recovery. The Acting Chair of the Executive Board states that “[t]he recovery is losing momentum temporarily during the second half of 2010 and will likely remain weak in the first half of 2011, as extraordinary policy stimulus is gradually withdrawn.” In view of the report and its findings, one might expect a strong bias towards continuing fiscal stimulus in weak economies, and a bias against fiscal consolidation. However, this paper finds that the IMF continues to support pro-cyclical policies in some countries, fiscal consolidation in many others, and clearly does not support central bank financing of fiscal stimulus – even in countries such as the United States – where the threat of high inflation is very remote.IMF