BOLD Responses to Negative Reward Prediction Errors in Human Habenula

Although positive reward prediction error, a key element in learning that is signaled by dopamine cells, has been extensively studied, little is known about negative reward prediction errors in humans. Detailed animal electrophysiology shows that the habenula, an integrative region involved in many processes including learning, reproduction, and stress responses, also encodes negative reward-related events such as negative reward prediction error signals. In humans, however, the habenula's extremely small size has prevented direct assessments of its function. We developed a method to functionally locate and study the habenula in humans using fMRI, based on the expected reward-dependent response phenomenology of habenula and striatum and, we provide conclusive evidence for activation in human habenula to negative reward prediction errors

Monte Carlo Planning method estimates planning horizons during interactive social exchange

Reciprocating interactions represent a central feature of all human exchanges. They have been the target of various recent experiments, with healthy participants and psychiatric populations engaging as dyads in multi-round exchanges such as a repeated trust task. Behaviour in such exchanges involves complexities related to each agent's preference for equity with their partner, beliefs about the partner's appetite for equity, beliefs about the partner's model of their partner, and so on. Agents may also plan different numbers of steps into the future. Providing a computationally precise account of the behaviour is an essential step towards understanding what underlies choices. A natural framework for this is that of an interactive partially observable Markov decision process (IPOMDP). However, the various complexities make IPOMDPs inordinately computationally challenging. Here, we show how to approximate the solution for the multi-round trust task using a variant of the Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm. We demonstrate that the algorithm is efficient and effective, and therefore can be used to invert observations of behavioural choices. We use generated behaviour to elucidate the richness and sophistication of interactive inference

Neural signature of fictive learning signals in a sequential investment task

Reinforcement learning models now provide principled guides for a wide range of reward learning experiments in animals and humans. One key learning (error) signal in these models is experiential and reports ongoing temporal differences between expected and experienced reward. However, these same abstract learning models also accommodate the existence of another class of learning signal that takes the form of a fictive error encoding ongoing differences between experienced returns and returns that "could-have-been-experienced" if decisions had been different. These observations suggest the hypothesis that, for all real-world learning tasks, one should expect the presence of both experiential and fictive learning signals. Motivated by this possibility, we used a sequential investment game and fMRI to probe ongoing brain responses to both experiential and fictive learning signals generated throughout the game. Using a large cohort of subjects (n = 54), we report that fictive learning signals strongly predict changes in subjects' investment behavior and correlate with fMRI signals measured in dopaminoceptive structures known to be involved in valuation and choice

To Detect and Correct: Norm Violations and Their Enforcement

Compliance with social norms requires neural signals related both to the norm and to deviations from it. Recent work using economic games between two interacting subjects has uncovered brain responses related to norm compliance and to an individual's strategic outlook during the exchange. These brain responses possess a provocative relationship to those associated with negative emotional outcomes, and hint at computational depictions of emotion processing

Economic probes of mental function and the extraction of computational phenotypes

AbstractEconomic games are now routinely used to characterize human cognition across multiple dimensions. These games allow for effective computational modeling of mental function because they typically come equipped with notions of optimal play, which provide quantitatively prescribed target functions that can be tracked throughout an experiment. The combination of these games, computational models, and neuroimaging tools open up the possibility for new ways to characterize normal cognition and associated brain function. We propose that these tools may also be used to characterize mental dysfunction, such as that found in a range of psychiatric illnesses. We describe early efforts using a multi-round trust game to probe brain responses associated with healthy social exchange and review how this game has provided a novel and useful characterization of autism spectrum disorder. Lastly, we use the multi-round trust game as an example to discuss how these kinds of games could produce novel bases for representing healthy behavior and brain function and thus provide objectively identifiable subtypes within a broad spectrum of mental function

A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making

Neuroeconomics is the study of the neurobiological and computational basis of value-based decision making. Its goal is to provide a biologically based account of human behaviour that can be applied in both the natural and the social sciences. This Review proposes a framework to investigate different aspects of the neurobiology of decision making. The framework allows us to bring together recent findings in the field, highlight some of the most important outstanding problems, define a common lexicon that bridges the different disciplines that inform neuroeconomics, and point the way to future applications

Detecting Mens Rea in the Brain

What if the widely used Model Penal Code (MPC) assumes a distinction between mental states that doesn’t actually exist? The MPC assumes, for instance, that there is a real distinction in real people between the mental states it defines as “knowing” and “reckless.” But is there? If there are such psychological differences, there must also be brain differences. Consequently, the moral legitimacy of the Model Penal Code’s taxonomy of culpable mental states – which punishes those in defined mental states differently – depends on whether those mental states actually correspond to different brain states in the way the MPC categorization assumes