Low Take-up Rates: The Role of Information

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the role of information in determining take-up patterns of social benefits in a non-stigma environment. We find that take-up rate of households who have the incentive to search for information for a longer period of time is between 8 and 13 percentage points higher as compared to a control group of households. This result is robust to the inclusion of various household characteristics. Our finding provides strong empirical support for information as an important explanation for low take-up rates.take-up, social benefits, information cost

Parental Actions and Siblings’ Inequality

The model presented in the paper generates important implications concerning how the allocation of resources between children varies across income groups. In the model, poor and middle-income families tend to channel their resources into a few children whereas rich families (and perhaps very poor families as well) tend to allocate resources more evenly. As a result, poor and middle- income families tend to generate more inequality relative to richer families.

Fiscal Rules and Composition Bias in OECD Countries

Using a sample of OECD countries, this paper finds that while fiscal rules succeeded in reducing total government expenditures and budget deficits in the medium term, they significantly affected the composition of government expenditure: the ratio of social transfers to government consumption declined. In contrast, we do not find a stable effect of fiscal rules on public investment. It is shown that the compositional shift against social transfers is beyond “from welfare to work” policies, which have been adopted by many OECD countries during the nineties. Our empirical examination reveals that the reduction of social transfers relative to government consumption did not occur in countries with strong legal protection to social rights.fiscal rules, government deficit, government expenditure, expenditures composition

The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-up Rates: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much higher take-up rate - up to double - as compared to a control group of households. Our estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates.take-up, social benefits

Sibling Correlations and Social Mobility in Latin America

In this paper, social mobility is measured by looking at the extent to which family background determines socioeconomic success. Roughly speaking, social mobility can be measure by means of two distinct types of correlations: intergenerational correlations and sibling correlations.

Social Identity and Voter Turnout

This paper uses the unique social structure of Arab communities to examine the effect of social identity on voter turnout. We first show that voters are more likely to vote for a candidate who shares their social group (signified by last name) as compared to other candidates. Using last name as a measure of group affiliation, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and voter turnout which is consistent with theoretical models that reconcile the paradox of voting by incorporating groups behavior.voter turnout, paradox of voting, social identity, local elections

Constitutional Commitment to Social Security and Welfare Policy

In this paper we explore whether the constitutional text has any practical meaning for welfare policy. To examine the empirical importance of the constitution, we first constructed for 68 countries an index of constitutional commitment to social security in five areas: Old Age, disability and survivors (OASDI), Unemployment, Sickness, Work Injury and Income Support. We find that the extent and coverage of social security laws is not sensitive to the degree of constitutional commitment to social security.Welfare Policy, Social Security, Constitution, Legal Origins

Do Economic Policymakers Practice what they Preach? The Case of Pension Decisions

This paper examines whether policymakers, economists at the Israeli Finance Ministry, act in their personal pension decisions in accordance with the rational behaviour assumptions underlying the pension policies they advance. We find that while economists' decisions regarding three other important decisions such as buying an apartment, a car and a large appliance, are largely in line with rational models, pension decisions deviate significantly from these models. A large share of these policymakers hardly search for relevant information regarding their chosen pension fund, do not know the most necessary information and consider only one option before choosing the preferred pension fund. A significant difference was found between specialized policymakers (economists in the Pension Division) and general policymakers (economists in all other Divisions) showing that specialized policymakers are significantly less biased.policymaking, pension decisions, expert, rational choice

The effect of benefits level on take-up rates: evidence from a natural experiment

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to study the effect of social benefits level on take-up rates. We find that households who are eligible for double benefits (twins) have much higher take-up rate - up to double - as compared to a control group of households. Our estimated effect of benefits level is much higher relative to the standard cross section estimates. This finding is less exposed to a selection bias that might plague much of the previous research on the link between benefits level and take-up. It provides strong empirical support for the level of benefits as a key factor in determining take-up rates

Fiscal rules and composition bias in OECD countries

Using a sample of OECD countries, this paper finds that while fiscal rules succeeded in reducing total government expenditures and budget deficits in the medium term, they significantly affected the composition of government expenditure: the ratio of social transfers to government consumption declined. In contrast, we do not find a stable effect of fiscal rules on public investment. It is shown that the compositional shift against social transfers is beyond 'from welfare to work' policies, which have been adopted by many OECD countries during the nineties. Our empirical examination reveals that the reduction of social transfers relative to government consumption did not occur in countries with strong legal protection to social rights