Coercive power in social exchange

This book describes the progression and results of a decade-long program of experimental research on power in social exchange relations. Exchange theorists have traditionally excluded punishment and coercion from the scope of their analyses; but Molm examines whether exchange theory can be expanded to include reward and coercive power. Working within the framework of Emerson's power-dependence theory, but also drawing on the decision theory concepts of strategic action and loss aversion, Molm develops and tests a theory that emphasizes the interdependence of reward and coercive power. Her work shows that they are fundamentally different, not only in their effects on behavior, but also in the structural incentive to use power and the risks of power use. When exchanges are negotiated and secured by the 'shadow of the future,' rather than by binding agreements, dependence both encourages and constrains the use of coercion

In the eye of the beholder: Procedural justice in social exchange

This article develops and tests alternative predictions about how the form of social exchange, negotiated or reciprocal, affects perceptions of fairness, independent of the structure and outcomes of exchange. Theories of procedural justice predict that fair exchange procedures should enhance perceptions of the exchange partner\u27s fairness. Negotiated exchange-which incorporates collective decision-making, advance knowledge of terms, mutual assent, and binding agreements-clearly appears more fair than does reciprocal exchange on most procedural dimensions. Thus, these theories imply that perceptions of the other\u27s fairness should be greater in negotiated than in reciprocal exchange. Results from three experiments, however, show the opposite: Actors perceive negotiated exchange partners as less fair, and they are less willing to engage in unequal exchanges with them; these effects are robust across multiple levels of inequality and variations within the two forms of exchange. These findings support the authors\u27 alternative argument: Rather than increasing perceptions of fairness, features of negotiated exchange instead serve to heighten the salience of conflict between actors, trigger self-serving attributions that lead actors to perceive others\u27 motives and traits unfavorably, and increase perceptions that the other is unfair. The authors discuss implications for theory and for negotiation and reciprocity in social life

Power in negotiated and reciprocal exchange

While classical exchange theorists excluded bargaining from the scope of their theories, most contemporary theorists have done the opposite, concentrating exclusively on negotiated exchanges with binding agreements. We analyze how the form of social exchange-negotiated or reciprocal-affects the distribution of power in exchange networks. These two forms of exchange differ in fundamental ways that affect how actors use power and the kinds of risk and uncertainty they face. We predict that these basic differences will affect the relation between the availability of alternative partners and actors\u27 use of power, and will produce lower power use in reciprocal exchange than in negotiated exchange. We test our predictions in a laboratory experiment. The results support the underlying logic of our theory, partially support its specific predictions, and raise new questions about the importance of the different time perspectives required by negotiated and reciprocal exchange

Risk and trust in social exchange: An experimental test of a classical proposition

The classical exchange theorists proposed that trust is more likely to develop between partners when exchange occurs without explicit negotiations or binding agreements. Under these conditions, the risk and uncertainty of exchange provide the opportunity for partners to demonstrate their trustworthiness. This study develops the theoretical implications of this proposition and conducts an experimental test that compares levels of both trust and commitment in two forms of direct exchange, negotiated and reciprocal. The results support the classical proposition, showing that reciprocal exchange produces stronger trust and affective commitment than negotiated exchange, and that behaviors signaling the partner\u27s trustworthiness have greater impact on trust in reciprocal exchange

The value of exchange

Contemporary social exchange researchers have largely ignored how variations in the value of exchange affect power relations, concentrating instead on effects of the structure of exchange, particularly the size and shape of exchange networks. In this article, we show that value, when conceptualized and studied as a dimension of actors\u27 alternative exchange relations, has strong and systematic effects on actors\u27 use of power. Results of a laboratory experiment support our hypotheses, showing that an actor\u27s power over another increases with the value of that actor\u27s exchange with alternative partners. The effects of value on power use are comparable in strength to the effects of the availability of alternatives, and they are remarkably robust, holding for both negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange and for networks in which the availability of alternative partners is both high and low