Prediction of severe neutropenia and diarrhoea in breast cancer patients treated with abemaciclib

Introduction: Neutropenia and diarrhoea are common and potentially serious adverse events associated with abemaciclib in advanced breast cancer (ABC), and the risk factors have been minimally explored. The study aimed to develop clinical prediction tools that allow personalized predictions of neutropenia and diarrhoea following abemaciclib initiation. Materials and methods: Data was pooled from MONARCH 1, 2 and 3 trials investigating abemaciclib. Cox proportional hazard analysis was used to assess the association between pre-treatment clinicopathological data and grade ≥3 diarrhoea and neutropenia occurring within the first 365 days of abemaciclib use. Results: Older age was associated with increased risk of grade ≥3 diarrhoea [HR [95%CI] for age > 70: 1.72 [1.14–2.58]; P = 0.009]. A clinical prediction tool for abemaciclib induced grade ≥3 neutropenia was optimally defined by race, ECOGPS and white blood cell count. Large discrimination between subgroups was observed; the highest risk subgroup had a 64% probability of grade ≥3 neutropenia within the first 365 days of abemaciclib (150 mg twice daily) + fulvestrant/NSAI, compared to 5% for the lowest risk subgroup. Conclusion: The study identified advanced age as significantly associated with an increased risk of abemaciclib induced grade ≥ 3 diarrhoea. A clinical prediction tool, defined by race, ECOGPS and pre-treatment white blood cell count, was able to discriminate subgroups with significantly different risks of grade ≥3 neutropenia following abemaciclib initiation. The tool may enable improved interpretation of personalized risks and the risk-benefit ratio of abemaciclib

Audit of Data Sharing by Pharmaceutical Companies for Anticancer Medicines Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration

IMPORTANCE: Emerging policies drafted by the pharmaceutical industry indicate that they will transparently share clinical trial data. These data offer an unparalleled opportunity to advance evidence-based medicine and support decision-making. OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the eligibility of independent, qualified researchers to access individual participant data (IPD) from oncology trials that supported US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of new anticancer medicines within the past 10 years. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: In this quality improvement study, a cross-sectional analysis was performed of pivotal clinical trials whose results supported FDA-approved anticancer medicines between January 1, 2011, and June 30, 2021. These trials’ results were identified from product labels. EXPOSURES: Eligibility for IPD sharing was confirmed by identification of a public listing of the trial as eligible for sharing or by receipt of a positive response from the sponsor to a standardized inquiry. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: The main outcome was frequency of IPD sharing eligibility. Reasons for data sharing ineligibility were requested and collated, and company-, drug-, and trial-level subgroups were evaluated and presented using χ(2) tests and forest plots. RESULTS: During the 10-year period examined, 115 anticancer medicines were approved by the FDA on the basis of evidence from 304 pharmaceutical industry–sponsored trials. Of these trials, 136 (45%) were eligible for IPD sharing and 168 (55%) were not. Data sharing rates differed substantially among industry sponsors, with the most common reason for not sharing trial IPD being that the collection of long-term follow-up data was still ongoing (89 of 168 trials [53%]). Of the top 10 anticancer medicines by global sales, nivolumab, pembrolizumab, and pomalidomide had the lowest eligibility rates for data sharing (<10% of trials). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: There has been a substantial increase in IPD sharing for industry-sponsored oncology trials over the past 5 years. However, this quality improvement study found that more than 50% of queried trials for FDA-approved anticancer medicines were ineligible for IPD sharing. Data accessibility would be substantially improved if, at the time of FDA registration of a medicine, all data that support the registration were made available

Accessibility of clinical study reports supporting medicine approvals: a cross-sectional evaluation

OBJECTIVE: Clinical study reports (CSRs) are highly detailed documents that play a pivotal role in medicine approval processes. Though not historically publicly available, in recent years major entities including the European Medicines Agency (EMA), Health Canada, and the U.S Food &amp; Drug Administration (FDA) have highlighted the importance of CSR accessibility. The primary objective herein was to determine the proportion of CSRs that support medicine approvals available for public download as well as the proportion eligible for independent researcher request via the study sponsor.STUDY DESIGN AND SETTING: This cross-sectional study examined the accessibility of CSRs from industry-sponsored clinical trials whose results were reported in the FDA-authorized drug labels of the top 30 highest-revenue medicines of 2021. We determined 1) whether the CSRs were available for download from a public repository, and 2) whether the CSRs were eligible for request by independent researchers based on trial sponsors' data sharing policies.RESULTS: There were 316 industry-sponsored clinical trials with results presented in the FDA-authorized drug labels of the 30 sampled medicines. Of these trials, CSRs were available for public download from 70 (22%), with 37 available at EMA and 40 at Health Canada repositories. While pharmaceutical company platforms offered no direct downloads of CSRs, sponsors confirmed that CSRs from 183 (58%) of the 316 clinical trials were eligible for independent researcher request via the submission of a research proposal. Overall, 218 (69%) of the sampled clinical trials had CSRs available for public download and/or were eligible for request from the trial sponsor.CONCLUSION: CSRs were available from 69% of the clinical trials supporting regulatory approval of the 30 medicines sampled. However, only 22% of the CSRs were directly downloadable from regulatory agencies, the remaining required a formal application process to request access to the CSR from the study sponsor.</p

Current safeguards, risk mitigation, and transparency measures of large language models against the generation of health disinformation: repeated cross sectional analysis

Peer reviewed: TrueFunder: Cancer Council Australia; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100020670Funder: National Health and Medical Research Council; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000925Objectives: To evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards to prevent large language models (LLMs) from being misused to generate health disinformation, and to evaluate the transparency of artificial intelligence (AI) developers regarding their risk mitigation processes against observed vulnerabilities. Design: Repeated cross sectional analysis. Setting: Publicly accessible LLMs. Methods: In a repeated cross sectional analysis, four LLMs (via chatbots/assistant interfaces) were evaluated: OpenAI’s GPT-4 (via ChatGPT and Microsoft’s Copilot), Google’s PaLM 2 and newly released Gemini Pro (via Bard), Anthropic’s Claude 2 (via Poe), and Meta’s Llama 2 (via HuggingChat). In September 2023, these LLMs were prompted to generate health disinformation on two topics: sunscreen as a cause of skin cancer and the alkaline diet as a cancer cure. Jailbreaking techniques (ie, attempts to bypass safeguards) were evaluated if required. For LLMs with observed safeguarding vulnerabilities, the processes for reporting outputs of concern were audited. 12 weeks after initial investigations, the disinformation generation capabilities of the LLMs were re-evaluated to assess any subsequent improvements in safeguards. Main outcome measures: The main outcome measures were whether safeguards prevented the generation of health disinformation, and the transparency of risk mitigation processes against health disinformation. Results: Claude 2 (via Poe) declined 130 prompts submitted across the two study timepoints requesting the generation of content claiming that sunscreen causes skin cancer or that the alkaline diet is a cure for cancer, even with jailbreaking attempts. GPT-4 (via Copilot) initially refused to generate health disinformation, even with jailbreaking attempts—although this was not the case at 12 weeks. In contrast, GPT-4 (via ChatGPT), PaLM 2/Gemini Pro (via Bard), and Llama 2 (via HuggingChat) consistently generated health disinformation blogs. In September 2023 evaluations, these LLMs facilitated the generation of 113 unique cancer disinformation blogs, totalling more than 40 000 words, without requiring jailbreaking attempts. The refusal rate across the evaluation timepoints for these LLMs was only 5% (7 of 150), and as prompted the LLM generated blogs incorporated attention grabbing titles, authentic looking (fake or fictional) references, fabricated testimonials from patients and clinicians, and they targeted diverse demographic groups. Although each LLM evaluated had mechanisms to report observed outputs of concern, the developers did not respond when observations of vulnerabilities were reported. Conclusions: This study found that although effective safeguards are feasible to prevent LLMs from being misused to generate health disinformation, they were inconsistently implemented. Furthermore, effective processes for reporting safeguard problems were lacking. Enhanced regulation, transparency, and routine auditing are required to help prevent LLMs from contributing to the mass generation of health disinformation

Current safeguards, risk mitigation, and transparency measures of large language models against the generation of health disinformation: repeated cross sectional analysis.

Peer reviewed: TrueFunder: Cancer Council Australia; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100020670Funder: National Health and Medical Research Council; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000925OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards to prevent large language models (LLMs) from being misused to generate health disinformation, and to evaluate the transparency of artificial intelligence (AI) developers regarding their risk mitigation processes against observed vulnerabilities. DESIGN: Repeated cross sectional analysis. SETTING: Publicly accessible LLMs. METHODS: In a repeated cross sectional analysis, four LLMs (via chatbots/assistant interfaces) were evaluated: OpenAI's GPT-4 (via ChatGPT and Microsoft's Copilot), Google's PaLM 2 and newly released Gemini Pro (via Bard), Anthropic's Claude 2 (via Poe), and Meta's Llama 2 (via HuggingChat). In September 2023, these LLMs were prompted to generate health disinformation on two topics: sunscreen as a cause of skin cancer and the alkaline diet as a cancer cure. Jailbreaking techniques (ie, attempts to bypass safeguards) were evaluated if required. For LLMs with observed safeguarding vulnerabilities, the processes for reporting outputs of concern were audited. 12 weeks after initial investigations, the disinformation generation capabilities of the LLMs were re-evaluated to assess any subsequent improvements in safeguards. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The main outcome measures were whether safeguards prevented the generation of health disinformation, and the transparency of risk mitigation processes against health disinformation. RESULTS: Claude 2 (via Poe) declined 130 prompts submitted across the two study timepoints requesting the generation of content claiming that sunscreen causes skin cancer or that the alkaline diet is a cure for cancer, even with jailbreaking attempts. GPT-4 (via Copilot) initially refused to generate health disinformation, even with jailbreaking attempts-although this was not the case at 12 weeks. In contrast, GPT-4 (via ChatGPT), PaLM 2/Gemini Pro (via Bard), and Llama 2 (via HuggingChat) consistently generated health disinformation blogs. In September 2023 evaluations, these LLMs facilitated the generation of 113 unique cancer disinformation blogs, totalling more than 40 000 words, without requiring jailbreaking attempts. The refusal rate across the evaluation timepoints for these LLMs was only 5% (7 of 150), and as prompted the LLM generated blogs incorporated attention grabbing titles, authentic looking (fake or fictional) references, fabricated testimonials from patients and clinicians, and they targeted diverse demographic groups. Although each LLM evaluated had mechanisms to report observed outputs of concern, the developers did not respond when observations of vulnerabilities were reported. CONCLUSIONS: This study found that although effective safeguards are feasible to prevent LLMs from being misused to generate health disinformation, they were inconsistently implemented. Furthermore, effective processes for reporting safeguard problems were lacking. Enhanced regulation, transparency, and routine auditing are required to help prevent LLMs from contributing to the mass generation of health disinformation

Current safeguards, risk mitigation, and transparency measures of large language models against the generation of health disinformation: repeated cross sectional analysis.

Peer reviewed: TrueFunder: Cancer Council Australia; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100020670Funder: National Health and Medical Research Council; FundRef: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000925OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards to prevent large language models (LLMs) from being misused to generate health disinformation, and to evaluate the transparency of artificial intelligence (AI) developers regarding their risk mitigation processes against observed vulnerabilities. DESIGN: Repeated cross sectional analysis. SETTING: Publicly accessible LLMs. METHODS: In a repeated cross sectional analysis, four LLMs (via chatbots/assistant interfaces) were evaluated: OpenAI's GPT-4 (via ChatGPT and Microsoft's Copilot), Google's PaLM 2 and newly released Gemini Pro (via Bard), Anthropic's Claude 2 (via Poe), and Meta's Llama 2 (via HuggingChat). In September 2023, these LLMs were prompted to generate health disinformation on two topics: sunscreen as a cause of skin cancer and the alkaline diet as a cancer cure. Jailbreaking techniques (ie, attempts to bypass safeguards) were evaluated if required. For LLMs with observed safeguarding vulnerabilities, the processes for reporting outputs of concern were audited. 12 weeks after initial investigations, the disinformation generation capabilities of the LLMs were re-evaluated to assess any subsequent improvements in safeguards. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The main outcome measures were whether safeguards prevented the generation of health disinformation, and the transparency of risk mitigation processes against health disinformation. RESULTS: Claude 2 (via Poe) declined 130 prompts submitted across the two study timepoints requesting the generation of content claiming that sunscreen causes skin cancer or that the alkaline diet is a cure for cancer, even with jailbreaking attempts. GPT-4 (via Copilot) initially refused to generate health disinformation, even with jailbreaking attempts-although this was not the case at 12 weeks. In contrast, GPT-4 (via ChatGPT), PaLM 2/Gemini Pro (via Bard), and Llama 2 (via HuggingChat) consistently generated health disinformation blogs. In September 2023 evaluations, these LLMs facilitated the generation of 113 unique cancer disinformation blogs, totalling more than 40 000 words, without requiring jailbreaking attempts. The refusal rate across the evaluation timepoints for these LLMs was only 5% (7 of 150), and as prompted the LLM generated blogs incorporated attention grabbing titles, authentic looking (fake or fictional) references, fabricated testimonials from patients and clinicians, and they targeted diverse demographic groups. Although each LLM evaluated had mechanisms to report observed outputs of concern, the developers did not respond when observations of vulnerabilities were reported. CONCLUSIONS: This study found that although effective safeguards are feasible to prevent LLMs from being misused to generate health disinformation, they were inconsistently implemented. Furthermore, effective processes for reporting safeguard problems were lacking. Enhanced regulation, transparency, and routine auditing are required to help prevent LLMs from contributing to the mass generation of health disinformation