The (Elusive) Theory of Everything

Stephen Hawking's work on black holes and the origin of the universe is arguably the most concrete progress theoretical physicists have made toward reconciling Einstein's gravitation and quantum physics into one final theory of everything. Physicists have a favorite candidate for such a theory, string theory, but it comes in five different formulations, each covering a restricted range of situations. A network of mathematical connections, however, links the different string theories into one overarching system, enigmatically called M-theory: perhaps the network is itself the final theory. In a new book, The Grand Design, Hawking and Caltech physicist Leonard Mlodinow argue that the quest to discover a final theory may in fact never lead to a unique set of equations. Every scientific theory, they write, comes with its own model of reality, and it may not make sense to talk of what reality actually is. This essay is based on that book

Solving the Schrödinger equation with use of 1/N perturbation theory

The large N expansion provides a powerful new tool for solving the Schrödinger equation. In this paper, we present simple recursion formulas which facilitate the calculation. We do some numerical calculations which illustrate the speed and accuracy of the technique

Relation between the psychological and thermodynamic arrows of time

In this paper we lay out an argument that generically the psychological arrow of time should align with the thermodynamic arrow of time where that arrow is well defined. This argument applies to any physical system that can act as a memory, in the sense of preserving a record of the state of some other system. This result follows from two principles: the robustness of the thermodynamic arrow of time to small perturbations in the state, and the principle that a memory should not have to be fine-tuned to match the state of the system being recorded. This argument applies even if the memory system itself is completely reversible and nondissipative. We make the argument with a paradigmatic system, and then formulate it more broadly for any system that can be considered a memory. We illustrate these principles for a few other example systems and compare our criteria to earlier treatments of this problem