The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits

Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because they are guided by automatic yet rational, propositional processes. Others still suggest that habits guide intelligent behaviour without involving propositional states by shaping perception in action-soliciting ways. We develop an alternative fourth answer based on John Dewey’s pragmatist account of habit. We argue that habits promote intelligent behaviour by shaping perception, by forming an interrelated network among themselves, and by cooperating with the environment

Anchoring empathy in receptivity

In one sense of the term, empathy refers to the act of sharing in another person’s experience of and perspective on the world. According to simulation accounts of empathy, we achieve this by replicating the other’s mind in our imagination. We explore a form of empathy, empathic perspective-taking, that is not adequately captured by existing simulationist approaches. We begin by pointing out that we often achieve empathy (or share in another’s perspective) by listening to the other person. This form of empathy, which we call “empathy through listening”, involves four distinctive features: (i) the actual sharing of a perspective; (ii) dynamical unfolding; (iii) collaboration; and (iv) mutual transformation. Next, we consider the individual basis of empathy through listening. We argue that it requires an attitude of “receptivity” and elaborate on this elusive concept in terms of “epistemic respect”. Finally, we consider whether this form of empathy can be adequately explained within the simulationist framework. We argue that simulationist approaches must be complemented by a receptivity-based conception of empathy—that is, a conception that envisions empathy not so much as an individual imaginative enterprise, but rather as a collaborative practice of engaging with the other while paying her due epistemic respect

Situated self-awareness in expert performance: a situated normativity account of riken no ken

We explore the nature of expert minds in skilled performance by examining classic Japanese dramatist Zeami’s account of skilled expertise in Noh drama. Zeami characterizes expert minds by the co-existence of mushin and riken no ken. Mushin (“no-mind”) is an empty state of mind devoid of mental contents. Riken no ken (“seeing with a separate seeing”) is a distinctive form of self-awareness, where the actor embodies a common perspective with the audience upon one’s own performance. Conventional accounts of riken no ken present it as a form of imagination: expert actors deliver their performance by imagining what it looks like from an external point of view. These imagination-based accounts, however, do not square well with the claim that riken no ken co-exists with mushin. We propose an alternative perception-based account that better accounts for this co-existence, drawing on the concept of “situated normativity” from embodied-ecological theories of cognition. The situated normativity account characterizes riken no ken as a form of “direct affective perception” in which actors are aware of their performance’s quality of attunement with the performative situation. Expert Noh actors realise a common perspective with the audience not by imagining an external point of view, but by perceiving the situation that encompasses their own performance from an aesthetic perspective cultivated and shared within the Noh community

エナクションの現象学 : 身体的行為としての事物知覚と他者知覚

学位の種別: 課程博士審査委員会委員 : （主査）東京大学准教授 石原 孝二, 東京大学教授 信原 幸弘, 東京大学教授 廣野 喜幸, 立正大学教授 村田 純一, 立教大学教授 河野 哲也University of Tokyo(東京大学

Analysis of HCV genotypes from blood donors shows three new HCV type 6 subgroups exist in Myanmar.

The prevalence of hepatitis C virus (HCV) genotypes in Myanmar in comparison with the rest of Southeast Asia is not well known. Serum samples were obtained from 201 HCV antibody-positive volunteer blood donors in and around the Myanmar city of Yangon. Of these, the antibody titers of 101 samples were checked by serial dilution using HCV antibody PA test II and Terasaki microplate as a low-cost method. To compare antibody titers by this method and RNA identification, we also checked HCV-RNA using the Amplicor 2.0 test. Most high-titer groups were positive for HCV-RNA. Of the 201 samples, 110 were successfully polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplified. Among them, 35 (31.8%) were of genotype 1, 52 (47.3%) were of genotype 3, and 23 (20.9%) were of type 6 variants, and phylogenetic analysis of these type 6 variants revealed that 3 new type 6 subgroups exist in Myanmar. We named the subgroups M6-1, M6-2, and M6-3. M6-1 and M6-2 were relatively close to types 8 and 9, respectively. M6-3, though only found in one sample, was a brand-new subgroup. These subtypes were not seen in Vietnam, where type 6 group variants are widely spread. These findings may be useful for analyzing how and when these subgroups were formed

Enactive pain and its sociocultural embeddedness

This paper disputes the theoretical assumptions of mainstream approaches in philosophy of pain, representationalism and imperativism, and advances an enactive approach as an alternative. It begins by identifying three shared assumptions in the mainstream approaches: the internalist assumption, the brain-body assumption, and the semantic assumption. It then articulates an alternative, enactive approach that considers pain as an embodied response to the situation. This approach entails the hypothesis of the sociocultural embeddedness of pain, which states against the brain-body assumption that the intentional character of pain depends on the agent\u27s sociocultural background. The paper then proceeds to consider two objections. The first questions the empirical basis of this hypothesis. It is argued based on neuroscientific evidence, however, that there is no empirical reason to suppose that the first-order experience of pain is immune to sociocultural influences. The second objection argues that the mainstream approaches can account for sociocultural influences on pain by drawing on the conceptual distinction between narrow and wide content. In response, the semantic conception of pain underpinning the proposal is challenged. Pain experience can occur in pre-reflective, affectively reflective, or cognitively reflective forms, but the semantic conception at most only applies to the last form. The paper concludes that the enactive approach offers a promising alternative framework in philosophy of pain

The integrated structure of consciousness: phenomenal content, subjective attitude, and noetic complex

We explore the integrated structure (or the unity) of consciousness by examining the phenomenological axioms of the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. After clarifying the notion of phenomenological axioms by drawing on resources from Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Section 1), we develop a critique of the integration axiom by drawing on phenomenological analyses developed by Aron Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty (Section 2 & 3). This axiom is ambiguous. It can be read either atomistically as claiming that the phenomenal content of conscious experience is an integrated complex and holistically as claiming that it is an integrated Gestalt. We argue that the latter reading provides a better characterization of the internal structure of the phenomenal content. Furthermore, the integrated structure of consciousness is not confined to the phenomenal content, but it also extends into the subjective attitude (Section 4). Subjective attitudes and phenomenal contents are interdependent constituents that jointly make up conscious experiences. This implies a novel theoretical challenge to the scientific component of IIT, which is to explain how to accommodate the subjective dimension of consciousness into its explanatory scope (Section 5). IIT can respond in a few different ways, but most importantly, it cannot just ignore it once and for all. As one possible way to address the challenge, we propose introducing a novel construct, noetic complex, to develop a fine-grained model of the neural underpinning of consciousness (Section 6)