Flight Test Limitations and Strategic Arms Control

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68500/2/10.1177_096701068201300317.pd

Understanding International Conflict: Some Theoretical Gaps

The purpose here is to consider some significant gaps in the theoretical bases with which we seek to under stand international conflict - either at the level of non-military hostility or at that of actual warfare. The in centives behind both levels of conflictive behavior are examined in terms of discrepancies between achieved and expected levels of attainment (attainment gaps) on relevant needs. Two general conflict-inducing situa tions at the level of non-violent hostility are identified: one where the attainment gap is causally attributable to the target of the hostility and another where such behavior might help narrow the gap even in the absence of external attributability. Although the properties of a nation which, in the second situation, might make it the object of another's hostility are not well understood, some tentative suggestions are advanced to account for this possibility. The differences in the incentives behind warfare and those that lead to simple hostility are considered, with particular attention to the relation between specific sorts of unsatisfied needs and war involvement. It is suggested that both the salience of certain needs and the range of strategies to enhance attainments thereon are factors which link given needs to armed conflict; both, it is argued, are shaped by the nature and structure of the societies within which the needs are experienced. Situations where the bene fits from simple hostility carry over into (or are amplified by) warfare are discussed, as are instances where the contrary occurs. Tentative explanations for these patterns are suggested. Finally, the impact of military capacity on the transition from hostility to warfare is examined, both from the point of view of the balance between potential antagonists and the nature of the actual weaponry involved.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68393/2/10.1177_002234338201900105.pd

Capital, Labor, and the Spoils of War

The article deals with certain political and economic consequences of recent American war involvements. It is found that the nation's economy experienced particularly pronounced surges of growth during wartime and certain implications of this fact for both Keynesian and Marxian doctrine are discussed. It is further demonstrated that, contrary to much conven tional wisdom, labor rather than business derived the greatest gains from U.S. military interventions abroad - a finding which, while perhaps counterintuitive, can be explained by the joint exigencies of politics and economics in wartime. Finally, while economic con siderations may not have influenced the decisions to initiate foreign intervention, it is sug gested that they may well have affected the subsequent expansion and duration of military involvement.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68421/2/10.1177_002234338001700202.pd

Universalism vs. Particularism: On the Limits of Major Power Order

Relations between major powers can be described as shifting between universalism and particularism. In periods of universalism, major powers try to work out acceptable rules of behavior among one another, whereas in periods of particularism, they emphasize special interests of special powers. The way historians see shifts in major power relations since 1816 largely follows such a classification. By comparing the policies pursued during four periods of universalism and four periods of particularism, as well as analysing what ended or initiated such periods, the limits of major power universalism can be evaluated. Particularly, the short-comings of the recent period of detente are illuminated. Also some principles for a more enduring form of universalism are suggested.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68816/2/10.1177_002234338402100304.pd

The Political Economy of US Military Spending

The causes of the dramatic rise in military spending in the post-war era have been the subject of much political and academic controversy. No extant formulation seems to provide a compelling explanation of the dynamics involved in the levels of, and rates of change in, such spending. In light of this, the authors develop a new model, based mainly on a political-business cycle argument, to account for these dynamics. The basic proposition in this model is that variations in national defense spending arise from political considerations which are related to real and desired conditions within the national economy. Applying this model to the experience of the United States 1948-1976, the authors show that it has a large measure of empirical validity. If one removes the effects of war-time mobilization, it is clear that for the United States the principal driving forces in military spending dynamics were (1) the perceived utility of such spending in stabilizing aggregate demand, (2) the political or electoral value of the perceived economic effects arising out of such spending, and (3) the pressures of institutional-constituency demands.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/68958/2/10.1177_002234337901600202.pd