Lanse Minkler on Human Rights and Structural Adjustment by Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 276pp.

A review of: Human Rights and Structural Adjustment by Rodwan Abouharb & David Cingranelli. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 276pp

Integrity and Agreement: Economics When Principles Also Matter

Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-161) and index.Mode of access: Internet

The Role of Constitutions on Poverty: A Cross-National Investigation

In this paper we use novel historical data on economics and social rights from the constitutions of 201 countries and an instrument variable strategy to answer two important questions. First, do economic and social rights provisions in constitutions reduce poverty? Second, does the strength of constitutional language of the economic and social rights matter? Constitutional provisions can be framed either more weakly as directive principles or more strongly as enforceable law. We find three important results. First, we do not find an association between constitutional rights generally framed and poverty. Second, we do not find an association between economic and social rights framed as directive principles and poverty. Third, we do find a strong negative association between economic and social rights framed as enforceable law and poverty. When we use legal origins as our IV, we find evidence that this result is causal. Our results survive a variety of robustness checks. The policy implication is that constitutional provisions framed as enforceable law provide effective meta-rules with incentives for policymakers to initiate, fund, monitor and enforce poverty reduction policies

Economic Rights and the Policymaker's Decision Problem

Economic rights can be instantiated in a variety of ways. This paper investigates the problem with making economic rights into policy from one source: the political policymaker. By modeling the policymaker's decision problem we can identify particular decision flaws and possible correctives that might prompt economic rights instantiation through "enlightened self-interest." A complementary approach involves constitutionalizing economic rights with directive principles and enforceable law, which could work somewhat independently of the policymaker's preferences and/or beliefs. The last part of the paper looks at a sample of actual constitutions to see if government effort toward economic rights fulfillment is related with constitutionalization. The evidence here suggests a positive relationship: those countries with better economic rights provisions in their constitutions demonstrate greater economic rights effort.Economic Rights; Constitutions; Human Rights; Political Policymaker

Managing Moral Motivations

Firms confront three problems: (1) shirking (sub-optimal provision of effort), (2) smooth transfer of knowledge, and (3) eliciting new knowledge. The motivations possessed by firm members are four: (a) instrumental rationality (i.e., self-interest), (b) moral motivations and integrity, (c) intrinsic motivations, and (d) fairness motivations. The trick for the firm is to manage motivations in a way that solves its particular problems. The purpose of this paper is to provide the foundations for moral motivations and moral integrity, and to discuss the kinds of problems that they can and cannot solve, particularly in context of the complex motivational mix