Russian Crisis: Expectations Against Facts

2015–2016 turned out to be the period of the most prolonged decline in the latest Russian economic history (not counting the transformation crisis of the 1990s). By the end of 2016 there were signs of the end of the crisis, and in 2017 it seemed to have given grounds to believe that the crisis was overcome. To what extent have the system problems of the domestic economy really been overcome and external shocks, which acted as a catalyst for the structural and institutional failures that form the fundamental basis of the crisis, have been leveled? This article is devoted to the discussion of this question. The article analyzed expert estimates and statistics for 2017. It is shown that the expectations of overcoming the crisis are conflicting with objective indicators of economic dynamics. This is manifested in the following. First, in the low ability to self-generation of economic growth. Although the multiplier of output in the economy as a whole increased somewhat after the catastrophic decrease by 2000 compared to 1990 (to 1.35 against 2.0), it remains low (1.93). It is explained considerably by the primitiveness of the Russian economy that saw the decrease in the level of intra-industrial interactions and the length of added value chains at the beginning of the crisis compared to the beginning of 1980s, although the opposite is seen in the advanced economies. Second, the constant institutional shell that remains the biggest problematic sphere when looking at transition to economy of growth that generates the increase in the quality of life. The simultaneous solution to the two-part problem: saving the ‘stability’ of institutional and providing the dynamic development of economy and society – appears to be impossibl

Chinese Global and Russian Spatial Strategies: Harmonization Potential

A probability of the harmonization of the Chinese sub-global strategy ‘One Belt, One Road’, proposed in 2013, and Russian integration project for the Eurasia economic cooperation are reviewed as well as the influence of this potential synchronized project on the Far Eastern segment of the Russian spatial strategy. It is noted that the problems of spatial heterogeneity gave push to the ‘One Belt, One Road’ project when China approached the point in economic development where different regional economic zones demand new infrastructural solutions for maintaining economic dynamics. The article shows that the declared co-development of countries involved is based on the rigid pragmatic financial-credit and infrastructural expansion of Central Asian model: mandatory provision of significant share in property (controlling stake, if possible), mandatory financing with construction contract and guaranteed future export of services for operating the facilities, ensuring the rights on full (or no less than 50%) export of raw materials for further processing to China, employing Chinese labor in Russian-Chinese enterprises, and using Chinese machinery and equipmen