High frequency rays of cosmic origin II. Mountain peak and airplane observations

The elimination in penetrating ray experiments of temperature and pressure effects is accomplished through new features in the design of Wulf electroscopes, but especially through immediate reduction in situ of all deflections to volts. Variation of penetrating radiation with altitude and with time of day. — When suitable precautions are taken for eliminating the activity of adjacent rocks, both airplane and mountain peak observations agree in showing a definite variation of the penetrating radiation with altitude alone. Within the limits of experimental error all observations are consistent in showing no dependence of the penetrating radiation upon the time of day or upon the position of heavenly bodies. Absorption coefficients of penetrating rays. — Absorption experiments made on Pikes Peak with lead sheets 4.8 cm thick furnish evidence for the existence on mountain peaks of copious new rays of local origin of no greater hardness than that of gamma rays. If these new rays are assumed to be homogeneous their absorption coefficient is about 3.1 per meter of water. These experiments, however, furnish no definite evidence for the existence of very penetrating rays of cosmic origin. Necessary characteristics of cosmic rays if they exist — Such rays cannot produce as much as 2 ions per cc per sec. at sea level if they have an absorption coefficient not less than 0.25 per meter of water. If cosmic rays exist at all they must be less intense than this, or else they must be more penetrating than anyone has as yet suggested

The evolution and development of visual perspective taking

I outline three conceptions of seeing that a creature might possess: ‘the headlamp conception,’ which involves an understanding of the causal connections between gazing at an object, certain mental states, and behavior; ‘the stage lights conception,’ which involves an understanding of the selective nature of visual attention; and seeing-as. I argue that infants and various nonhumans possess the headlamp conception. There is also evidence that chimpanzees and 3-year-old children have some grasp of seeing-as. However, due to a dearth of studies, there is no evidence that infants or nonhumans possess the stage lights conception of seeing. I outline the kinds of experiments that are needed, and what we stand to learn about the evolution and development of perspective taking

KINEMATIC COMPARISON OF TWO RACING WHEELCHAIR PROPULSION TECHNIQUES

The purpose of this study was to quantify selected 3-D kinematic characteristics of the upper body during racing wheelchair stroking over a roller system using the conventional technique (CVT) and para-backhand technique (PBT). Eight CVT and seven PBT users served as the subjects. Each subject performed maximum effort stroking for 30 s at two loads and was recorded by two S-VHS camcorders (60 Hz). The CVT was found to have significant shorter push time, smaller relative push time, and greater relative recovery time than the PBT. Significant difference in arm position at the instant of hand release was found between the two techniques and the difference may have implications for the stress placed on the structures around the shoulder joint. When compared to each other, the CVT is a more compact stroke and the PBT has a faster overall movement speed

Cognitive Computation sans Representation

The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is extrinsic to formal procedures as such, and the intended interpretation of syntax makes no difference to the execution of an algorithm. So the unique 'content' postulated by RTM is superfluous to the formal procedures of CTM. And once these procedures are implemented in a physical mechanism, it is exclusively the causal properties of the physical mechanism that are responsible for all aspects of the system's behaviour. So once again, postulated content is rendered superfluous. To the extent that semantic content may appear to play a role in behaviour, it must be syntactically encoded within the system, and just as in a standard computational artefact, so too with the human mind/brain - it's pure syntax all the way down to the level of physical implementation. Hence 'content' is at most a convenient meta-level gloss, projected from the outside by human theorists, which itself can play no role in cognitive processing

The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Account of Function

The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function

Casting Light Upon The Great Endarkenment

While the Enlightenment promoted thinking for oneself independent of religious authority, the ‘Endarkenment’ (Millgram 2015) concerns deference to a new authority: the specialist, a hyperspecializer. Non-specialists need to defer to such authorities as they are unable to understand their reasoning. Millgram describes how humans are capable of being serial hyperspecializers, able to move from one specialism to another. We support the basic thrust of Millgram’s position, and seek to articulate how the core idea is deployed in very different ways in relation to extremely different philosophical areas. We attend to the issue of the degree of isolation of different specialists and we urge greater emphasis on parallel hyperspecialization, which describes how different specialisms can be embodied in one person at one time

A Unifying Theory of Biological Function

A new theory that naturalizes biological function is explained and compared with earlier etiological and causal role theories. Etiological theories explain functions from how they are caused over their evolutionary history. Causal role theories analyze how functional mechanisms serve the current capacities of their containing system. The new proposal unifies the key notions of both kinds of theories, but goes beyond them by explaining how functions in an organism can exist as factors with autonomous causal efficacy. The goal-directedness and normativity of functions exist in this strict sense as well. The theory depends on an internal physiological or neural process that mimics an organism’s fitness, and modulates the organism’s variability accordingly. The structure of the internal process can be subdivided into subprocesses that monitor specific functions in an organism. The theory matches well with each intuition on a previously published list of intuited ideas about biological functions, including intuitions that have posed difficulties for other theories

A Functional Naturalism

I provide two arguments against value-free naturalism. Both are based on considerations concerning biological teleology. Value-free naturalism is the thesis that both (1) everything is, at least in principle, under the purview of the sciences and (2) all scientific facts are purely non-evaluative. First, I advance a counterexample to any analysis on which natural selection is necessary to biological teleology. This should concern the value-free naturalist, since most value-free analyses of biological teleology appeal to natural selection. My counterexample is unique in that it is likely to actually occur. It concerns the creation of synthetic life. Recent developments in synthetic biology suggest scientists will eventually be able to develop synthetic life. Such life, however, would not have any of its traits naturally selected for. Second, I develop a simple argument that biological teleology is a scientific but value-laden notion. Consequently, value-free naturalism is false. I end with some concluding remarks on the implications for naturalism, the thesis that (1). Naturalism may be salvaged only if we reject (2). (2) is a dogma that unnecessarily constrains our conception of the sciences. Only a naturalism that recognizes value-laden notions as scientifically respectable can be true. Such a naturalism is a functional naturalism

Tomonaga-Luttinger features in the resonant Raman spectra of quantum wires

The differential cross section for resonant Raman scattering from the collective modes in a one dimensional system of interacting electrons is calculated non-perturbatively using the bosonization method. The results indicate that resonant Raman spectroscopy is a powerful tool for studying Tomonaga-Luttinger liquid behaviour in quasi-one dimensional electron systems.Comment: 4 pages, no figur