A Critical Examination of Spontaneous Perspective Taking

A number of authors have identified an extension of Theory of Mind (ToM) termed as ‘spontaneous perspective taking’, in which another’s visual perspective is computed both ‘rapidly’ and ‘spontaneously’ (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). The current work examines this notion. Experiments 1 and 2 employed the ambiguous number paradigm with different manipulations of attention. Evidence was found to suggest the spontaneous assumption of another’s visual perspective. However, most importantly, this effect was also identified during conditions when, as the visual perspective taking theory would predict, it should not be apparent. Alternatively, Experiment 3 was unable to identify this effect using a variant of the dot perspective task. The next two experiments increased the measurement sensitivity of spontaneous visual perspective taking using eye movements. Again, similar patterns in the data were identified when the phenomenon should not have been exhibited. Next, Experiments 6 and 7, assessed whether the notion is routed within ToM through experimentation on young children. The developmental findings were unclear, however there were indications that the concept is progressively improved with age. Subsequently, Experiments 8, 9, and 10 adapted the examination of this notion by investigating whether perceived ownership had any effects. Initially, using a novel single response method no significant results were found. However, when using standardised response time measures it was suggested that individuals were exhibiting a spontaneous visual perspective taking response, irrespective of perceived ownership. Lastly, Experiments 11, 12, and 13 introduced an alternative theory suggesting that the agent, as well as any other orientation cue, act as a reference point that anchors and orientates the image. Overall, the present findings challenge the spontaneous visual perspective taking theory; as a number of alternative concepts have also been suggested to contribute towards this phenomenon

Perspective-Taking: In Search of a Theory.

Perspective-taking has been one of the central concerns of work on social attention and developmental psychology for the past 60 years. Despite its prominence, there is no formal description of what it means to represent another's viewpoint. The present article argues that such a description is now required in the form of theory-a theory that should address a number of issues that are central to the notion of assuming another's viewpoint. After suggesting that the mental imagery debate provides a good framework for understanding some of the issues and problems surrounding perspective-taking, we set out nine points that we believe any theory of perspective-taking should consider

Mental states modulate gaze following, but not automatically.

A number of authors have suggested that the computation of another person’s visual perspective occurs automatically. In the current work we examined whether perspective-taking is indeed automatic or more likely to be due to mechanisms associated with conscious control. Participants viewed everyday scenes in which a single human model looked towards a target object. Importantly, the model’s view of the object was either visible or occluded by a physical barrier (e.g., briefcase). Results showed that when observers were given five seconds to freely view the scenes, eye movements were faster to fixate the object when the model could see it compared to when it was occluded. By contrast, when observers were required to rapidly discriminate a target superimposed upon the same object no such visibility effect occurred. We also employed the barrier procedure together with the most recent method (i.e., the ambiguous number paradigm) to have been employed in assessing the perspective-taking theory. Results showed that the model’s gaze facilitated responses even when this agent could not see the critical stimuli. We argue that although humans do take into account the perspective of other people this does not occur automatically

Visual Cognition and the Science of Magic

A number of authors have argued that the art of conjuring can assist the development of theories and knowledge in visual cognition and psychology more broadly. A central assumption of the so-called science of magic is that magicians possess particular insight into human cognition. In a series of experiments, we tested the Insight hypothesis by assessing three factors that magicians argue are important for a popular illusion. Participants viewed videos of a magician performing the French Drop sleight whilst gaze, motion, and muscular tension were manipulated across experiments. Contrary to what the community of conjurers state, results showed that none of these influenced the perceived success of the effect. We also found that a visual priming technique, one suggested of many and used by an eminent magician, does not influence participant responses. Overall, these findings fail to support the Insight hypothesis. We suggest that scientists of magic have erroneously imbued magicians with insights they do not possess