On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts

The National Park Service has struggled to improve the quality of service provided by concessioners for decades. To address these concerns, the Park Service eliminated the right of first refusal from the largest revenue-generating concession contract auctions beginning in 2000. This article provides models of concession contract auctions with and without the right of first refusal. The optimal bidding strategies and expected level of service are found. The results confirm the auction without the right of first refusal leads to bids that include a higher level of service. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

HANDEDNESS AND DIRECTIONAL ASYMMETRY IN THE LONG BONES OF THE HUMAN UPPER-LIMB

The long bones of the human upper limb usually show lateral asymmetries of length. This pattern can be attributed either to the mechanical consequences of handedness bias or to genetic or hormonal factors acting directly on longitudinal bone growth. Length data was obtained from the long bones of the upper limbs of a large skeletal assemblage from Wharram Percy, Yorkshire (England), predominantly deriving from the 11th-16th centuries A.D. The Wharram Percy adult skeletons had a population distribution of lateral asymmetries of length in the humerus and in the humerus-plus-radius (a proxy arm length index) which closely parallels the pattern of behavioural handedness found in modern populations. This pattern was developing in the skeletons from the infant and juvenile age ranges, but was absent in the neonates (of whom 12 out of 14 had longer left humeri). We argue that this supports the environmental hypothesis that the ontogeny of long bone length asymmetry is consequent to the earlier development of lateral bias in mechanical loading of the upper limbs

The Cost Effectiveness of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program Bonus Allocation Mechanism

The U.S. Export Enhancement Program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism. The current mechanism resembles a discriminatory-price, common-value auction. However, auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons. This article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative, uniform-price auction. Estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the current format and simulations suggest that adopting a uniform-price auction format for bonus allocation may yield considerable savings to the Treasury by eliminating incentives to pad bids and increasing participation in the auction. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

(M+1)st-Price Auction Protocol

. This paper presents a new protocol for M + 1st-price auction, a style of auction in which the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price, determined by the (M + 1)st price. A set of distributed servers collaborates to resolve the (M + 1)st price without revealing any information in terms of bids including the winners' bids. A new trick to jointly and securely compute the highest value as a degree of distributed polynomials is introduced. The building block requires just one round for bidders to cast bids and one round for auctioneers to determine the winners. 1 Introduction The Internet is a prime vehicle for supporting electronic auction, a primitive pricing mechanism for setting prices. The most common auction style is the open-bid English auction, in which bidders incrementally raise the prices bid for goods until as many winners are left as the number of units of goods. Bidders are required to be watching the current prices, and it usually takes a long time to close ..