Nomination contests: theory and empirical evidence from professional soccer

This paper develops a theory of contests based on perceived abilities, and provides evidence for the predictions of this theory using panel data from professional soccer. We examine how soccer players perform in club matches during the informal)nomination contests for national teams prior to an important international Cup, the Euro 2008. Our differences-in-differences analysis uses players from nonqualified nations who play in the same league as a control group. We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output measures for players with intermediate chances of being nominated, as proxied by past national team participations. For players with no prior national team experience there is no significant effect. We also find support for the theory that players whose nomination is close to certain reduce their effort in order to avoid injuries or exhaustion prior to the Cup. Finally, any positive reaction is strongest for young players. --

Nomination contests : theory and empirical evidence from professional soccer

This paper develops a theory of contests based on perceived abilities, and provides evidence for the predictions of this theory using panel data from professional soccer. We examine how soccer players perform in club matches during the informal)nomination contests for national teams prior to an important international Cup, the Euro 2008. Our differences-in-differences analysis uses players from nonqualified nations who play in the same league as a control group. We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output measures for players with intermediate chances of being nominated, as proxied by past national team participations. For players with no prior national team experience there is no significant effect. We also find support for the theory that players whose nomination is close to certain reduce their effort in order to avoid injuries or exhaustion prior to the Cup. Finally, any positive reaction is strongest for young players

Delivered pricing and the impact of spatial differentiation on cartel stability

This paper analyzes the impact of spatial differentiation on the sustainability of collusion on delivered prices. It shows that the choice of the punishment mechanism that enforces collusion is crucial for determining whether differentiation facilitates cartel pricing or not. If punishments are optimal, then differentiation tends to facilitate collusion. Optimal punishments impose minmax profits on deviators independently of the degree of differentiation. A high degree of differentiation then renders deviations less profitable, since it makes business stealing more costly but does not affect the deviator's punishment profits. Depending on the transport cost technology, excessive differentiation may have a countervailing effect, however, because it also implies high transport costs for the cartel. If collusion is sustained by standard grim trigger punishments instead, then collusion may be easiest for minimal differentiation. The reason is that competitive and thus grim trigger punishment profits are higher the higher the degree of differentiation.Delivered pricing Collusion Optimal penal codes Spatial differentiation

Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination Between Sellers?

© 2019 INFORMS. We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting resulting from algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that, although better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor prices to demand conditions, it also increases each firm's temptation to deviate to a lower price in time periods of high predicted demand. Overall, our research suggests that, despite concerns expressed by policy makers, better forecasting and algorithms can lead to lower prices and higher consumer surplus

What Are We Really Good At? Product Strategy with Uncertain Capabilities

Firms often learn about their own capabilities through their products\u27 successes and failures. This paper explores the interaction between learning about capabilities and product strategy in a formal model. We consider a firm that can launch a sequence of products, where each product\u27s success probability depends on the fit between the firm\u27s capabilities and the product. A successful new product always causes the firm to become more optimistic about the capability most relevant for that product; however, it can also cause the firm to become less optimistic about some of its other capabilities, including capabilities the new product does not use. The firm\u27s optimal forward-looking product strategy accounts for short-run expected products as well as for the information value of learning for future decisions. We find that a product sharing few or even no capabilities with potential future products can have a greater information value than a product that shares more capabilities with future products and that learning about capabilities can affect the optimal sequence of product launch decisions

Buyer power and intrabrand coordination.

Abstract We analyze the competitive effects of vertical contracts in a contracting situation where rival retailers offer contracts to a manufacturer. In contrast t

Vertical relations

The paper presents recent advances in the analysis of successive oligopolies characterized by "interlocking relationships", where competing upstream suppliers deal with the same set of competing downstream partners. We first highlight the extent to which interlocking relationships alter competition, and may allow vertical restraints such as Resale Price Maintenance to eliminate it upstream as well as downstream. Modeling difficulties, such as the inexistence or a large multiplicity of equilibria, however arise. After reviewing how similar issues have been successfully addressed in the case of a single supplier, we draw lessons for more general multilateral settings.Vertical relations Multilateral bargaining Successive oligopolies Resale Price Maintenance