Microeconomics 2000/2001

x+213hlm.;27c

Microeconomics 2002/2003

x+214hlm.;28c

"Friends Are Thieves of Time": Heuristic Attention Sharing in Stable Friendship Networks

These are the files necessary to reproduce all simulations in the paper. The main Matlab files contain extensive comments. All other Matlab files are variation on the main file or contain specific functions. The Mathematica notebook transforms files in .g6 format into .mat files for Matlab for the part of the simulations which uses data on non-isomorphic networks up to n=12. The remaining .mat file contains simulated networks for n=20

Naïve imitation and partial cooperation in a local public goods model

These are the files necessary to reproduce all simulations in the paper. The main Mathematica notebook contains extensive comments. All other notebook files are variation on the main file and function similarly. The Excel files contain the data to produce the graphs

Replication data for: Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups

In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish. In this article, the authors experimentally investigate public-good provision in normal and privileged groups with and without decentralized punishment. The authors find that compared to normal groups, privileged groups are relatively ineffective in using costly sanctions to increase everyone's contributions. Punishment is less targeted toward strong free riders, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. Thus, the authors show that privileged groups are not as privileged as they initially seem

Replication data for: Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations

This document contains supplementary materials for the paper Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations. It is organized in the following way: Section 1 consists of a sample of the instructions used in the experiment and in the online questionnaire study, Section 2 contains the results of nonparametric comparisons between treatments, Section 3 provides a detailed description of the frequency of periods with maximal contributions, Section 4 presents the regressions of the various robustness checks for the norm-elicitation technique reported in the paper, and Section 5 provides regressions that illustrate the reaction in contributions to being punished. We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no positive contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contributions emerge across group types and individuals in different roles. In some cases these differences result from the emergence of an efficiency norm where all fully contribute. In the cases where full efficiency is not attained, these differences result from the enforcement of different relative contribution norms. Hence, our experimental data show that, even in heterogeneous groups, individuals can overcome the collective action problem inherent in public good games by agreeing on and enforcing a contribution norm