Payout Policy

This paper surveys the literature on payout policy. We start with a description of the Miller-Modigliani payout irrelevance proposition, and then consider the effect of relaxing the assumptions on which it is based. We consider the role of taxes, asymmetric information, incomplete contracting possibilities, and transaction costs. The accumulated evidence indicates that changes in payout policies are not motivated by firms' desire to signal their true worth to the market. Both dividends and repurchases seem to be paid to reduce potential overinvestment by management. We also review the issue of the form of payout and the increased tendency to use open market share repurchases. Evidence suggests that the rise in the popularity of repurchases increased overall payout and increased firms' financial flexibility.

On the Importance of Measuring Payout Yield: Implications for Empirical Asset Pricing

Previous research showed that the dividend price ratio process changed remarkably during the 1980's and 1990's, but that the total payout ratio (dividends plus repurchases over price) changed very little. We investigate implications of this difference for asset pricing models. In particular, the widely documented decline in the predictive power of dividends for excess stock returns in time series regressions in recent data is vastly overstated. Statistically and economically significant predictability is found at both short and long horizons when total payout yield is used instead of dividend yield. We also provide evidence that total payout yield has information in the cross-section for expected stock returns exceeding that of dividend yield and that the high minus low payout yield portfolio is a priced factor. The evidence throughout is shown to be robust to the method of measuring total payouts.

Trading in the Presence of Short-Lived Private Information: Evidence from Analyst Recommendation Changes

We study how short-lived private information affects trading strategies and liquidity provision. Our empirical identification rests on information acquisition before analyst recommendations are publically announced. Consistent with theory, institutional investors who are likely to possess short-lived private information on average “buy the rumor and sell the news,” buying before analyst upgrades and selling when upgrades are announced. When we go beyond existing theory, we find that different classes of informed institutions differ in their profit-taking patterns, reflecting variations in their trading horizons and motives. The returns to holding private information are economically large. Individuals, who are unlikely to be informed early, buy on upgrade announcements but not before. Institutions that are not attentive to firm-specific news appear to suffer from a winner’s curse, emerging as de-facto liquidity providers to better-informed institutions. Placebo tests confirm that these trading patterns are unique to situations in which some investors have a short-lived informational advantage

Using Expectations to Test Asset Pricing Models

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72165/1/j.1755-053X.2005.tb00109.x.pd

Financing Payouts

We study the extent to which firms rely on the capital markets to fund their payouts. We find that 42% of firms that pay out capital also initiate debt or equity issues in the same year, resulting in 32% of aggregate payouts being externally financed. Most firms that simultaneously raise and distribute capital do not generate enough free cash flow to fund their payouts internally. Firms devote more external capital to finance share repurchases than to avoid dividend cuts. Payouts financed by debt, which allow firms to jointly manage their capital structure and liquidity, are by far the most common

The Deleveraging of U.S. Firms and Institutional Investors’ Role

Corporate leverage has decreased markedly in the U.S. since 1992. In contrast to press coverage of hedge funds increasing debt, increases in institutional investments, primarily by mutual funds, account for part of this deleveraging. We use implied mutual fund trades constructed from individual-investor flows as exogenous variation in institutional ownership for estimation. Supporting the hypothesis institutions contributed to deleveraging, our estimates increase significantly after regulatory reforms incentivized stronger institutional governance. Firms deleverage by reducing debt and transitioning to debt associated with enhanced monitoring and efficiency. Counterfactual simulations indicate aggregate leverage would have been eight percentage points higher without institutions' influence

The Deleveraging of U.S. Firms and Institutional Investors’ Role

Corporate leverage has decreased markedly in the U.S. since 1992. In contrast to press coverage of hedge funds increasing debt, increases in institutional investments, primarily by mutual funds, account for part of this deleveraging. We use implied mutual fund trades constructed from individual-investor flows as exogenous variation in institutional ownership for estimation. Supporting the hypothesis institutions contributed to deleveraging, our estimates increase significantly after regulatory reforms incentivized stronger institutional governance. Firms deleverage by reducing debt and transitioning to debt associated with enhanced monitoring and efficiency. Counterfactual simulations indicate aggregate leverage would have been eight percentage points higher without institutions' influence

Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?

Initiations and omissions of dividend payments are important changes in corporate financial policy. This paper investigates the market reaction to such changes in terms of prices, volume, and changes in clientele. Consistent with the prior literature we find that short run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations (-7.0% vs. +3.4% three day return). However, we show that, when we control for the change in the magnitude of dividend yield (which is larger for omissions), the asymmetry shrinks or disappears, depending on the specification. In the 12 months after the announcement (excluding the event calendar month), there is a significant positive market-adjusted return for firms initiating dividends of +7.5% and a significant negative market-adjusted return for firms omitting dividends of -11.0%. However, the post dividend omission drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples (long in initiation stocks and short in omission stocks) earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. Although these changes in dividend policy might be expected to produce shifts in clientele, we find little evidence for such a shift. Volume increases, but only slightly and briefly, and there are no important changes in institutional ownership.