Market versus administrative reallocation of agricultural land in a period of rapid industrialization

Under communal farm production, there was little incentive to work hard: the communal system guaranteed a livelihood, and there were few private gains from additional efforts. The reform that introduced the household responsibility system in China in the early 1980s sharpened individual work incentives by assigning specific plots and the rights to residual income to individual households. However, the household responsibility system left unresolved questions about the reallocation of land over time - questions that have become increasingly important (for both efficiency and equity) with the rapid growth of the non-farm economy. The authors use household and village data to show that the initially egalitarian distribution of land is becoming more dispersed over time. In what has become a hybrid property rights system, in some areas local village leaders (the cadre) were empowered to periodically redistribute land between households on the basis of economic and demographic changes among households. In other villages, households were granted much greater immunity against redistribution of any sort. Similarly, villages differed in the degree to which individual households could trade land among themselves. Some villages did not regulate the practice, and other required village approval or prohibited land rental relationships. The authors use simulated maximum likelihood methods to estimate hybrid panel models of the determinants of both market-based and administrative reallocation of land. They also use them to estimate the insecurity-induced investment costs of market-based reallocation of land. They find that administrative reallocation responds to the increasing inequality but non-market reallocations come at a significant cost in forgone investment.Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Municipal Housing and Land,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Housing and Land,Urban Housing,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Specialization without regret - transfer rights, agricultural productivity, and investment in an industrializing economy

A number of studies have examined the effects of secure tenure on agricultural investment and productivity. The authors also study the importance of rights to household residual income and land use being transferable. Contemporary China - where industrialization has spread rapidly, if unevenly - is a good place to study the economic effects of transfer rights as well as conventional security of tenure. Village collectives formally own land in China, so there can be no individual land sales, but farmers are sometimes entitled to sell their rights to use the land allocated to them under the household responsibility system. Whether a household has secure tenure depends on whether its landholding will be reduced if the household population declines, whether the landholding will be increased if the household population increases, and how frequent average land adjustments are under the household responsibility system. Analyzing panel data for a sample of farm households, the authors study the"investment regret mitigation effect", which results when greater transfer rights make households more willing to invest because they are less likely to regret such investments when they can recoup the investment value even if they exit farming. The authors find that transfer rights may be especially important in an industrializing economy. A property rights system with incomplete security of tenure but with strong transfer rights that permit"specialization without regret"- so farmers can recoup the value of an investment even if they exit farming - may have much to recommend it.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Municipal Housing and Land

Personal Volunteer Computing

We propose personal volunteer computing, a novel paradigm to encourage technical solutions that leverage personal devices, such as smartphones and laptops, for personal applications that require significant computations, such as animation rendering and image processing. The paradigm requires no investment in additional hardware, relying instead on devices that are already owned by users and their community, and favours simple tools that can be implemented part-time by a single developer. We show that samples of personal devices of today are competitive with a top-of-the-line laptop from two years ago. We also propose new directions to extend the paradigm

Network Codes Resilient to Jamming and Eavesdropping

We consider the problem of communicating information over a network secretly and reliably in the presence of a hidden adversary who can eavesdrop and inject malicious errors. We provide polynomial-time, rate-optimal distributed network codes for this scenario, improving on the rates achievable in previous work. Our main contribution shows that as long as the sum of the adversary's jamming rate Zo and his eavesdropping rate Zi is less than the network capacity C, (i.e., Zo+Zi<C), our codes can communicate (with vanishingly small error probability) a single bit correctly and without leaking any information to the adversary. We then use this to design codes that allow communication at the optimal source rate of C-Zo-Zi, while keeping the communicated message secret from the adversary. Interior nodes are oblivious to the presence of adversaries and perform random linear network coding; only the source and destination need to be tweaked. In proving our results we correct an error in prior work by a subset of the authors in this work.Comment: 6 pages, to appear at IEEE NetCod 201