Industry ownership of banks and credit market competition

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 179 (97.36) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Banking competition as mixed common and private value auction

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 179 (97.30) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

The effect of public information on competition and R D investment

SIGLEAvailable from UuStB Koeln(38)-981102640 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

On the effects of banks’ equity ownership on credit markets

Banking and commerce, Regulation and antitrust, Glass–Steagall act, Gramm–Leach–Bliley act, Auctions, G21, D44, L40,

The effect of public information on competition and R&D investment

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 179 (97.28) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

R&D COMPETITION AND ENDOGENOUS SPILLOVERS

The paper examines firms' choices between innovation and imitation in duopoly. We show that in the unique equilibrium asymmetric firms choose the same level of expenditure on imitation and the same ratio of innovative cost reduction to output. We evaluate the marginal contribution of innovation and imitation expenditure by small and large firms to consumer surplus and welfare, and discuss the desirability of differentiated R&D subsidies on innovation and imitation in terms of R&D tax rebates. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester, 2006.

On additive spillovers and returns to scale in R&D

This paper explores economically meaningful forms of cost functions for process research and development in the presence of imperfect appropriability of inventive output. We propose, as a central criterion to be satisfied by the knowledge production process, that a given R&D investment should always produce more cost reduction if devoted to one lab rather than two independent labs operated under natural spillovers. With input spillovers this postulate is broadly satisfied. However, with output spillovers this is generally not the case for R&D technologies having decreasing returns to scale. We identify economically plausible restrictions on the size of spillovers and on the properties of the R&D cost function so as to bring about compatibility with the above postulate. Some empirical evidence in support of both the criterion and of its theoretical implications is discussed.

Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: Incentives and welfare effects

Contrary to much of the existing literature, we obtain robust and clear-cut results for the incentives and welfare effects of information sharing when information is firm-specific. We show that firms' incentives to share this type of information are aligned with social welfare. Whenever revealing information is the dominant strategy (such as for Cournot firms revealing costs or Cournot and Bertrand firms revealing demand), it is socially beneficial. Only cost information in Bertrand competition will not be revealed but this is socially desirable, too. These findings are independent of distributional assumptions on random shocks and signals and hold for general asymmetric oligopoly with any mixture of substitute, complementary and independent goods.Information sharing Cost uncertainty Firm-specific information Benchmarking

Learning by doing, spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004Market evolution, Learning by doing, Spillover, Shakeout,

On additive spillovers and returns to scale in R&D

This paper explores economically meaningful forms of cost functions for process research and development in the presence of imperfect appropriability of inventive output. We propose, as a central criterion to be satisfied by the knowledge production process, that a given R&amp;D investment should always produce more cost reduction if devoted to one lab rather than two independent labs operated tinder natural spillovers. With input spillovers this postulate is broadly satisfied. However, with output spillovers this is generally not the case for R&amp;D technologies having decreasing returns to scale. We identify economically plausible restrictions on the size of spillovers and on the properties of the R&amp;D cost function so as to bring about compatibility with the above postulate. Some empirical evidence in support of both the criterion and of its theoretical implications is discussed. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.</p