An inability of [gamma]-acetylenic GABA to block eating evoked by hypothalamic stimulation

Several lines of evidence have implicated the nigrostriatal dopamine system and the neocortex for eating occurring either spontaneously or in response to electrical stimulation of the lateral hypothalamus (ESLH). GABA-ergic neural systems are known to modulate activity in the nigrostriatal system and neocortex. The GABA-transaminase inhibitor, [gamma]-acetylenic GABA (GAG) was administered to rats eating in response to ESLH. This drug produced hypersynchronization of the cortical EEG and behavioral sedation, but did not alter the current threshold for evoking eating by ESLH. Implications of results for understanding mechanisms underlying ESLH-induced eating are discussed.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/23181/1/0000108.pd

Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception: Further Consideration

The term self-deception describes the puzzling situation in which a person appears both to know and not know one and the same thing. Consider as an example a cancer patient who maintains the expectation of recov-ery even while surrounded by the signs of an incurable malignancy. Presumably this patient knows unconsciously that the disease is incur-able, but manages to prevent that knowledge from becoming conscious. Interestingly, one uf the reasons for concluding that the patient uncon-sciously knows of the incurable malignancy is the very success of the defense. How could that defense be maintained so effectively without using knowledge of the unwelcome fact to anticipate the forms in which it might try to intrude into consciousness? THE PARADOX OF SELF-DECEPTION The sense in which this example is puzzling, or paradoxical, is shown in Fig. 3.1. Some encountered situation, or stimulus, is assumed to receive both unconscious and conscious analyses. The unconscious analysis, which is assumed to occur first, identifies a threatening, or anxiety-evoking, aspect of the stimulus. In Fig. 3.1, the anxiety-evoking stimulus is represented as some proposition, p-such as, "I have a terminal ma-lignancy. " Conscious analysis, however, fails to apprehend this proposi-tion. There are three puzzling aspects of this situation. First, how can the person manage unconsciously to reach the conclusion that proposition p is true while not also reaching that conclusion consciously? Second, what good does it do for the person not to know consciously that p is true? Should it not produce anxiety just to know unconsciously that p i