The First Analyst Coverage of Neglected Stocks

"We examine the first analyst coverage of 549 "neglected" stocks that publicly traded at least one year without research coverage. The stocks experience a +4.86% abnormal return at initiation announcement. Positive returns are driven by positive coverage and not the mere introduction of coverage. Initiations from investment banks elicit lower announcement returns if the bank had a prior business relationship with the covered firm. Research firms paid by the covered company to provide coverage elicit announcement returns that are not significantly different from other analysts. Announcement returns are also influenced by liquidity increases and factors consistent with downward-sloping demand curves." Copyright (c) 2010 Financial Management Association International.

Have changing takeover defense rules and strategies entrenched management and damaged shareholders? The case of defeated takeover bids

Using the Delaware Supreme Court's Time-Warner decision of July 1989 as a focal point, we study defeated takeover bids before and after July 1989 to assess the direct effects of stronger takeover impediments on takeover defense tactics used to defeat bids and the resulting shareholder wealth outcomes and managerial turnover. We find that firms that defeated takeover bids after July 1989 shifted away from the use of active takeover defenses (repurchases, special dividends, greenmail, and leverage increases). Nevertheless, shareholders of firms that defeat a takeover experienced slightly better wealth outcomes in the 1990s than in the 1980s. We also find increased managerial turnover rates after defeating a takeover bid post Time-Warner, suggesting that managers that defeat hostile takeover bids did not become more entrenched due to greater takeover impediments relative to prior years.Takeovers Agency costs

The Determinants of Tendering Rates in Interfirm and Self-Tender Offers.

The authors estimate the determinants of shareholder heterogeneity by examining the shareholder responses to fixed-price self-tender offers and two-tier interfirm tender offers. Tendering rates are increased in the cash price relative to the postoffer price of the stock. Proxies for capital gains' tax liabilities also explain tendering rates. Controlling for the cash tender relative to the postoffer price of the stock, the authors find that tendering rates are significantly higher in interfirm tender offers than in self-tender offers, which indicates that shareholders view accepting another firm's stock as an unattractive means of avoiding capital gains. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

Equity Issuance and Adverse Selection: A Direct Test Using Conditional Stock Offers.

The authors conduct a unique test of adverse selection in the equity issuance process. While common stock is the dominant means of payment in bank mergers, stock acquisition agreements provide target shareholders with varying degrees of protection against adverse price movements in the bidder's stock between the time of the merger agreement and the time of merger completion. The authors show that it is the degree of protection against adverse price changes and not the percent of stock offered in a bank merger that explains bidder merger announcement abnormal returns. This result is difficult to explain outside of an adverse selection framework. Copyright 1997 by American Finance Association.