Patent Auctions

In advancing his prospect theory of patents, Edmund Kitch dismissed the possibility of distributing rights to particular inventions through an auction, arguing that the patent system avoids the need for governmental officials to define the boundaries of inventions that have not yet been created. Auctions for patent rights to entire inventive fields, however, might accentuate the benefits of a prospect approach, by allowing for earlier and broader patents. Auction designs that award the patent to the bidder that commits the most money to research and development or that agrees to charge the lowest price, meanwhile, can reduce the costs of prospect approach. Concerns about the government’s ability to decide correctly when to hold auctions, however, provide an uneasy case for patent races over patent auctions. More modest uses of auctions might improve welfare. For example, an auction to a small number of parties of the right to race in a technological field might reduce wasteful duplication and thus accelerate innovation. Similarly, patentees might be allowed to demand auctions for extended patent scope, with the caveat that a patentee would need to substantially outbid others to win such an auction

On the Alienation of Legal Claims

Courts have become increasingly skeptical about rules restricting plaintiffs’ ability to sell legal claims, and legal commentators have argued that markets for claims would be efficient, moving claims to those who can prosecute them most efficiently. Claim sales intuitively might appear to present a clash of economic and philosophical arguments, with perceived efficiency benefits coming at the expense of societal commitments to values other than efficiency. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz argues that economic and philosophical arguments do point in opposite directions, but in the reverse directions from what one might expect. A range of philosophical and other noneconomic considerations, such as concerns about commodification, corrective justice, legal ethics, and procedural justice, pose no significant problems for claim sales. There is, however, a significant economic problem. Markets for legal claims face a particularly strong adverse selection effect, because a prospective purchaser must consider not only why the plaintiff wishes to dispose of the claim, but also why the plaintiff cannot obtain a better deal from the defendant. Thus, even a regime permitting alienation might result in very few claim sales, and many of those may be motivated by prospective inefficiencies, such as attempts to manipulate the path of legal doctrine. If, however, in some legal context plaintiffs managed to overcome this adverse selection problem, so that claim sales became the norm, the economic concern would be eliminated. But philosophical concerns would reemerge, as this Article shows by using a hypothetical mandatory alienation regime as a heuristic device

The Pomeron structure and diffractive parton distributions

Measurements of the diffractive structure function, $F_2^D$, of the proton at HERA are used to extract the partonic structure of the Pomeron. Regge Factorization is tested and is found to describe well the existing data within the selected kinematic range. The analysis is based on the next to leading order QCD evolution equations. The results obtained from various data sets are compared. An analysis of the uncertainties in determining the parton distributions is provided. The probability of diffraction is calculated using the obtained results.Comment: Talk presented at DIS05, Madison, Wisconsi

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Judicial Citation to Legislative History: Contextual Theory and Empirical Analysis

Judge Leventhal famously described the invocation of legislative history as the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one\u27s friends. The volume of legislative history is so great and varied, some contend, that judges cite it selectively to advance their policy agendas. In this article, we employ positive political and contextual theories of judicial behavior to examine how judges use legislative history. We consider whether opinion-writing judges, as Judge Leventhal might suggest, cite legislative history from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge? Or do judges make such choices in a broader context than Judge Levanthal\u27s statement suggests. We posit that an opinion writing judge would cite legislative statements supporting an outcome preferred by the opinion-writing judge, when such statements come from legislators who share the same political-ideological perspective as the opinion-writing judge\u27s colleagues or superiors. This should be so regardless of whether the cited legislator shares the broader perspectives of the opinion-writing judge himself. Put in Leventhal\u27s terms, instead of looking for their own ideological friends, judges look over the heads of the guests for the legislative friends of the judge\u27s colleagues on the bench (or superiors on higher benches). We test this approach with court opinion data gathered from LEXIS and find evidence of hierarchy (high court oversight) and panel (co-members on a court) effects in citation to legislative history, effects that appear related to the political-ideological identification of judges who review or are co-members on a panel of the authoring judge. Specifically, we find that the higher the proportion of Republicans in the reviewing court or sitting on the same three-judge panel, the higher the proportion of legislative history cites that will be to Republican legislators, independent of the political orientation of the authoring judge

Defining Dicta

The doctrine of stare decisis applies only to holdings of past cases, but scholars and courts have paid far more attention to stare decisis doctrine than to the distinction between holding and dicta, particularly in recent years. The lack of attention that the distinction receives may reflect a sense among legal analysts that they know dicta when they see it, but the problem is considerably more analytically complex than it may at first appear. In this Article, Professors Abramowicz and Stearns identify a number of structural problems that may affect whether statements in judicial opinions should be classified as holding or dicta. Drawing on a theoretical model that illustrates the role of the holding-dicta distinction in disciplining the application of stare decisis, they then develop four normative criteria and apply those criteria to each of the structural problems. After describing the weaknesses in various previous attempts to identify the holding-dicta line, the authors offer their own definitions. A holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning that are actually decided, are based upon the facts of the case, and lead to the judgment. A proposition in a case that is not holding is dicta

Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance

Building on the success of prediction markets at forecasting political elections and other matters of public interest, firms have made increasing use of prediction markets to help make business decisions. This Article explores the implications of prediction markets for corporate governance. Prediction markets can increase the flow of information, encourage truth telling by internal and external firm monitors, and create incentives for agents to act in the interest of their principals. The markets can thus serve as potentially efficient alternatives to other approaches to providing information, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s internal controls provisions. Prediction markets can also produce an avenue for insiders to profit on and thus reveal inside information while maintaining a level playing field in the market for a firm’s securities. This creates a harmless way around existing insider trading laws, undercutting the argument for the repeal of these laws. In addition, prediction markets can reduce agency costs by providing direct assessments of corporate policies, thus serving as an alternative or complement to shareholder voting as a means of disciplining corporate boards and managers. Prediction markets may thus be particularly useful for issues where agency costs are greatest, such as executive compensation. Deployment of these markets, whether voluntarily or perhaps someday as a result of legal mandates, could improve alignment between shareholders and managers on these issues better than other proposed reforms. These markets might also displace the business judgment rule because they can furnish contemporaneous and relatively objective benchmarks for courts to evaluate business decisions

Measurement of an AGN Central Mass on Centiparsec Scales: Results of Long-Term Optical Monitoring of Arp 102B

The optical spectrum of the broad-line radio galaxy Arp 102B has been monitored for more than thirteen years to investigate the nature of the source of its broad, double-peaked hydrogen Balmer emission lines. The shape of the lines varied subtly; there was an interval during which the variation in the ratio of the fluxes of the two peaks appeared to be sinusoidal, with a period of 2.16 years and an amplitude of about 16% of the average value. The variable part of the broad H-alpha line is well fit by a model in which a region of excess emission (a quiescent ``hot spot'') within an accretion disk (fitted to the non-varying portion of the double-peaked line) completes at least two circular orbits and eventually fades. Fits to spectra from epochs when the hot spot is not present allow determination of the disk inclination, while fits for epochs when it is present provide a measurement of the radius of the hot spot's orbit. From these data and the period of variation, we find that the mass within the hot spot's orbit is 2.2 +0.2/-0.7 times 10^8 solar masses, within the range of previous estimates of masses of active galactic nuclei. Because this mass is determined at a relatively small distance (~1000 AU) from the central body, it is extremely difficult to explain without assuming that a supermassive black hole lies within Arp 102B. The lack of any systematic change in the velocity of the blue peak over time yields a lower limit on the combined mass of the two bodies in a binary black hole model like that of Gaskell (1983) of 10^10 solar masses.Comment: 29 pages, including 6 figures; to appear in the Astrophysical Journal 199

Bifurcating Settlements

In settling a lawsuit, parties agree on their obligations to one another, but they need not separately address each issue, claim, or remedy that a trial court would have confronted. The legal system, however, can bifurcate the settle-ment process, requiring separate resolution of components of a settlement. Bi-furcation can protect third parties, for example, by preventing divorcing parents from trading child custody for money. In addition to identifying a wide range of contexts in which preventing trade-offs may be desirable, this Article shows that bifurcation will generally have only modest (and sometimes beneficial) effects on settlement rates