4,506 research outputs found

    An Equality Paradign for Preventing Genetic Discrimination

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    On June 26, 2000, scientists announced at a White House news conference that they had completed mapping the human genome sequence, the human race\u27s genetic blueprint. This pronouncement generated tremendous and well-deserved excitement. Genomics, the study and application of genetic information, promises to be an unparalleled tool for improving public health. Genetic testing can identify asymptomatic individuals who are at risk of becoming ill themselves or bestowing illness on their children. As a result, individuals who test positive can take prophylactic measures to slow or stop disease and can also reduce the births of progeny at high risk of compromised health. At the same time, predictive genetic testing threatens unprecedented harm in its potential to engender (and then defend on the grounds of alleged statistical probability) discriminatory treatment in employment. Consequently, scientists most involved in the Human Genome Project and politicians most supportive of it recommend strong legal protections against genetic discrimination. Nevertheless, while the Constitution and the Privacy Act of 19749 provide some protection against the collection, use, and dissemination of genetic information on privacy grounds, effective federal regulations specifically protecting individuals from genetic discrimination in employment are almost nonexistent. Specifically, a single executive order bars federal agencies from discriminating in employment on the basis of genetic information. Despite repeatedly voiced intentions, Congress has yet to pass legislation specifically prohibiting misuse of genetic information in the area of employment, although a five-year-old bill is once more pending. Notably, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) has had mixed initial success in applying the antidiscrimination provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act ( ADA ) to the realm of genetic discrimination. By contrast, the scope of state statutes varies by jurisdiction. About half of the jurisdictions prohibit workplace ethical acceptability of somatic gene therapy, germ-line therapy, and somatic or germ-line modification)

    A Theory of Expressive International Law

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    What is the pull of international society and how does it influence the willingness of States to enter into or comply with international law? Since Grotius first identified the concept that States seek esteem from the broader global community, its parameters have proven illusive. Nonetheless, the notion remains central to discussions of why States comply with international agreements. Understanding the reputational mechanism that impels State compliance is especially important to human rights treaties. Unlike other regimes, States that ratify and abide by the terms of these instruments receive neither reciprocal nor immediate benefits. Consequently, the desire for international esteem is the crucible by which compliance with human rights norms is determined. Professor Oona Hathaway has recently raised concerns about the efficacy of the reputational mechanism through an empirical study suggesting that ratification of human rights treaties may lead to increased human rights violations. While these findings have been challenged on both econometric and normative grounds, the need to understand whether Hathaway\u27s findings are simply the result of faulty measurement, improper regime design, or the inability of social forces to compel compliance is crucial to the development and success of the international human rights project. Answers to these questions begin with the development of more detailed models of the way social forces work. Not only will such models enable us to determine if social forces can be harnessed to better ensure compliance with human rights treaties, they also provide a framework that can help us better design human rights instruments

    A Theory of Expressive International Law

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    What is the pull of international society and how does it influence the willingness of States to enter into or comply with international law? Since Grotius first identified the concept that States seek esteem from the broader global community, its parameters have proven illusive. Nonetheless, the notion remains central to discussions of why States comply with international agreements. Understanding the reputational mechanism that impels State compliance is especially important to human rights treaties. Unlike other regimes, States that ratify and abide by the terms of these instruments receive neither reciprocal nor immediate benefits. Consequently, the desire for international esteem is the crucible by which compliance with human rights norms is determined. Professor Oona Hathaway has recently raised concerns about the efficacy of the reputational mechanism through an empirical study suggesting that ratification of human rights treaties may lead to increased human rights violations. While these findings have been challenged on both econometric and normative grounds, the need to understand whether Hathaway\u27s findings are simply the result of faulty measurement, improper regime design, or the inability of social forces to compel compliance is crucial to the development and success of the international human rights project. Answers to these questions begin with the development of more detailed models of the way social forces work. Not only will such models enable us to determine if social forces can be harnessed to better ensure compliance with human rights treaties, they also provide a framework that can help us better design human rights instruments

    On the economics of product differentiation in Auditing

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    https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings/1176/thumbnail.jp

    Tennessee v. Lane

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    The Disability-Employability Divide: Bottlenecks to Equal Opprotunity

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    Equal opportunity might appear to comprise a relatively simple question: Do similarly situated persons have an equal chance to attain a particular goal, or do obstacles irrelevant to their qualifications or to the desired goal preclude achievement? But equal opportunity is complicated.1 There are descriptive and prescriptive dimensions to this question. Nuances exist when determining who is similarly situated, whether those individuals have the same opportunity, what goals we care about equalizing, and whether the ultimate aspiration is equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. Moreover, what means should we employ to remove obstacles, are these means likely to be successful, and do the cultural means justify the societal ends? And some readily apparent factors leading to inequalities of opportunity seem inexorable, including our individual genetic makeup, the environments in which we are raised, and our overall social circumstances. These considerations have prompted some scholars to argue that equality of opportunity is possible only if both law and government are committed to achieving it.2 To discuss equal opportunity in a coherent way often requires focusing on specific domains.3 One field in which equal opportunity has special resonance is employment. Societal support exists both for the descriptive idea that racial discrimination poses an obstacle to equal opportunity and for the prescriptive idea that such an obstacle ought to be overcome. Accordingly, a law like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 conveys something specific about what opportunities are important (work), what obstacles are inappropriate (discrimination), and what type of equality of opportunity is desired (race, color, sex, religion, and national origin). Such antidiscrimination laws generally enjoy strong support in the United States.4 Joseph Fishkin’s new book, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity, 5 reinvigorates the concept of equal opportunity by simultaneously engaging with its complications and attempting to simplify its ambitions. Fishkin describes bottlenecks as narrow spaces in the opportunity structure through which people must pass if they hope to reach a range of opportunities on the other side (p. 13). A significant component of the American opportunity structure that Bottlenecks leaves largely unexplored, however, relates to people with disabilities.6 This Review applies Fishkin’s theory to explore how disability law creates and perpetuates bottlenecks that keep people with disabilities from achieving a greater degree of human flourishing. In particular, disability policy’s opportunity structure features a conceptual disability– employability divide that ultimately prevents people with disabilities from reaching a wider array of opportunities. Fishkin’s book, in concert with this Review, introduces new and inventive ways of reimagining and implementing structural solutions to these bottlenecks. Part I provides an overview of Fishkin’s arguments, including his theory of opportunity pluralism, which he advances as a theoretical framework for broadening the opportunity structure. Part II then applies Fishkin’s theory to administrative disability policy to address and evaluate the disability– employability divide as a bottleneck. In particular, this Part explores how people with disabilities are frequently unable to pass through certain bottleneck policies to reach productive employment on the other side. Part III then proffers several policy solutions that could enable people with disabilities to move through or around the bottlenecks that keep them from accessing productive work opportunities

    The Disability-Employability Divide: Bottlenecks to Equal Opprotunity

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    Equal opportunity might appear to comprise a relatively simple question: Do similarly situated persons have an equal chance to attain a particular goal, or do obstacles irrelevant to their qualifications or to the desired goal preclude achievement? But equal opportunity is complicated.1 There are descriptive and prescriptive dimensions to this question. Nuances exist when determining who is similarly situated, whether those individuals have the same opportunity, what goals we care about equalizing, and whether the ultimate aspiration is equality of opportunity or equality of outcome. Moreover, what means should we employ to remove obstacles, are these means likely to be successful, and do the cultural means justify the societal ends? And some readily apparent factors leading to inequalities of opportunity seem inexorable, including our individual genetic makeup, the environments in which we are raised, and our overall social circumstances. These considerations have prompted some scholars to argue that equality of opportunity is possible only if both law and government are committed to achieving it.2 To discuss equal opportunity in a coherent way often requires focusing on specific domains.3 One field in which equal opportunity has special resonance is employment. Societal support exists both for the descriptive idea that racial discrimination poses an obstacle to equal opportunity and for the prescriptive idea that such an obstacle ought to be overcome. Accordingly, a law like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 conveys something specific about what opportunities are important (work), what obstacles are inappropriate (discrimination), and what type of equality of opportunity is desired (race, color, sex, religion, and national origin). Such antidiscrimination laws generally enjoy strong support in the United States.4 Joseph Fishkin’s new book, Bottlenecks: A New Theory of Equal Opportunity, 5 reinvigorates the concept of equal opportunity by simultaneously engaging with its complications and attempting to simplify its ambitions. Fishkin describes bottlenecks as narrow spaces in the opportunity structure through which people must pass if they hope to reach a range of opportunities on the other side (p. 13). A significant component of the American opportunity structure that Bottlenecks leaves largely unexplored, however, relates to people with disabilities.6 This Review applies Fishkin’s theory to explore how disability law creates and perpetuates bottlenecks that keep people with disabilities from achieving a greater degree of human flourishing. In particular, disability policy’s opportunity structure features a conceptual disability– employability divide that ultimately prevents people with disabilities from reaching a wider array of opportunities. Fishkin’s book, in concert with this Review, introduces new and inventive ways of reimagining and implementing structural solutions to these bottlenecks. Part I provides an overview of Fishkin’s arguments, including his theory of opportunity pluralism, which he advances as a theoretical framework for broadening the opportunity structure. Part II then applies Fishkin’s theory to administrative disability policy to address and evaluate the disability– employability divide as a bottleneck. In particular, this Part explores how people with disabilities are frequently unable to pass through certain bottleneck policies to reach productive employment on the other side. Part III then proffers several policy solutions that could enable people with disabilities to move through or around the bottlenecks that keep them from accessing productive work opportunities

    Analytical Rebridging Monte Carlo: Application to cis/trans Isomerization in Proline-Containing, Cyclic Peptides

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    We present a new method, the analytical rebridging scheme, for Monte Carlo simulation of proline-containing, cyclic peptides. The cis/trans isomerization is accommodated by allowing for two states of the amide bond. We apply our method to five peptides that have been previously characterized by NMR methods. Our simulations achieve effective equilibration and agree well with experimental data in all cases. We discuss the importance of effective equilibration and the role of bond flexibility and solvent effects on the predicted equilibrium properties.Comment: 29 pages, 8 PostScript figures, LaTeX source. to appear in J. Chem. Phys., 199

    A Peters cycle at the end of the cosmic ray spectrum?

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    We investigate the degree to which current ultrahigh energy cosmic ray observations above the ankle support a common maximum rigidity for all nuclei, often called a Peters cycle, over alternative scenarios for the cosmic ray spectra escaping sources. We show that a Peters cycle is not generally supported by the data when compared with these alternatives. We explore the observational signatures of non-Peters cycle scenarios, and the opportunities to explore both ultrahigh energy cosmic ray source conditions, as well as, physics beyond the Standard model they present
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