3,481 research outputs found

    Universal twist in Equivariant K-theory for proper and discrete actions

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    We define equivariant projective unitary stable bundles as the appropriate twists when defining K-theory as sections of bundles with fibers the space of Fredholm operators over a Hilbert space. We construct universal equivariant projective unitary stable bundles for the orbit types, and we use a specific model for these local universal spaces in order to glue them to obtain a universal equivariant projective unitary stable bundle for discrete and proper actions. We determine the homotopy type of the universal equivariant projective unitary stable bundle, and we show that the isomorphism classes of equivariant projective unitary stable bundles are classified by the third equivariant integral cohomology group. The results contained in this paper extend and generalize results of Atiyah-Segal.Comment: 46 pages. To appear in Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society. This version might differ from the published version, thought its mathematical contents are the sam

    The Tarai: A Part of Moghlan or Gorkha? Perspectives from the Time of the Anglo- Gorkha War (1814-1816)

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    The Tarai has always been considered an integral part of the modern Nepali state. However, the status of this important stretch of territory was open to ambiguity and flux in much of the period prior to the Anglo-Gorkha War of 1814-1816. A host of petty hill principalities and little kingdoms, further south in Moghlan (the plains of North India below the foothills of the Himalayas) constantly competed to control these lands and their resources. Furthermore, a web of tenurial, taxation, and hierarchical political relationships knitted the lands of the tarai to those of Moghlan. For the rulers of the emerging kingdom of Gorkha, governance of the tarai posed the usual set of dilemmas and possibilitiesÂŻdisputes with neighboring little kingdoms and problems of revenue administration mediated their efforts to tap the valuable agrarian resources of these lands. Gorkha was also increasingly drawn into a series of disputes with an emerging territorial power in north IndiaÂŻthe East India Company. Company officials increasingly articulated their claims in terms of the establishment of clear territorial boundaries all the while choosing to ignore the web of tenurial, taxation, and political relationships that had traditionally constituted territory in south asia. The Anglo-Gorkha War of 1814-1816 resulted in the delineation of the boundaries between Gorkha and the Company state. Nepal\u27s tarai as we know it emerged, it might be argued, out of the historical specificities of that colonial encounter and its aftermath, an encounter that affirmed the geographical credentials of the modern state in south AsiaÂŻoccupying a definite portion of the earth\u27s surface, divided into non-overlapping divisions and sub-divisions

    "Value-at-Risk for Country Risk Ratings"

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    The country risk literature argues that country risk ratings have a direct impact on the cost of borrowings as they reflect the probability of debt default by a country. An improvement in country risk ratings, or country creditworthiness, will lower a country's cost of borrowing and debt servicing obligations, and vice-versa. In this context, it is useful to analyse country risk ratings data, much like financial data, in terms of the time series patterns, as such an analysis provides policy makers and industry stakeholders with a more accurate method of forecasting future changes in the risks and returns associated with country risk ratings.

    It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?

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    The internal models amendment to the Basel Accord allows banks to use internal models to forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) thresholds, which are used to calculate the required capital that banks must hold in reserve as a protection against negative changes in the value of their trading portfolios. As capital reserves lead to an opportunity cost to banks, it is likely that banks could be tempted to use models that underpredict risk, and hence lead to low capital charges. In order to avoid this problem the Basel Accord introduced a backtesting procedure, whereby banks using models that led to excessive violations are penalised through higher capital charges. This paper investigates the performance of five popular volatility models that can be used to forecast VaR thresholds under a variety of distributional assumptions. The results suggest that, within the current constraints and the penalty structure of the Basel Accord, the lowest capital charges arise when using models that lead to excessive violations, thereby suggesting the current penalty structure is not severe enough to control risk management. In addition, an alternative penalty structure is suggested to be more effective in aligning the interests of banks and regulators.

    "It Pays to Violate: How Effective are the Basel Accord Penalties?"

    Get PDF
    The internal models amendment to the Basel Accord allows banks to use internal models to forecast Value-at-Risk (VaR) thresholds, which are used to calculate the required capital that banks must hold in reserve as a protection against negative changes in the value of their trading portfolios. As capital reserves lead to an opportunity cost to banks, it is likely that banks could be tempted to use models that underpredict risk, and hence lead to low capital charges. In order to avoid this problem the Basel Accord introduced a backtesting procedure, whereby banks using models that led to excessive violations are penalised through higher capital charges. This paper investigates the performance of five popular volatility models that can be used to forecast VaR thresholds under a variety of distributional assumptions. The results suggest that, within the current constraints and the penalty structure of the Basel Accord, the lowest capital charges arise when using models that lead to excessive violations, thereby suggesting the current penalty structure is not severe enough to control risk management. In addition, an alternative penalty structure is suggested to be more effective in aligning the interests of banks and regulators.
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