Ideal Tightly Couple (t,m,n) Secret Sharing

As a fundamental cryptographic tool, (t,n)-threshold secret sharing ((t,n)-SS) divides a secret among n shareholders and requires at least t, (t<=n), of them to reconstruct the secret. Ideal (t,n)-SSs are most desirable in security and efficiency among basic (t,n)-SSs. However, an adversary, even without any valid share, may mount Illegal Participant (IP) attack or t/2-Private Channel Cracking (t/2-PCC) attack to obtain the secret in most (t,n)-SSs.To secure ideal (t,n)-SSs against the 2 attacks, 1) the paper introduces the notion of Ideal Tightly cOupled (t,m,n) Secret Sharing (or (t,m,n)-ITOSS ) to thwart IP attack without Verifiable SS; (t,m,n)-ITOSS binds all m, (m>=t), participants into a tightly coupled group and requires all participants to be legal shareholders before recovering the secret. 2) As an example, the paper presents a polynomial-based (t,m,n)-ITOSS scheme, in which the proposed k-round Random Number Selection (RNS) guarantees that adversaries have to crack at least symmetrical private channels among participants before obtaining the secret. Therefore, k-round RNS enhances the robustness of (t,m,n)-ITOSS against t/2-PCC attack to the utmost. 3) The paper finally presents a generalized method of converting an ideal (t,n)-SS into a (t,m,n)-ITOSS, which helps an ideal (t,n)-SS substantially improve the robustness against the above 2 attacks

An Automated Analyzer for Financial Security of Ethereum Smart Contracts

At present, millions of Ethereum smart contracts are created per year and attract financially motivated attackers. However, existing analyzers do not meet the need to precisely analyze the financial security of large numbers of contracts. In this paper, we propose and implement FASVERIF, an automated analyzer for fine-grained analysis of smart contracts' financial security. On the one hand, FASVERIF automatically generates models to be verified against security properties of smart contracts. On the other hand, our analyzer automatically generates the security properties, which is different from existing formal verifiers for smart contracts. As a result, FASVERIF can automatically process source code of smart contracts, and uses formal methods whenever possible to simultaneously maximize its accuracy. We evaluate FASVERIF on a vulnerabilities dataset by comparing it with other automatic tools. Our evaluation shows that FASVERIF greatly outperforms the representative tools using different technologies, with respect to accuracy and coverage of types of vulnerabilities