Is Explaining Intuition Compatible with Trusting it?

First, a summary of anti-naturalist criticism of explanationism,\ud taking Th. Nagel"s work (1997) as typical. A common\ud assumption in the debate is the following one: if there\ud is a causal explanation of our intuitions, it will appeal to the\ud design of our mind, and ultimately to the causal-historical\ud forces shaping it. In other words, the thinkers find their\ud intuitions immediately compelling because they, the intuitions,\ud reflect the built-up of thinker"s minds. The intuitioncontents,\ud on the other hand, tend to be true, since the\ud built-up of the mind reflects the most general structures of\ud reality that has been causally shaping it. Most explanationists\ud offer the design account as the best available\ud explanation-sketch. The anti-explanationists, from Kant\ud (Critique of Pure reason, B 176) through Wittgensteinians\ud (e.g., J: Lear) to Th. Nagel (1997), G. Bealer (1987) and J.\ud Pust (2001), perform a modus tollens on this designfocused\ud account. Since it is self-undermining and has unacceptable\ud normative conesquences it should be rejected,\ud they claim. Here is Nagel"s recent formulation of the use of\ud evolutionary hypothesis about the origin of our minddesign