Politics and the geographic allocation of public funds in a semi-democracy: The case of Ghana, 1996-2004.

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers and that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this nding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either. --Public goods,Elections,Politics,Ghana

The Allocation of Public Goods and National Elections in Ghana

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either.Public goods, elections, ethnic, Africa, Ghana

The Allocation of Public Goods and National Elections in Ghana

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either

Do remittances affect poverty and inequality ? Evidence from Mali.

Using a 2006 household survey in Mali, we compare current poverty rates and inequality levels with counterfactual ones in the absence of migration and remittances. With proper hypotheses on migrants and a selection model, we are able to impute a counterfactual income for households currently receiving remittances. We show that remittances reduce poverty rates by 5% to 11% and the Gini coefficient by about 5%. Households in the bottom quintiles are more dependent on remittances, which are less substitutable by additional workforce.Indicateurs de pauvreté; Mali; Envois de fonds; Travailleurs migrants;

Etude sur la croissance partagée au Sénégal, 2001-2005

L'objet de cette étude est de dresser un bilan des performances économiques et sociales du Sénégal durant la première période de la présidence Wade (2001 à 2006). Plus particulièrement, on s'interroge sur l'efficacité de la stratégie de croissance accélérée (SCA) ‐ fortement défendue par les autorités sénégalaises‐ à lutter contre la pauvreté. Après un diagnostic sur les fondements de la croissance macro‐économique au Sénégal, cette étude examine les évolutions de l'emploi et de plusieurs indicateurs sociaux de développement. Nous montrons tout d'abord que les performances de croissance ont été bien en deçà des objectifs fixés par la SCA. Malgré la volonté des autorités à promouvoir l'investissement privé, les changements structurels des fondements de la croissance macroéconomique souhaités ne sont pas observés et la croissance reste fortement tributaire des fonds publics et, partant, de l'aide internationale, comme durant la période post‐dévaluation (1994‐2001). Ensuite, l'étude montre que les secteurs cibles de la SCA ne participent qu'assez marginalement à la création d'emplois de ces dernières années. Par contre, en matière de développement social (mesuré par les raccordements à l'eau, l'électricité et la scolarisation des enfants), on note des augmentations assez importantes des niveaux moyens à l'échelle nationale. Ces progrès sont à mettre au compte des politiques de développement social soutenues par le document stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté (DSRP). Cependant, les améliorations des indicateurs sociaux des ménages pauvres comme des classes moyennes, notamment en milieu rural, bien que réelles ne permettent pas une réduction significative du dualisme ville/campagne

Spatial externalities between Brazilian municipios and their neighbours

Economic growth certainly is not a uniform process over space, especially in a country as vast and diverse as Brazil. Among the determinants of local growth, the role of externalities has been much discussed in the recent literature (Glaeser et al., 1992). These externalities not only matter for growth within a given city or region but also for growth in neighbouring localities (Lopez-Baso et al., 2004). Our paper aims at providing a causal decomposition of spatial externalities occurring in the growth process of Brazilian municipios. Local growth may impact neighbours through a variety of externalities, and understanding how these externalities operate is crucial for the elaboration of public policies. Previous works on related topics include a recent paper by Lall and Shalizi (2003). Focusing on the Brazilian Northeast, the authors find that growth in municipios is negatively influenced by growth in their neighbourhood. Clearly, it seems worthwhile to extend this kind of analysis to the whole country to try and find if this phenomenon is a Northeastern specificity or a nationally valid result. Moreover, providing a more detailed account of the role of various sources of spatial externalities, and of their potential heterogeneities between regions, would be valuable. Spatial externalities Why may growth at a location affect growth at a neighbouring location? Several causes can be invoked. First, through technological externalities, a locality may benefit from improved economic conditions in another. For instance, if some firms in a locality have developed innovative processes, knowledge spillovers may favour the diffusion of new technologies to firms at neighbouring locations. Linkages between input suppliers and final producers may also be critical: if a final consumption good produced at a particular location benefits from a booming demand, upstream firms in the same region will thrive. Finally, proximity of an important economic centre may improve matching on the labour market, thus reducing costs and increasing labour productivity. Pecuniary externalities may also matter in spatial growth differentials: growth at a location may attract new firms and workers, thus increasing land rents. Transmission of this land market tension to nearby localities can reduce incentives for firms to locate there, and therefore attenuate growth prospects. Finally, local economic growth may foster immigration from less dynamic places. The impact of this migration on both the departure and arrival locations depends on various factors, notably the differences in education levels between the two localities, the substitutability between skilled and unskilled workers in production and the state of local labour markets. Empirical strategy: In order to disentangle which channels matter the most among the various kind of externalities, and to evaluate their spatial scope, we focus on the most rapidly growing Brazilian municipios. From a qualitative point of view, selecting a sample of fast growing localities permits to have a better understanding of the local growth process, since part of these localities are “polar cases” owing their rapid growth to a restricted combination of factors. Moreover, the strength of spatial externalities is likely to be greater in these locations.We evaluate the effects of these externalities on the performance of neighbouring municipios using spatial econometrics methods (Anselin, 2003), and controlling for various local characteristics of the neighbourhood (economic specializations, education, density, public infrastructures, etc.). Using different neighbours’ sets permits to measure the geographical scope of these externalities: some types of externalities only operate at short distance, while others may impact more distant locations. (Neighbours’ sets can be geographically defined, but also sets designed following other similarity or complementarity criterions.) Policy implications: poverty traps and land market issues Understanding how local growth may spread to neighbours or may hinder their economic performance is critical for policy design. Many Brazilian regions are characterized by important spatial inequalities between municipios, which seem to be very persistent over time. These poverty traps result from disparities in growth among neighbours and reducing them requires a better understanding of their formation. Moreover, local policies aiming at fostering growth may have adverse effects on nearby localities, certainly not a desirable outcome. Knowing which are the “bad” channels may help designing more efficient policies. Land and transportation policies are also a closely related issue: some spatial externalities are driven by the functioning of the land market. When rising rents in a growing locality are transmitted to adjacent locations, for instance, public policies may be needed to reduce market tensions through the development of new land plots or the improvement of transportation networks. In this case again, evaluating the strength and spatial scope of pecuniary externalities can help improving these policies.

The Allocation of Public Goods and National Elections in Ghana

The body of literature on purely democratic countries can sometimes fail to explain the behavior of government in semi-democratic African countries. Empirical and theoretical political economic papers find that public funds target ruling party supporters and swing districts. Our results, however, suggest that the opposite was true of Ghana. We observe that pro-government districts received less public investment when the NDC was in power. We posit that this finding is partially driven by the government's will to curry favor with opposition politicians. Indeed, in addition to pursuing its electoral objectives, the government of an emerging democracy may fear political instability and keep the lid on potential unrest by bargaining with opposition leaders. Our analysis also shows that, when controlling for votes and other covariates (including wealth, urbanization and density), public goods allocation is not driven by ethnic group targeting either

The impact of income shocks on children education: the 1987-1989 locust plague in Mali.

This paper estimates the long run impact of a large income shock, by exploiting the regional variation of the 1987-1989 locust invasion in Mali. Using exhaustive Population Census data, we construct birth cohorts of individuals and compare those born and living in the years and villages a ected by locust plagues with other cohorts. We assert that in-utero and early childhood exposure to income shock had a larger negative effects on the probability to go to school than later childhood exposure. Indeed, the proportion of boys born during the shock and who later enrolled at school is reduced by 4.9% if they lived in a community invaded by locusts, and by 3.5% for girls. This impact goes up to 6% for boys and 5% for girls living in rural areas. Concerning the number of years of education and the probability to achieve primary school, no real impact is found for boys while girls who lived in a community a ected by locusts have completed between 0.25 and 0.67 lower grades than if they had lived in another community. Finally, we nd that children living in rural localities and belonging to farmer households appear to have been much more affected than other children, living in urban localities or belonging to cattle breeder or shopkeeper households.Locust.; Education; Shocks; Mali;