Equivalence and Stooge Strategies in Zero-Sum Games

Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investigated was the extent to which subjects would exploit a programmed stooge as a function of the degree to which the stooge departed from his optimal strategy mix. The results indicated that subjects learned to exploit the nonrational play of the stooge opponent. The game factor, on the other hand, seemed to have no significant effect upon the strategy-choice behavior of the players. The implications of these results are discussed in light of questions raised by previous research on decision-making in 2 x 2 zero-sum games.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67183/2/10.1177_002200277301700306.pd

When Is Intercession Science?

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66942/2/10.1177_002188637100700609.pd

The author replies:

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/72159/1/j.1939-0025.1982.tb01468.x.pd

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT STATUTES:

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/74194/1/j.1939-0025.1982.tb02666.x.pd

The Effects Of Response-dependent Parameter Changes In The Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

Ph.D.ExperimentsPsychologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/179834/2/6717768.pd

Threat in a two-person game

A two-person nonzero-sum game which provides one player with a threat option is experimentally investigated in this study. In the game, both players have a dominating strategy choice but the "natural" outcome of the game, defined as the intersection of dominating strategy choices, gives one player his largest payoff and the other player his next to smallest. However, the "dissatis-fied" player (the one who does not receive his largest payoff at the natural outcome) can, by switching his strategy choice, reduce the other's payoffs but only at a cost to himself. The dissatisfied player's ability to lower the other's payoffs constitutes a "threat."It was found that in repeated trials of play of this game, those players who were likely to carry out their threats were those who won the most concessions from the other. The results of this study suggest that a threat-appeasement, punishment-capitulation interaction develops between the players. That is, the existence of the threat option for one player leads the other to make concessions in order to avoid punishment and, once punishments are carried out, they too are likely to result in concessions for the punishers.It is also noted that the "sure-thing" principle fails to provide an adequate description of the strategy choice behavior of naive subjects.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/32825/1/0000200.pd