The Appeal of the Underdog

When people observe competitions, they are often drawn to figures that are seen as disadvantaged or unlikely to prevail. The present research tested the scope and limits of people\u27s support for underdogs. The first two studies demonstrated, in the context of Olympic matches (Study 1) and the Israeli—Palestinian conflict (Study 2), that observers\u27 support for a competitor increased when framing it as an underdog. The final two studies explored mechanisms underlying support for underdogs. Study 3 showed that participants attributed more effort to a team when they believed it to be an underdog, and perceptions of effort mediated liking. In Study 4, participants reading a hypothetical sporting event supported a team with a low probability of success and labeled it an underdog unless it had greater resources than an opponent, suggesting that low expectations by themselves do not engender support if positive outcomes are not seen as deserved

Utilitarianism: a psychophysical perspective

The psychological doctrines of empiricism, associationism, and hedonism served as intellectual sources for the development of utilitarianism in the 18th century and psychophysics in the 19th. Utilitarianism, first articulated by Bentham in 1781, makes four implicit but nevertheless important psychophysical assumptions: (1) that utilities, which reflect "benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness," are quintessentially psychological concepts; (2) that utilities are quantitative; (3) that utilities are commensurable across different objects; and (4) that utilities are commensurable across individuals. Although utilities sometimes reflect the satisfaction of biological needs, they commonly represent psychological valences or values, whose subjective strengths may themselves derive, dynamically, from processes of decision-making