23 research outputs found
Mixed Oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade policy: a note
In debates over privatization and global competition mixed Cournot oligopoly models have been used to show that the presence of a state-owned enterprise in the host country is always associated with a distortionary effect that may justify privatization even if the public firm is just as efficient as its private counterparts. This study argues that this result is valid only under Cournot competition and Cournot competition is not a plausible modelling assumption in this context because in this type of market the firmsā simultaneous play strategies lack credibility.Privatization; Mixed oligopoly; Strategic Trade Policy
Market distortions and public enterprise strategies in an international mixed oligopoly
This study investigates the possible sources of distortions in an international mixed oligopoly. We extend the existing linear/quadratic model to a general framework and show that a public enterprise may either serve as a regulatory device or may itself create an additional level of distortion. Which of these is the case depends critically on the timing of firms output decisions. We then extend the basic quantity setting game to incorporate a preplay stage at which firms can choose the timing of action, rather than moving in an exogenously imposed sequence, in order to determine endogenously the equilibrium sequence of moves. We argue that the distortions associated with a public enterprise and the welfare gain of privatization found in earlier studies can be attributed to an arbitrary and unjustified modeling assumption concerning the order of play, rather than to public ownership.Privatization; International Mixed Oligopoly; Strategic Trade Policy
Market distortions and public enterprise strategies in an international mixed oligopoly
This study investigates the possible sources of distortions in an international mixed oligopoly. We extend the existing linear/quadratic model to a general framework and show that a public enterprise may either serve as a regulatory device or may itself create an additional level of distortion. Which of these is the case depends critically on the timing of firms output decisions. We then extend the basic quantity setting game to incorporate a preplay stage at which firms can choose the timing of action, rather than moving in an exogenously imposed sequence, in order to determine endogenously the equilibrium sequence of moves. We argue that the distortions associated with a public enterprise and the welfare gain of privatization found in earlier studies can be attributed to an arbitrary and unjustified modeling assumption concerning the order of play, rather than to public ownership
Mixed Oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade policy: a note
In debates over privatization and global competition mixed Cournot oligopoly models have
been used to show that the presence of a state-owned enterprise in the host country is always
associated with a distortionary effect that may justify privatization even if the public firm is
just as efficient as its private counterparts. This study argues that this result is valid only under
Cournot competition and Cournot competition is not a plausible modelling assumption in this
context because in this type of market the firmsā simultaneous play strategies lack credibility
Market distortions and public enterprise strategies in an international mixed oligopoly
This study investigates the possible sources of distortions in an international mixed oligopoly. We extend the existing linear/quadratic model to a general framework and show that a public enterprise may either serve as a regulatory device or may itself create an additional level of distortion. Which of these is the case depends critically on the timing of firms output decisions. We then extend the basic quantity setting game to incorporate a preplay stage at which firms can choose the timing of action, rather than moving in an exogenously imposed sequence, in order to determine endogenously the equilibrium sequence of moves. We argue that the distortions associated with a public enterprise and the welfare gain of privatization found in earlier studies can be attributed to an arbitrary and unjustified modeling assumption concerning the order of play, rather than to public ownership
Mixed Oligopoly, privatization and strategic trade policy: a note
In debates over privatization and global competition mixed Cournot oligopoly models have
been used to show that the presence of a state-owned enterprise in the host country is always
associated with a distortionary effect that may justify privatization even if the public firm is
just as efficient as its private counterparts. This study argues that this result is valid only under
Cournot competition and Cournot competition is not a plausible modelling assumption in this
context because in this type of market the firmsā simultaneous play strategies lack credibility