17 research outputs found
Philosophy of rational belief
The problems of characterizing rational belief are fewer than is
the case with knowledge, though we presumably believe more things
than we know. Knowledge is often defined as a special kind of
justified true belief. Fallibilism urges that any of the conditions
for knowledge may fail. In the case of rational belief we are
dealing with fewer conditions, and withdrawal in the event of failure
is less drastic. 2. Talk of beliefs involves problems of
intensionality (referential opacity) and intentionality (allusion to
believing subjects). But talk of beliefs is not clearly dispensable.
Reference both to conscious mental states and to dispositions is
needed to account for belief. If belief is to be rational it requires
at least adequate evidential support. Belief should largely be
determined by evidence but there is a voluntary element which we
cannot exclude. Rational belief is not all or nothing acceptance.
Paradox results if we do not proportion belief to evidence. 3. We
need to consider the rationality of complexes of beliefs. Here two
such sets of beliefs are selected for study in their own right, and
for purpose of comparison. One comprises beliefs about the
historical past, the other, metaphysical theistic beliefs. Mitchell
argues for an analogy between them, and that in each case upholders
of such beliefs construct a cumulative case in their defence. This
raises complex issues of which the most important is that of the
criteria to be used. 4. Beliefs about historical events use theory
and observation to give an account of what is not directly
accessible. Rival theories are assessed by criteria as in other
disciplines. The extent to which the criteria used here differ
from those used in science is considered in relation to two problems
One is the special character of historical explanation. The other is
the debate between realists and anti-realists with regard to the
historical past, and the role of implicit prediction here. Though
there are differences from science, the rational assessment of beliefs
about the historical pa3t has identifiable similarities with science in
its methods and criteria. 5* In "til© case of metaphysical beliefs
examples are selected from recent writing on theistic belief by Swinburne.
Some, both theists and non-theists, differentiate sharply between
metaphysical and other beliefs. Criticism is here made of those who
emphasize incommensurability and commitment as precluding rational
scrutiny. Hick's -view is more cautious, and we must admit that people
do use rational criteria yet differ in their conclusions. Swinburne
is perhaps over-confident in using Bayes' theorem here, with
consequential over—emphasis on prior probabilities. 6. We need to
consider several criteria and their appropriateness for assessing
metaphysical beliefs. i) Internal consistency is one, as is consistency
with other beliefs. ii) Swinburne places too much emphasis on
simplicity, though it is one criterion amongst others. iii) Explanatory
power is also relevant, though gains in explanatory power take different
forms, and some gains are of an unusual type. iv) Pruitfulness in
making successful prediction plays a large role in science, and is
implicit in historical study. It should not he excluded here, though
appeal to it requires careful assessment. v) Accuracy is also
important, and should be ranked higher than simplicity, though assessing
accuracy here has problems of its own. We can therefore use these
criteria to assess the rationality of metaphysical as of other
beliefs, but in some cases, here as elsewhere, clashes of criteria
leave ground for continuing conflict