A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle

Should Fertility Treatment be State Funded?

Many states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for state funding of fertility treatment as one good among many that could enable citizens to pursue valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it is currently given. I then consider and reject reasons one might think that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding, over the other goods that might enable life projects. First, I deny that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a disease or disability. Second, I argue that individuals do not have a right to assistance with the project of having a child of their own. Third, I deny that providing fertility treatment is a special case on the grounds that having children is good for society. However, there may be one exception: states have a reason to fund fertility treatment for same sex couples that does not apply to heterosexual couples

How to be a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: From metaphysics to social practice

There is something attractive about combining the values of equality and responsibility, even though the view most commonly associated with doing so, of luck egalitarianism, is beset with objections. This article hence proposes an alternative approach to being a responsibility-sensitive egalitarian: one grounded on our valuable social practices of responsibility, rather than on a desire to mitigate the influence of luck on people's prospects. First, I argue that this practice-based approach better captures the very reasons that responsibility is significant for justice than does the prevalent approach among luck egalitarians: namely, the values of fairness, choice and respect. Second, I show that the remaining motivation of the luck egalitarian approach, of being ‘anti-luck’, is impoverished. I conclude by suggesting that this practice-based approach is better motivated and more palatable than existing forms of luck egalitarianism, even for those relational egalitarians who standardly criticise making egalitarianism responsibility-sensitive

Rescuing responsibility for the left: An egalitarian account of social security and obligation

Without a convincing account of inequality's causes, egalitarians will continue to cede ground to the right, whose language of prudence and responsibility justifies further tightening of the welfare system. Advancing the cause of equality requires engaging with the right on the terrain of ideas and values, argues Emily McTernan

Investigating Miniaturized Electrodynamic Tethers for Picosatellites and Femtosatellites

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/143110/1/1.A33629.pd

Development of a Modeling Capability for Energy Harvesting Modules in Electrodynamic Tether Systems

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/90615/1/AIAA-2011-7323-271.pd

Electrodynamic Tethers for Energy Harvesting and Propulsion on Space Platforms

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/83661/1/AIAA-2010-8844-783.pd

Enabling Ultra-small Sensor Spacecraft for the Space Environment using Small-Scale Electrodynamic Tethers

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/90614/1/AIAA-2011-7322-799.pd