Statement of Kenneth McLennan before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations on Chapter II of its Fact Finding Report to the U.S. Department of Labor

Testimony_McLennan_080394.pdf: 431 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

The Expected Number of Real Roots of a Multihomogeneous System of Polynomial Equations

Theorem 1 is a formula expressing the mean number of real roots of a random multihomogeneous system of polynomial equations as a multiple of the mean absolute value of the determinant of a random matrix. Theorem 2 derives closed form expressions for the mean in special cases that include earlier results of Shub and Smale (for the general homogeneous system) and Rojas (for ``unmixed'' multihomogeneous systems). Theorem 3 gives upper and lower bounds for the mean number of roots, where the lower bound is the square root of the generic number of complex roots, as determined by Bernstein's theorem. These bounds are derived by induction from recursive inequalities given in Theorem 4

Manipulation in Elections with Uncertain Preferences

A decision scheme (Gibbard (1977)) is a function mapping profiles of strict preferences over a set of social alternatives to lotteries over the social alternatives. Motivated by conditions typically prevailing in elections with many voters, we say that a decision scheme is weakly strategy-proof if it is never possible for a voter to increase expected utility (for some vNM utility function consistent with her true preferences) by misrepresenting her preferences when her belief about the preferences of other voters is generated by a model in which the other voters are i.i.d. draws from a distribution over possible preferences. We show that if there are at least three alternatives, a decision scheme is necessarily a random dictatorship if it is weakly strategy-proof, never assigns positive probability to Pareto dominated alternatives, and is anonymous in the sense of being unaffected by permutations of the components of the profile. This result is established in two settings- a) a model with a fixed set of voters; b) the Poisson voting model of Meyerson (1998a,b, 2000, 2002).

ANL/RBC: A computer code for the analysis of Rankine bottoming cycles, including system cost evaluation and off-design performance

This report describes, and is a User's Manual for, a computer code (ANL/RBC) which calculates cycle performance for Rankine bottoming cycles extracting heat from a specified source gas stream. The code calculates cycle power and efficiency and the sizes for the heat exchangers, using tabular input of the properties of the cycle working fluid. An option is provided to calculate the costs of system components from user defined input cost functions. These cost functions may be defined in equation form or by numerical tabular data. A variety of functional forms have been included for these functions and they may be combined to create very general cost functions. An optional calculation mode can be used to determine the off-design performance of a system when operated away from the design-point, using the heat exchanger areas calculated for the design-point

Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining

We study a model of sequential bargaining in which, in each period before an agreement is reached, the proposer’s identity (and whether there is a proposer) are randomly determined; the proposer suggests a division of a pie of size one; each other agent either approves or rejects the proposal; and the proposal is implemented if the set of approving agents is a winning coalition for the proposer. The theory of the fixed point index is used to show that stationary equilibrium expected payoffs of this coalitional bargaining game are unique. This generalizes Eraslan (2002) insofar as: (a) there are no restrictions on the structure of sets of winning coalitions; (b) different proposers may have different sets of winning coalitions; (c) there may be a positive probability that no proposer is selected.

Imitation Games and Computation

TAn imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a given two person game to a symmetric game whose symmetric Nash equilibria are in oneto-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. We give a way of passing from a given symmetric two person game to an imitation game whose Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric Nash equilibria of the given symmetric game. Lemke (1965) portrayed the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke paths algorithm. Using imitation games, we show how Lemke paths may be obtained by projecting Lemke-Howson paths.

The Market for Liars: Reputation and Auditor Honesty

In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a "two-tier equilibrium" in which "reputable" auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of losing reputation, while "disreputable" auditors accept bribes because even persistent refusal does not create a good reputation. The main findings are: (a) honest auditors charge higher fees, and have economic profits accruing to reputation; (b) as the fraction of auditors who are honest increases, the premium charged by reputable auditors eventually decreases, which diminishes the incentive to refuse bribes; (c) if the fraction of honest auditors exceeds an upper bound, there does not exist a two-tier equilibrium; (d) thus the reputation mechanism may be undermined by entry into the honest segment of the industry, if it is possible; (e) increasing auditor independence increases the upper bound.