Statements about the pervasiveness of behavior require data about the pervasiveness of behavior

Despite recent close attention to issues related to the reliability of psychological research (e.g., the replication crisis), issues of the validity of this research have not been considered to the same extent. This paper highlights an issue that calls into question the validity of the common research practice of studying samples of individuals, and using sample-based statistics to infer generalizations that are applied not only to the parent population, but to individuals. The lack of ergodicity in human data means that such generalizations are not justified. This problem is illustrated with respect to two common scenarios in psychological research that raise questions for the sorts of theories that are typically proposed to explain human behavior and cognition. The paper presents a method of data analysis that requires closer attention to the range of behaviors exhibited by individuals in our research to determine the pervasiveness of effects observed in sample data. Such an approach to data analysis will produce results that are more in tune with the types of generalizations typical in reports of psychological research than mainstream analysis methods

How mean is the mean?

In this paper we voice concerns about the uncritical manner in which the mean is often used as a summary statistic in psychological research. We identify a number of implicit assumptions underlying the use of the mean and argue that the fragility of these assumptions should be more carefully considered. We examine some of the ways in which the potential violation of these assumptions can lead us into significant theoretical and methodological error. Illustrations of alternative models of research already extant within Psychology are used to explore methods of research less mean-dependent and suggest that a critical assessment of the assumptions underlying its use in research play a more explicit role in the process of study design and review

Situierte Handlungsfähigkeit: normatives Medium des menschlichen Handelns

In this paper the notion of individual agency is critically examined in light of the enactive approach to understanding the mind. It is argued that following the work of Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese and others, agency must be considered in terms that are situational rather than bounded by biological individuals. Such a revised notion of agency presents substantive challenges to our current theory and research practices in this area. Drawing on the work of Harry Heft, Roger Barker and others some theoretical and methodological resources are advanced that may help to address these challenges. It is argued that the notion of ‘behaviour settings’ developed by Barker and his colleagues, and refined somewhat more recently by Heft, offers a coherent way of thinking in terms that address the systemic and holistic nature of situated agency.U ovome se radu kritički ispituje pojam individualne djelovnosti u svjetlu odjelovljujućeg pristupa razumijevanju uma. Tvrdi se da, prateći rad Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiela Di Paola, Toma Froesea i dr., djelovnost mora biti shvaćena u terminima koji su situacijski, a ne ograničeni biološkim individuama. Takav revidiran pojam djelovnosti predstavlja značajne izazove našoj trenutnoj teoriji i istraživačkoj praksi u tom području. Oslanjajući se na radove Harryja Hefta, Rogera Barkera i dr., predložit će se neki teorijski i metodološki resursi koji bi mogli pomoći u suočavanju s ovim izazovima. U radu se tvrdi da pojam ‘okružje ponašanja’, koji su razvili Barker i njegovi suradnici a nedavno doradio Heft, nudi koherentan način mišljenja koji odgovara sistemskoj i holističkoj naravi situirane djelovnosti.Dans cet article, la notion de capacité d’agir individuelle fait l’objet d’un examen critique à la lumière de l’approche énactive de la compréhension de l’esprit. On affirme que, suivant les travaux de Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese et d’autres, la capacité d’agir doit être considérée en termes situationnels plutôt que limités aux individus biologiques. La notion de capacité d’agir ainsi revue présente d’importants défis à l’encontre de nos théories et nos pratiques actuelles dans ce domaine. En s’appuyant sur les travaux de Harry Heft, Roger Barker et d’autres encore, sont avancées quelques ressources théoriques et méthodologiques susceptibles d’aider à répondre à ces défis. On affirme que la notion « d’environnement comportemental » développée par Roger Barker et ses collègues, plus récemment quelque peu affinée par Harry Heft, propose une façon de réfléchir cohérente dans des termes qui abordent la nature systémique et holistique de l’activité située.In diesem Paper wird der Begriff der individuellen Handlungsfähigkeit kritisch untersucht – im Lichte des enaktiven Ansatzes zur Auffassung des Verstands. Indem man die Arbeit Hanne De Jaeghers, Ezequiel Di Paolos, Tom Froeses u. a. verfolgt, wird dargelegt, dass die Handlungsfähigkeit eher unter dem Situationsaspekt betrachtet werden muss als unter dem Aspekt der Begrenzung durch biologische Individuen. Solch eine revidierte Notion der Handlungsfähigkeit stellt bedeutungsvolle Herausforderungen für unsere aktuelle Theorie und Forschungspraktiken in diesem Bereich dar. Gestützt auf die Arbeit von Harry Heft, Roger Barker u. a. werden einige theoretische und methodologische Ressourcen vorgebracht, die zum Herangehen an diese Herausforderungen beitragen könnten. Man vertritt die Ansicht, dass der Begriff der „Verhaltenseinstellungen“, den Barker samt seinen Kollegen entwickelt und Heft in jüngerer Zeit nennenswert verfeinert hat, eine kohärente Denkweise bietet, die der systemischen und holistischen Natur der situierten Handlungsfähigkeit entspricht

Noise, the mess, and the inexhaustible world

This chapter outlines an embodied conception of noise. From an enactive and ecological perspective noise is an inevitable complement to the richness of bodily sensitivities and complex actions. The world around us, the universe, is replete, full of inexhaustible texture available to be explored at every scale at which we are capable, or can become capable, of making distinctions. Drawing on work in ecological psychology I suggest that noise is our experience of that encompassing fullness, and can be encountered in a number of different ways depending on the organisation of our bodies and activities at different scales across a given period. While that fullness can be overwhelming, and create challenges for us to distinguish and coordinate effectively with the particular aspects of the world most relevant to our present concerns - noise can be intrusive and disruptive - I argue that there are significant positive aspects to the phenomenon. Noise is an inherent part of the rich messiness of the world as discussed in recent enactive work, which provides both robustness to developmental processes as well as opportunities for action that support adaptive agency. In a noisy, messy world there are always more options available to explore

Facing Life: The messy bodies of enactive cognitive science

Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive approach, particularly the enactive conceptions of life and bodies. Following the lead of others, I argue that enactive cognitive science can benefit from a deeper reading and integration with extant work on the complexity and multiplicity of the living body within feminist philosophy and feminist science studies

Qualities of Consent: An enactive approach to making better sense

Philosophical work on the concept of consent in the past few decades has got to grips with it as a rich notion. We are increasingly sensitive to consent not as a momentary, atomic, transactional thing, but as a complex idea admitting of various qualities and dimensions. In this paper we note that the recognition of this complexity demands a theoretical framework quite different to those presently extant, and we suggest that the enactive approach is one which offers significant value in this regard. In consonance with arguments made by Laurie Penny about how consent is a continuous and dynamic process, we outline how an enactive approach identifies consent as temporally extended (rather than momentarily transactional), and as affected by the skilfulness of the agents involved, the fitness of community provided resources to negotiate the consensual relationship over time, and the unfolding of circumstances in the situation in which the joint action is taking place. We argue that the value of an enactive perspective on consent is in highlighting these complexities, and providing resources to articulate and theorise them in ways that are not open to other current approaches