Enforcing ‘Self-Enforcing’ International Environmental Agreements

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ignore the issue of enforcing compliance by parties to the terms of an agreement. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent enforcement body with the power to monitor the parties’ compliance to the terms of the IEA and impose penalties in cases of noncompliance. This approach is broadly consistent with the enforcement mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol under the Marrakesh Accords. We find that costly enforcement limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly enforcement. Consequently, costly enforcement of IEAs is associated with higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly enforcement. These conclusions are accentuated when monitoring for compliance to IEAs is inaccurate.International environmental agreements, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government. Key Words:

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements with Industries

Although the theoretical literature on the performance of voluntary approaches to environmental protection has progressed quite far in the last decade, no one has rigorously addressed the obvious point that even voluntary emissions control policies must be enforced. This paper examines the consequences of the need for costly enforcement of voluntary environmental agreements with industries on the ability of these agreements to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. We find that enforcement costs that are borne by the members of a voluntary emissions control agreement limit the circumstances under which an agreement can form in place of an emissions tax. However, if an agreement does form, member-financed enforcement induces greater participation than if compliance with the agreement could be enforced without cost to its members. Moreover, a voluntary emission control agreement with an industry can be a more efficient way to achieve an environmental quality objective than an emission tax, but only if: (1) the members of an agreement bear the costs of enforcing compliance with the agreement; (2) there exists member-financed agreements that reach the government’s environmental quality target while leaving the members of the agreement at least as well off as they would be under an emissions tax, and (3) the enforcer of the agreement has a significantly better monitoring technology or a higher sanction available to it than the government.Voluntary agreements, self-enforcing agreements, emissions tax, enforcement

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players. Key Words:

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.public goods, coalition formation, inequality aversion, participation requirement, experiments

The Problem of Maintaining Compliance within Stable Coalitions: Experimental Evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to not comply with their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger (and provide more of a public good) when their members must finance enforcement relative to when compliance is ensured without the need for costly enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that giving coalition members the opportunity to violate their commitments while requiring them to finance enforcement to maintain compliance reduces the overall provision of the public good. The decrease in the provision of the public good is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a theoretically stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. When we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form, the average provision of the public good increases significantly. Key Words: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods

The problem of maintaining compliance within stable coalitions: experimental evidence

This study examines the performance of stable cooperative coalitions that form to provide a public good when coalition members have the opportunity to violate their commitments. A stable coalition is one in which no member wishes to leave and no non-member wishes to join. To counteract the incentive to violate their commitments, coalition members fund a third-party enforcer. This leads to the theoretical conclusion that stable coalitions are larger, and provide more of a public good, when their members are responsible for financing enforcement. However, our experiments reveal that member-financed enforcement of compliance reduces the provision of the public good. The decrease is attributed to an increase in the participation threshold for a stable coalition to form and to significant levels of noncompliance. Provision of the public good increases significantly when we abandon the strict stability conditions and require all subjects to join a coalition for it to form.lab experiments

Simultaneous intracranial EEG and fMRI of interictal epileptic discharges in humans

Simultaneous scalp EEG–fMRI measurements allow the study of epileptic networks and more generally, of the coupling between neuronal activity and haemodynamic changes in the brain. Intracranial EEG (icEEG) has greater sensitivity and spatial specificity than scalp EEG but limited spatial sampling. We performed simultaneous icEEG and functional MRI recordings in epileptic patients to study the haemodynamic correlates of intracranial interictal epileptic discharges (IED). Two patients undergoing icEEG with subdural and depth electrodes as part of the presurgical assessment of their pharmaco-resistant epilepsy participated in the study. They were scanned on a 1.5 T MR scanner following a strict safety protocol. Simultaneous recordings of fMRI and icEEG were obtained at rest. IED were subsequently visually identified on icEEG and their fMRI correlates were mapped using a general linear model (GLM). On scalp EEG–fMRI recordings performed prior to the implantation, no IED were detected. icEEG–fMRI was well tolerated and no adverse health effect was observed. intra-MR icEEG was comparable to that obtained outside the scanner. In both cases, significant haemodynamic changes were revealed in relation to IED, both close to the most active electrode contacts and at distant sites. In one case, results showed an epileptic network including regions that could not be sampled by icEEG, in agreement with findings from magneto-encephalography, offering some explanation for the persistence of seizures after surgery. Hence, icEEG–fMRI allows the study of whole-brain human epileptic networks with unprecedented sensitivity and specificity. This could help improve our understanding of epileptic networks with possible implications for epilepsy surgery

Development and validation of the guideline for reporting evidence-based practice educational interventions and teaching (GREET)

Abstract Background The majority of reporting guidelines assist researchers to report consistent information concerning study design, however, they contain limited information for describing study interventions. Using a three-stage development process, the Guideline for Reporting Evidence-based practice Educational interventions and Teaching (GREET) checklist and accompanying explanatory paper were developed to provide guidance for the reporting of educational interventions for evidence-based practice (EBP). The aim of this study was to complete the final development for the GREET checklist, incorporating psychometric testing to determine inter-rater reliability and criterion validity. Methods The final development for the GREET checklist incorporated the results of a prior systematic review and Delphi survey. Thirty-nine items, including all items from the prior systematic review, were proposed for inclusion in the GREET checklist. These 39 items were considered over a series of consensus discussions to determine the inclusion of items in the GREET checklist. The GREET checklist and explanatory paper were then developed and underwent psychometric testing with tertiary health professional students who evaluated the completeness of the reporting in a published study using the GREET checklist. For each GREET checklist item, consistency (%) of agreement both between participants and the consensus criterion reference measure were calculated. Criterion validity and inter-rater reliability were analysed using intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC). Results Three consensus discussions were undertaken, with 14 items identified for inclusion in the GREET checklist. Following further expert review by the Delphi panelists, three items were added and minor wording changes were completed, resulting in 17 checklist items. Psychometric testing for the updated GREET checklist was completed by 31 participants (n = 11 undergraduate, n = 20 postgraduate). The consistency of agreement between the participant ratings for completeness of reporting with the consensus criterion ratings ranged from 19 % for item 4 Steps of EBP, to 94 % for item 16 Planned delivery. The overall consistency of agreement, for criterion validity (ICC 0.73) and inter-rater reliability (ICC 0.96), was good to almost perfect. Conclusion The final GREET checklist comprises 17 items which are recommended for reporting EBP educational interventions. Further validation of the GREET checklist with experts in EBP research and education is recommended