Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

This paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm’s non-market strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms’ campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets’ campaign contributions and increase the proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of considering how a firm’s socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively disrupt corporate political activity

Order in the Court: How Firm Status and Reputation Shape the Outcomes of Employment Discrimination Suits

This article explores the mechanisms by which corporate prestige produces distorted legal outcomes. Drawing on social psychological theories of status, we suggest that prestige influences audience evaluations by shaping expectations, and that its effect will differ depending on whether a firm’s blameworthiness has been firmly established. We empirically analyze a unique database of more than 500 employment discrimination suits brought between 1998 and 2008. We find that prestige is associated with a decreased likelihood of being found liable (suggesting a halo effect in assessments of blameworthiness), but with more severe punishments among organizations that are found liable (suggesting a halo tax in administrations of punishment). Our analysis allows us to reconcile two ostensibly contradictory bodies of work on how organizational prestige affects audience evaluations by showing that prestige can be both a benefit and a liability, depending on whether an organization’s blameworthiness has been firmly established

Good Firms, Good Targets: The Relationship Among Corporate Social Responsibility, Reputation, and Activist Targeting

Much research on social movements and organizations contends that there is an empirical link between activists\u27 contentious activity and corporate social responsibility (CSR; e.g., Bartley 2007; Campbell 2007; Soule 2009). Typically, we assume that activists influence firms\u27 CSR practices directly. Activists target corporations in order to pursue their social change agendas, hoping to influence those companies to change their policies or practices (King and Pearce 2010). Targeting corporations give activists a way to directly address their grievances and influences a firm to amend an undesirable practice (King and Soule 2007; Walker, Martin, and McCarthy 2008; Lenox and Eesley 2009). For example, if a retail firm regularly sources its products from manufacturers that employ sweatshop labor, activists may raise concerns about this inflammatory practice by protesting the firm boycotting it. Getting in the activists\u27 spotlight puts public pressure on firms to change their practices, especially inasmuch as movement tactics draw unwanted negative attention from the media that could influence the public\u27s perceptions about a firm\u27s level of social responsibility (King 2008, 2011; Bartley and Child 2011)

Keeping Up Appearances: Reputational Threat and Impression Management after Social Movement Boycotts

In this paper, we show that corporate targets\u27 responses to social movements are a function of impression management to counteract perceived image threats created by movement tactics. An image threat occurs when an organization‟s audiences or reference publics are given reason to doubt its reliability or claimed conformity to socially acceptable behaviors, norms and values. We examine organizational responses to image threats created by social movement boycotts. Consumer boycotts, while ostensibly trying to cause a decline in a firm\u27s sales revenue and force them to change a policy or practice, have a pronounced negative impact on their targets\u27 public images. Boycotts may elicit increased efforts by the firm to engage in positive impression management and to reinforce positive audience perceptions. We argue that firms frequently use corporate social actions as part of their image repertoire when dealing with the threat of boycotts. Corporate social actions are especially likely to be used by firms that have built their reputation around being a virtuous” company. We draw on social movement theory and organizational theory to predict the conditions in which firms will respond to boycotts with increased levels of social action. We use a dataset of boycotts that were reported in major national newspapers from 1990 to 2005 to test our hypotheses

MORAL CHARACTER, MOTIVE, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BLAME

Blameworthiness, in the criminal law context, is conceived as the carefully calculated end product of discrete judgments about a transgressor\u27s intentionality, causal proximity to harm, and the harm\u27s foreseeability. Research in social psychology, on the other hand, suggests that blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to express and defend social values and expectations. The motivational processes that underlie psychological blame suggest that judgments of legal blame are influenced by factors the law does not always explicitly recognize or encourage. In this Article we focus on two highly related motivational processes – the desire to blame bad people and the desire to blame people whose motive for acting was bad. We report three original experiments that suggest that an actor\u27s bad motive and bad moral character can increase not only perceived blame and responsibility, but also perceived causal influence and intentionality. We show that people are motivated to think of an action as blameworthy, causal, and intentional when they are confronted with a person who they think has a bad character, even when the character information is totally unrelated to the action under scrutiny. We discuss implications for doctrines of mens rea definitions, felony murder, inchoate crimes, rules of evidence, and proximate cause

Does Gender Raise the Ethical Bar? Exploring the Punishment of Ethical Violations at Work

We investigate whether women are targets of more severe punishment than men following ethical violations at work. Using a large sample of working adults, Study 1 finds that ethical behavior is more strongly prescribed for women than for men. Women face intensified ethical prescriptions, relative to a gender-neutral person. Study 2 experimentally tests whether women are punished more severely than men. Study 2 also tests the scope of our theory by asking whether women are punished more for errors in general, or only for ethical violations. Study 3 examines our effect in the field by examining how severely attorneys are punished for violating the American Bar Association’s ethical rules. Female attorneys are punished more severely than male attorneys, after accounting for a variety of factors. Study 3 also provides evidence that the gender make-up of the decision-making group that allots punishment serves to moderate the extent of discriminatory punishments. When a larger percentage of women sat on the judges’ panels overseeing attorney disciplinary hearings, disparities in allotted punishment between men and women were smaller. Our research documents a new prescriptive stereotype faced by women and helps to explain gender disparities in organizations. It highlights punishment severity as a novel mechanism by which institutions derail women’s careers more than men’s

The Structural Elaboration of Board Independence: Executive Power, Institutional Logics, and the Adoption of CEO-Only Board Structures in U.S. Corporate Governance

This study builds on structural elaboration theory by developing a model to explain the adoption of board structures that appear to conform to the prevailing institutional logic, but which in fact contradict it. We test our theory with the case of CEO-only board structures, a formal increase in board independence that prior research has shown to lead to greater CEO entrenchment rather than increased shareholder value. Using an event history analysis of the Fortune 250 over a 27-year period, we examine three mechanisms that drive its adoption: executive interests, executive power, and elaboration opportunities. We show that the CEO-only structure is more likely to occur in firms in which a higher proportion of insiders predate the CEO, and in which the CEO has greater formal power and agenda control. We also find that powerful CEOs are more likely to realize the structural change following institutional opportunities, such as the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), and organizational contingencies, such as positive changes in firm performance. By exploring the mechanisms leading to the proliferation of the CEO-only structure, our study contributes to sociopolitical perspectives on corporate governance, as well as to theories of institutional logics and structural elaboration

Corporate Political Power: The Politics of Reputation & Traceability

We live, it is said, in a second Gilded Age, in which politics is dominated by corporate power and elite business interests. But how does corporate money flow into politics? This Article provides an original empirical analysis of when and why corporations engage in particular forms of political activity and uses those findings to develop a novel, empirically-grounded approach to the First Amendment’s treatment of traceability mandates in politics. We analyze the conditions under which firms shift between (1) using their political action committees (PACs) to contribute to candidates and political parties, and (2) engaging in less traceable forms of political activity, like lobbying, in which the specific targets of firms’ influence efforts are unknown. This Article identifies a key variable that explains when and why corporations shift from lighter (more traceable and direct) to darker (less traceable and more indirect) channels of political engagement. We demonstrate that corporate political activity grows darker as a firm’s reputation grows more negative. This dynamic produces the disquieting result that the corporate political interventions that are likely to be the most controversial are also those most likely to be deployed in ways the public is least able to monitor. Our findings indicate that the traceability of money creates a concrete limit on the ability of corporate actors to influence politics—a limit which plausibly applies to political giving more broadly. Corporate donors who are seen as political liabilities find it increasingly difficult to locate politicians who will openly take their money or accept other support. Politicians refuse or return traceable donations from disreputable donors. Our research thus demonstrates that the power of business in politics is more conditional than generally appreciated. This Article uses these empirical findings to interrogate the relationship between traceability mandates in politics and theories of the First Amendment. While the Supreme Court has prominently struck down restrictions on money in politics in cases like Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, it has repeatedly upheld a variety of disclosure requirements. For a range of reasons, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, however, disclosure mandates are likely to become an increasingly important site of conflict in both policy and litigation, making it ever more important to assess and theorize the justifications for them. Our research suggests an empirically-grounded justification: traceability alters politicians’ behavior, causing them to act more consistently with public opinion. In other words, traceability mandates make politicians more accountable to the people. At the same time, there is evidence that traceability policies, and the reduction of darker corporate money in politics they produce, promote the public’s belief that their views shape the political system. Traceability mandates, in sort, advance both objective and subjective forms of democratic accountability. We thus argue that policies that advance the traceability of corporate money in politics not only further core First Amendment values but may be required by them. By identifying how and why corporate money flows into politics at a fine level of detail, this Article also provides important information that policy makers can use to craft campaign finance and lobbying reforms. Our empirical findings and theoretical analysis support policy changes that increase the traceability of corporate money in politics, including broader and more robust disclosure requirements for corporate lobbying and individual donations made by corporate executives and directors

Having Been There Doesn\u27t Mean I Care: When Prior Experience Reduces Compassion for Emotional Distress

The current research found that participants who had previously endured an emotionally distressing event (e.g., bullying) more harshly evaluated another person’s failure to endure a similar distressing event compared with participants with no experience enduring the event or those currently enduring the event. These effects emerged for naturally occurring (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and experimentally induced (Study 2) distressing events. This effect was driven by the tendency for those who previously endured the distressing event to view the event as less difficult to overcome (Study 3). Moreover, we demonstrate that the effect is specific to evaluations of perceived failure: Compared with those with no experience, people who previously endured a distressing event made less favorable evaluations of an individual failing to endure the event, but made more favorable evaluations of an individual managing to endure the event (Study 4). Finally, we found that people failed to anticipate this effect of enduring distress, instead believing that individuals who have previously endured emotionally distressing events would most favorably evaluate others’ failures to endure (Study 5). Taken together, these findings present a paradox such that, in the face of struggle or defeat, the people we seek for advice or comfort may be the least likely to provide it