234 research outputs found
Wittgenstein and the Methodology of Semantics
R.C. Pradhan claims in Language, Reality, and Transcendence that, in Ludwig Wittgensteinâs Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations, â[i]n no case is Wittgenstein interested in the empirical facts regarding language, as for him philosophy does not undertake any scientific study of languageâ (Pradhan 2009, xiv). I consider Ludwig Wittgensteinâs purportedly anti-scientific and anti-empirical approach to language in light of advances by philosophers and linguists in the latter half of the 20th century. I distinguish between various ways of understanding Wittgensteinâs stance against scientism. Due to the success of more recent work on language, I argue that Wittgensteinâs critique, as interpreted by Pradhan in Language, Reality, and Transcendence, does not undermine the formal study of language. Nevertheless, I argue, the contention of Wittgenstein and Pradhan that language, through grammar (in Wittgensteinâs sense), serves a variety of functions still sheds light on the differences in meaning across different discourses. I argue that a synthesis of Wittgensteinâs pluralist theory of meaning with elements of a theoretical study of language offers the best comprehensive account of natural language. I will argue that this conception of language is consistent with elements of Pradhanâs interpretation. As Pradhan notes, âThe aim here is not to project one kind of grammatical determination but keep options open for many such grammatical determinations such that the grammatical nuances are not papered over in the name of the unity of grammarâ (Pradhan 2009, 28)
Minimalism and Expressivism
There has been a great deal of discussion in the recent philosophical literature of the relationship between the minimalist theory of truth and the expressivist metaethical theory. One group of philosophers contends that minimalism and expressivism are compatible, the other group contends that such theories are incompatible. Following Simon Blackburn (manuscript), I will call the former position âcompatibilismâ and the latter position âincompatiblism.â Even those compatibilist philosophers who hold that there is no conflict or tension between these two theoriesâminimalism and expressivismâtypically think that some revision of minimalism is required to accommodate expressivism. The claim that there is such an incompatibility, I will argue, is based on a misunderstanding of the historical roots of expressivism, the motivations behind the expressivist theory, and the essential commitments of expressivism. I will present an account of the expressivist theory that is clearly consistent with minimalism
Does Moral Discourse Require Robust Truth?
It has been argued by several philosophers that a deflationary conception of truth,
unlike more robust conceptions of truth, cannot properly account for the nature of moral discourse. This is due to what I will call the âquick route problemâ: There is a quick route from any deflationary theory of truth and certain obvious features of moral practice to the attribution of truth to moral utterances. The standard responses to the quick route problem are either to urge accepting a conception of truth more robust than deflationism (Boghossian 1990), or to revise deflationary accounts in order to block straightforward attribution of truth to moral utterances (Field 1994). I contend that neither of these standard responses is well-motivated, for it is a merit of deflationary accounts rather than a defect that such accounts present a quick route to moral truth
Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism
Subjectivism about reasons is the view that a person has a reason to
perform act A if she has some motivation to do A, or would have motivation to do A in certain circumstances. In On What Matters, Derek Parfit presents a series of arguments against subjectivism about reasons. In Parfitâs view, if subjectivism were true, nothing would actually matter. Parfit contends that there are only two positions regarding reasons: objectivism and subjectivism. I will argue for an inclusive position on reasons that is neither subjectivist nor objectivist. On this view of reasons, there are some reasons that are grounded in the motivations of individuals, and there are also reasons that are not grounded in such motivations. On the view I put forward, I contend, against Parfit, that even if there were no objective reasons, it would still be the case that some things matter
Review of Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will: New York: The New Press, 2013
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