Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats

Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.Public employment; bureaucrats

Inequality and crime: separating the effects of permanent and transitory income

Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is changes in permanent rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly insignificant effects on crime.Crime; permanent income; transitory income

Is there a "Race-to-the-Bottom" in the Setting of Welfare Benefit Levels? Evidence from a Policy Intervention

In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a policy intervention; more specifically, we use a centrally geared exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant; if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 59 SEK. This result is robust to several alternative model specifications.Welfare benefit level; Strategic interactions; Race-to-the-bottom; Policy intervention

Sluggishness, Endogeneity and the Demand for Local Public Services

Earlier studies estimating the demand for local public services by means of the median voter model have typically assumed exogenous regressors and static set-ups. Furthermore, the commonly used log-linear specification of the demand function has in most cases not been supported by a well-defined maximisation problem. In this paper, we investigate whether it is important to control for endogeneity and dynamics in empirical work. Using a panel of 266 Swedish municipalities over the period 1981-1987, our test results show that the regressors are endogenous and that the adjustment process is potentially sluggish. We get significantly lower price- and income elasticities when we control for endogeneity and dynamics. In addition, when we control for endogeneity and dynamics, we can no longer reject the hypothesis that observed behaviour can be rationalised by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. This implies that the log-linear specification of the demand function is valid as long as appropriate econometric techniques are used.Local public goods; Median voter; Panel data; Endogeneity; Sluggishness

Direct displacement effects of labour market programmes: the case of Sweden

Using a panel of 260 Swedish municipalities over the period 1987-1996, this paper investigates the direct displacement effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs). Compared to earlier studies on this topic, we have more and better data. From our GMM estimations, we find that (i) there are direct displacement effects from those ALMPs that generate subsidised labour (in the order of approximately 65 percent), but there seems to be no (significant) displacement effects from training, (ii) most ALMPs seem to increase labour force participation, and (iii) the adjustment to the optimal level of employment seems to be sluggish. A consequence of (ii) is that the earlier studies have overstated the displacement effects (since they nomalised with the labour force).Labour market programmes; Displacement effects; GMM estimation

Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects

Do governments increase public employment in election years? This paper answers this question by using data from Sweden and Finland, two countries that are similar in many respects but in which local elections are held at different points in time. These facts make it possible for us to separate an election effect from other time effects. Our results indicate that there is a statistically significant election year effect in local public employment, a production factor that is highly visible in the welfare services provided by the local governments in the Scandinavian countries. The effect also seems to be economically significant; the municipalities employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 capita in election years than in other years (which correspond to an increase by approximately 1 percent).election cycle, public employment, exogenous elections

Is There a "Race-to-the-Bottom" in the Setting of Welfare Benefit Levels? Evidence from a Policy Intervention

In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a policy intervention; more specifically, we use a centrally geared exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant; if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level with 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 65 SEK. This result seems to be robust to several alternative model specificationsWelfare benefit level, Strategic interactions, Race-to-the-bottom, Policy intervention

Migration and Local Public Services

Using unique Swedish micro data we examine the impact of local public services on community choice. The choice of community is modeled as a choice between a discrete set of alternatives. The US literature has produced conflicting evidence with respect to the importance of local public services. We find a robust positive (negative) relationship between local public services (local income tax rates) and the residential choices of short-distance migrants (defined as those moving within a local labor market). However, local public characteristics are less important for migrants who entered from other local labor markets. Using information on subsequent mobility, we also investigate whether the last result is due to lack of information about the characteristics of the local public sector. The evidence suggests that this is not the case.Migration; Local public services; Tiebout; Discrete choice; repeat migration

Direct Displacement Effects of Labour Market Programmes: The Case of Sweden

Using a panel of 260 Swedish municipalities over the period 1987-1996, this paper investigates the direct displacement effects of active labour market programmes (ALMPs). Compared to earlier studies on this topic, we have more and better data. From our GMM estimations, we find that (i) there are direct displacement effects from those ALMPs that generate subsidised labour (in the order of approximately 65 percent), but there seems to be no (significant) displacement effects from training, (ii) most ALMPs seem to increase labour force participation, and (iii) the adjustment to the optimal level of employment seems to be sluggish. A consequence of (ii) is that the earlier studies have overstated the displacement effects (since they normalised with the labour force).Labour market programmes; Displacement effects; GMM estimation

An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints

In this paper, we develop an empirical framework for detecting the existence and estimating the magnitude of the softness of a budget constraint. The defining feature of a soft budget constraint is a subordinate organization’s expectations of being bailed out by a superior organization in case of financial trouble. This implies that one has to link the organization’s expectations for being bailed out to its fiscal behavior in order to quantify the extent of the soft budget constraint. We postulate that expectations for bailouts are formed rationally and make use of an instrumental variable method to get consistent estimates of the parameters of interest. We argue that past own experience of being bailed out and bailouts of other subordinate organizations can be used to construct credible instruments for the formation of bailout expectations. We apply our empirical approach to a unique panel data set of 286 Swedish local governments where the central government provided a total of 1,697 bailouts between 1974 and 1992. Our results strongly suggest the existence of a soft budget constraint; a local government increases its level of debt by 6-10 percent if it expects to be bailed out with probability one as compared to when the likelihood is zero due to previous experience of being bailed out, while the effect on debt from bailouts of its geographical neighbors is roughly four times as large.Soft budget constraint; Bailout; Fiscal distress; Intergovernmental relations