The Value of Countermarketing Information to Smokers: Evidence from Field Auctions

Information about cigarettes can help smokers come to an informed decision about what cigarettes to purchase. Countermarketing information, which helps counter potentially biased marketing information, can fill this void, but little is known about the value of this information to smokers. In this paper, we use data from experimental auctions to estimate the value of countermarketing information to smokers. We find that countermarketing information has significant value to smokers who have been exposed to marketing information from tobacco companies, but we find no evidence it provides value to smokers not exposed to marketing informationfield auctions, value of information, cigarettes, Consumer/Household Economics, Health Economics and Policy,

Choosing a Cigarette Brand: Determining the Value of Countermarketing Information to Smokers Using Field Auctions

Information about cigarettes can help smokers come to an informed decision about what cigarettes to purchase. Countermarketing information can help smokers make informed decisions, but little is known about the value of this information to smokers. In this article, we use data from experimental auctions to estimate the value of countermarketing information that counters industry claims about reduced-risk cigarettes. We find that this information has significant value to smokers who have been exposed to marketing information from tobacco companies touting reduced-risk cigarettes, but we find no evidence it provides value to smokers not exposed to this marketing information.experimental auctions, field experiments, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, C93, M31,

Valuing Conflicting Public Information About a New Technology: The Case of Irradiated Foods

Scientists and advocates can disagree on the value of new products or technologies, such as growth hormones, genetically modified organisms, and food irradiation. Both sides of the debate disseminate information to the public hoping to influence public opinion. This study assesses the economic value of both pro and anti public information using food irradiation as a case study. The value of information sources is estimated in isolation and in combination. In isolation, the results indicate each set of information has value. In combination, only the anti-irradiation information is found to have net positive value (persuading some consumers to purchase non-irradiated products). Pro-irradiation information worked to decrease the value of anti-irradiation information by 68% per person.experimental auctions, irradiation, value of information, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Estimating the Value Consumers Derive from Product Labeling

Firms spend billions of dollars annually on new product and label designs in order to attract and retain customers. The issue of labeling is also important to government agencies and nonprofit labeling organizations. For example, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has an organizational body in its Office of Nutritional Products that deals with issues of food and dietary supplement labeling. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service also deals with labeling through its Labeling and Consumer Protection Staff. These government agencies spend millions of dollars trying to ensure that food labels adequately inform consumers. One issue that has not been examined is the welfare difference to consumers from alternative labeling schemes/regulations. It seems likely that different labels would differ in effectiveness at informing consumers.

Consumer Preferences for Fair Trade Foods: Implications for Trade Policy

Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, International Relations/Trade, Q18, Q51 Effects,

Do Practice Rounds Bias Experimental Auction Results?

Consumer/Household Economics,

Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.Experimental Auctions, Posted Prices, Affiliation

The Effect of Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions

We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value estimates elicited from experimental auctions. Comparing bids for one unit of a good, two units of a good, and a second unit of a good when endowed with the first unit, we find that willingness to pay for the second unit of a good is, on average, as much as 75% higher when endowed with the first unit. We go on to advance two theories that could potentially reconcile our results with neoclassical consumer theory.Endowment Effect, Experimental Auctions, Reciprocity, Top-Dog Effect

Information on genetically modified foods and how it affects consumers: evidence from experimental auctions

Genetically modified (GM) foods have been at the center of a contentious debate. One side of the debate includes environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, who are opposed to GM foods---these groups would like GM foods banned, or at the very least they want GM foods to be clearly labeled as such. On the other side of the debate are agribusiness companies like Monsanto and Syngenta, who view GM foods positively. They think GM foods help the environment and could help feed the malnourished. Both groups actively disseminate information on genetically modified foods.;This dissertation reports on several results from experimental auctions where consumers actually had to purchase food products if they won the auctions. Consumers were able to accurately read the signals for which food was GM in experimental markets that emulated mandatory and voluntary GM-labeling regimes. This shows evidence that the U.S. has been prudent in not implementing a mandatory labeling policy for GM foods. Consumers place a large value on keeping non-GM foods free from any GM-material (not allowing a small tolerance for GM-material). Consumers did not place extra value, however, on a 1% tolerant food relative to a 5% tolerant food. This provides evidence that if the United States chooses a tolerance policy for GM-material, a 5% GM-tolerance may be better than a 1% tolerance.;Currently the information available to consumers on GM foods is from interested parties. Chapter 4 shows that a third party source that provides verifiable information on GM foods could have a large annual value to U.S. consumers. This value is due to helping consumers make more informed choices. Verifiable information can also have value by preventing the non-adoption of socially useful inventions.;This dissertation also shows that a majority of consumers would either trust the government, or an independent third party source for information on GM foods---so if a body is created to disseminate this information, a quasi-governmental organization may be the most trusted. This dissertation provides a look at many aspects of how information on genetically modified foods affects consumer behavior

AJAE Appendix: Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 88, Number 4, November 2006.Demand and Price Analysis,