When placed strategically, campaign field offices can be very important in turning battleground states during presidential elections

The rise of social media, online campaigning and big data techniques has put a new spin on the traditional ‘ground game’ in political campaigns. Using data from the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, Joshua Darr and Matthew Levendusky investigate why campaign field offices are located where they are, and whether or not they can make a difference in elections. They find that, through strategic placement, Obama’s field offices accounted for as much as 50 percent of his margin of victory in some states. They argue that in an era of billion dollar campaigns, field offices offer a cost effective way to mobilize voters and leave a legacy of local volunteers

How America's politics influence how we do business and who we want to work for

In the wake of the 2016 presidential election, America's partisan divide has become even more apparent, with more and more people feeling that they actively dislike members of the opposite party. In new research, Christopher McConnell, Yotam Margalit, Neil Malhotra and Matthew Levendusky find that this negativity also extends to work and other business relationships. Not only are people willing to accept less pay from an employer who shares their party affiliation, they are also more likely to buy from sellers who are similar

Replication data for: Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization

Data to replicate the analyses in the aforementioned article

Replication data for: Partisan Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward the Oppposition

This is data to replicate the analyses in the aforementioned paper

Replication data for: Rethinking the Role of Political Information

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Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?

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Replication data for: Replication Materials for: The Microfoundations of Polarization

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How partisan media polarize Amerika

Bagaimana Partisan Media Polarize Amerika, Matthew Levendusky menegaskan-tetapi juga memenuhi syarat-baik klaim ini. Menggambar pada eksperimen dan data survei, ia menunjukkan bahwa orang Amerika yang menonton program partisan yang menjadi lebih tertentu dari keyakinan mereka dan kurang bersedia untuk mempertimbangkan manfaat dari pandangan yang bertentangan atau berkompromi. Dan sementara hanya segmen kecil dari populasi Amerika watches program media partisan, mereka yang cenderung lebih politis terlibat, dan pengaruhnya terhadap politik nasional karena itu jauh

Replication data for: Why Do Partisan Media Polarize Viewers?

The recent increase in partisan media has generated interest in whether such outlets polarize viewers. I draw on theories of motivated reasoning to explain why partisan media polarize viewers, why these programs affect some viewers much more strongly than others, and how long these effects endure. Using a series of original experiments, I find strong support for my theoretical expectations, including the argument that these effects can still be detected several days post-exposure. My results demonstrate that partisan media polarize the electorate by taking relatively extreme citizens and making them even more extreme. Though only a narrow segment of the public watches partisan media programs, partisan media’s effects extend much more broadly throughout the political arena

Replication Data for: Americans, Not Partisans: Can Priming American National Identity Reduce Affective Polarization?

In recent years, Americans have become more affectively polarized: that is, ordinary Democrats and Republicans increasingly dislike and distrust members of the opposing party. Such polarization is normatively troubling, as it exacerbates gridlock and dissensus in Washington. Given these negative consequences, I investigate whether it is possible to ameliorate this partisan discord. Building on the Common Ingroup Identity Model from social psychology, I show that by heightening subjects’ sense of American national identity, they come to see members of the opposing party as fellow Americans, rather than rival partisans. As a result, they like the opposing party more, thereby reducing affective polarization. Using several original experiments, as well as a natural experiment surrounding the July 4th holiday and the 2008 Summer Olympics, I find strong support for my argument. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for efforts to reduce polarization more generally