In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

Luis C. Corchon

Matteo Triosi

Research Papers in Economics

English

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation”

A Simple Proof of Maskin’s theorem on Nash Implementation”.

Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Private Information”.

Equilibrium in the Jungle”.

Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets.”

Implementation with Renegotiation”.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games”

Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation”

Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces”

Non Cooperative Implementation of the Core”.

Strategy-Proof Allocations at Diﬀerentiable Points”.

Voluntary implementation”.

IMPLEMENTATION WITH STATE DEPENDENT FEASIBLE SETS AND PREFERENCES: A RENEGOTIATION APPROACH