701 research outputs found
Private provision of public goods in the local interaction model
This paper analyses the evolutionary version of the Public Good game (Eshel,
Samuelson, and Shaked (1998)) when agents can use imitation and best reply
decision rules. I provide a condition, which completely describes agent behavior in
the long run, for any number of neighbors and any total number of agents.
Moreover, it is shown that it is enough to have just one decision rule per agent in
order to obtain the same long run outcomes. The paper gives an explanation why we
might observe irrational cooperation in the rational World
Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets
This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage
Altruistic Versus Rational Behavior in a Public Good Game
This paper analyses an evolutionary version of the Public Good game of Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998) in which agents can choose between imitation and best-reply decision rules. We describe conditions under which altruistic and spiteful (maximizing) behavior arise: these conditions are established for any number of neighbors and any total number of agents in the population. Given mistake-free play, (short-run) outcomes are identical whether agents are constrained to employ an imitation rule only; or they can choose between imitation and best-reply rules. Given the possibility of mistakes, (long-run) outcomes vary across these two scenarios. The paper suggests how to provide public goods and gives an explanation of why we observe seemingly irrational cooperation - altruistic behavior - in the rational world.
Sad-Loser Lottery
We consider lotteries with reimbursements. It turns out that without loss of generality it is enough analyze lotteries where the winner gets her expenses reimbursed. We find that such a lottery (Sad-Loser) has multiple pure-strategy equilibria. We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) a sufficient condition for the net total spending to be higher in the Sad-Loser lottery than in the standard lottery, (2) that the Exclusion Principle holds.
Location, Information and Coordination
In this paper, we consider K finite populations of boundedly rational agents whose preferences and information differ. Each period agents are randomly paired to play some coordination games. We show that several ``special`` (fixed) agents lead the coordination. In a mistake-free environment, all connected fixed agents have to coordinate on the same strategy. In the long run, as the probability of mistakes goes to zero, all agents coordinate on the same strategy. The long-run outcome is unique, if all fixed agents belong to the same population.
Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players
We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0Contests, Stochastic number of players, Over-dissipation.
Players with Fixed Resources in Elimination Tournaments
We consider two-round elimination tournaments where players have fixed resources instead of cost functions. Two approaches are suggested. If the players have the same resources and a success function is stochastic, then players always spend more resources in the first than in the second round in a symmetric equilibrium. Equal resource allocation between two rounds takes place only in the winner-take-all case. However, if the players have independent private resources and the success function is deterministic, then every player spends at least one third of his resources in the first round. The players spend exactly one third of their resources in the winner-take-all case. Applications for career paths, elections, and sports are discussedTournaments, auctions
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